People v. Martinez, G042402 (Cal. App. 2/23/2010)

• Decision Date: 23 February 2010
• Docket Number: G042402.
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTOS MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTOS MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

G042402.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three.

February 23, 2010.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, No. SWF015231, Judith C. Clark, Judge. Affirmed.

Jerry D. Whatley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Garrett Beaumont and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Not to be Published in Official Reports

OPINION

BEDSWORTH, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder and other crimes stemming from his participation in an attack against a group of people he had recently encountered at a bar. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding the attack was premeditated, and the trial court committed a host of instructional errors. In addition, he argues the court unduly restricted his right of cross-examination and erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. The Attorney General also raises an issue pertaining to the legality of appellant's prison sentence. We find the parties' claims unmeritorious and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

FACTS

One night around 10 o'clock, appellant drove to the Lake Inn tavern in Nuevo. He entered the bar with two younger men, and while they were inside they drank and socialized. Victor Ontiveros and four of his friends — Angel Valencia, Manuel Cadena and Samuel and Antonio Barajas — were also at the bar. Although there was some tension between Victor's group and appellant's group, nothing came of it inside the bar.

However, as the two groups were leaving the bar, Angel urinated near appellant's car, sparking a confrontation. The two groups exchanged heated words, and after several minutes of arguing, the two young men with appellant drew knives. Appellant tried to calm everyone down and convinced the two young men to get into his car. He then drove away with them.

Victor's group waited about 10 minutes before leaving in Victor's car. About a mile from the bar, they noticed appellant's car following them. With his headlights turned off, appellant bumped his car into the rear of Victor's vehicle. Then he struck the rear driver's side of the vehicle. The impact of the second collision caused both cars to lose control and go off the road.

When the cars stopped, Victor exited his car, as did Antonio and Manuel. Appellant and the two younger men approached them. Appellant began fighting with Manuel, and one of the younger men chased down Victor and stabbed him twice in the back. The two younger men then ordered Angel and Samuel out of their car. One of the men stabbed Angel in the abdomen, perforating his bowel, and the other repeatedly stabbed Samuel in the chest and back. Just before blacking out, Samuel heard the knifemen describe him and Angel as being as good as dead.

At this point in the attack, Manuel and appellant were still fighting. But when Manuel heard Angel screaming, he ran to his aid. Appellant and Antonio then began to grapple. As appellant held him, one of the younger men stabbed Antonio in the arm. Antonio then pulled away from appellant and ran over to where Angel and Manuel were hiding near the cars.

Appellant tried to escape in the vehicles, but they were both disabled, so he fled on foot. His two companions also ran away, and they were never identified. Later that night, appellant called his wife for a ride home and asked her to report that his car had been stolen. When they got home, appellant showered, changed clothes and told his wife about the fight. He had a large bump on his head and numerous abrasions on his arms and legs. At his wife's urging, he returned to the scene and surrendered to the police. Two days later, Angel died from his wounds.

In both his statements to the police and at trial, appellant denied any wrongdoing. He claimed he arrived at the bar alone and did not know the two men who ended up in his car. He also asserted Victor caused the cars to crash. He said he blacked out after the accident and doesn't remember much about the subsequent altercation, except that he may have been knocked unconscious at some point during the fight.

Relying on conspiracy and aiding and abetting principles, the prosecution charged appellant with murdering Angel (second degree), attempting to murder Victor and Samuel with premeditation, and assaulting Antonio with a deadly weapon. Appellant was also charged with five counts of assault with a deadly weapon, based on his own actions in driving his car into Victor's vehicle. The jury convicted appellant on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison.

I

Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding the attempted murders were carried out with premeditation. We disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.) We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) "Unless it is clearly shown that `on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict' the conviction will not be reversed. [Citation.]" (People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162.)

In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, the California Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence that may support a finding of premeditation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. These categories are descriptive, not normative or exhaustive, and are intended "to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]" (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125; see also People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We must remember "premeditation can occur in a brief period of time. `The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .' [Citations.]" (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1127.)

Here, all three categories of evidence identified in Anderson as being indicative of premeditation were present. As to whether the attack on the victims was planned, the record indicates appellant followed Victor's car after the initial confrontation in the parking lot. Although Victor waited about 10 minutes after appellant left the lot before driving away himself, appellant tracked him down on the roadway about a mile from the bar. Appellant then proceeded to ram his car into Victor's vehicle. When the initial bumper-to-bumper contact did not succeed in slowing Victor's car, appellant resorted to a more forceful tactic by slamming into the side of his car. Then, once Victor's car was disabled, appellant and his companions wasted little time confronting and inflicting serious harm on the victims. Considering the lengths appellant and his companions went through just to get at the victims, it appears their actions were the result of preexisting reflection as opposed to unconsidered impulse.

As for motive, it is undisputed appellant's group argued with Victor's group for several minutes after appellant discovered Angel urinating by his car. During this time, the friction between the groups became so intense that appellant's companions pulled out knives. Appellant was able to dissuade them from doing anything rash at that point, but, as explained above, the incident so annoyed appellant's group that they followed Victor's group from the bar and even risked harm to themselves by forcing Victor's car off of the road. Suffice it to say, there was sufficient evidence of enmity between the two groups for the jury to infer a motive for the charged offenses.

The manner in which appellant's group perpetrated the attack was also indicative of premeditation. Victor was stabbed twice in the back and Samuel was stabbed twice in the chest and eight times in the back. Although appellant describes the attack as "clumsy and ineffectual," that's not how the assailants saw things. When the attack was over, they described the victims as being as good as dead, which reflects a certain degree of satisfaction about the carnage they had inflicted. Considering all the circumstances, there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find the stabbings were carried out with premeditation.

II

Appellant contends the court's instructions on aiding and abetting were faulty because they permitted the jury to consider the assault he committed with his car as the target offense for the prosecution's natural and probable consequences theory.

Appellant's contention is based on the premise that a defendant can only be liable under the natural probable consequences doctrine if he aids and abets another person in committing the target offense. Since appellant personally committed the car assault, he contends the doctrine cannot be applied to that particular offense. Appellant is incorrect. In instructing on aiding and abetting, the court told the jury it could find appellant guilty of murder and attempted murder if those crimes were a natural and probable consequence of assault. Appellant concedes the instruction was proper to the extent it applied to the assaults he aided and abetted following...