People v. Martinez
Decision Date | 17 December 1985 |
Docket Number | No. F002865,F002865 |
Citation | 175 Cal.App.3d 881,221 Cal.Rptr. 258 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Tito MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., W. Scott Thorpe and David DeAlba, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant, Tito Martinez, and a codefendant, John Vela, were charged with robbery (Pen.Code, § 211). 1 It was further alleged defendant had suffered a prior felony conviction for robbery within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7. During trial and outside the presence of the jury, defendant admitted the alleged prior robbery conviction. After trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to state prison for the aggregate term of eight years. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
On March 28, 1983, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Theresa Flores and her cousin, Gina Dwyer, stopped at a Taco Bell restaurant on Niles Street at Mount Vernon in Bakersfield. Theresa and Gina were returning from a softball game and Theresa was still wearing her uniform. Theresa drove her 1978 Camaro into the Taco Bell lot and parked next to a Ford Thunderbird. The latter vehicle had backed into its parking space and had its headlights on. As Theresa pulled into the vacant parking space she noticed several people standing near the front of the Thunderbird.
After she parked her car, Theresa alighted and was suddenly approached by a man later identified as codefendant John Vela. Vela held a knife in his right hand, pointed it at Theresa's waist, and grabbed her purse with his left hand. Theresa screamed and released the purse. Vela then ran with the purse around the front of the Thunderbird, opened the passenger door and yelled, "Go, go." The Thunderbird sped away after Vela entered the car.
Meanwhile, Theresa ran toward the Thunderbird and read the license numbers off the rear license plate as the car passed by her. Theresa and her cousin immediately ran into the restaurant and asked the clerk to write down the license number and call the police.
At approximately 9:40 p.m., Kern County Sheriff's Deputy Robert Posey was dispatched to the Taco Bell. When Posey arrived a minute later, Theresa and her cousin gave him the license number and description of the car. Theresa and her cousin further advised Deputy Posey two young Mexican males were responsible. Posey immediately broadcast the information. Approximately three minutes after the broadcast Senior Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Eddy detained the same Ford Thunderbird at a Circle K market, approximately three and a half miles away from the Taco Bell. Officers transported Theresa and her cousin to the detention site. Both girls identified Vela as the culprit. Defendant was driving the vehicle when it was detained. Neither Theresa nor her cousin could identify him as the driver of the vehicle at the Taco Bell lot.
Officers found a paring knife on the floorboard of the Thunderbird and a folding knife in the locked glove compartment. However, they were unable to locate or recover the purse.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. On the evening of March 23, 1983, he was visiting his cousin, Julio Morales, in east Bakersfield. He left a few minutes past 9:30 p.m. to begin a long walk home. After defendant walked across Jefferson Park, a Ford Thunderbird pulled to the side of the road. John Vela, the brother of defendant's girlfriend, was driving the vehicle. Vela offered defendant a ride and defendant accepted. Vela then asked defendant to drive the car because Vela had been drinking. When defendant and Vela reached the Circle K market near Union and Columbus Avenues, defendant noticed a sheriff's car following them. Defendant assumed the deputy had seen Vela drinking a beer while the Thunderbird was in motion. The deputy stopped the Thunderbird just before it reached the market.
Defendant denied any knowledge of or participation in the robbery of Theresa Flores.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if he had been convicted
of a felony. Defendant testified he had previously been convicted of armed robbery. However, he also stated the incident was an unfortunate part of his history he truly regretted.
After the People rested their case-in-chief, the following exchange occurred:
In People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111, the Supreme Court addressed the impact of Proposition 8 2 on impeachment with felony priors. The court stated:
(Id., at p. 306, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111.)
Applying these rules, the court found the trial court erroneously permitted defendant, charged with receiving stolen property, to be impeached with a prior for simple heroin possession. The court held the latter offense does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Further, the Supreme Court held the trial court erroneously permitted defendant to be impeached with a prior for heroin possession for sale. While this offense necessarily involves moral turpitude, i.e., not dishonesty but the intent to corrupt others, the trial court erroneously concluded it had no discretion as to either prior. Finally, the court held under California Constitution, article VI, section 13 and People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 846, 78 S.Ct. 70, 2 L.Ed.2d 55, the errors were nonprejudicial.
The Supreme Court concluded the error in Castro was not prejudicial because the People's case was strong, defense witnesses provided exculpatory testimony, defendant herself volunteered she had been incarcerated at the California Rehabilitation Center and a women's prison before any attempt was made to impeach her with the priors, and the court instructed the jury to consider the priors only to determine the credibility of the witness. Upon a review of the entire record, the Supreme Court held it not reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the error.
In the instant case, the threshold question is satisfied. There can be no doubt robbery does involve moral turpitude, i.e., a readiness to do evil. All priors which necessarily involve dishonesty under the pre-Castro standards ipso facto involve moral turpitude under Castro. (People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 349, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700, Rev. den. Nov. 14, 1985.)
However, the trial court erred by failing to exercise its Evidence Code section 352 discretion on the record in ruling upon the admissibility of the prior. We then must review the entire record to determine whether or not it was reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the event he had testified without impeachment by his prior felony conviction. (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 319, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111.)
As noted above, Theresa Flores and her cousin, Gina Dwyer, stopped at the Taco Bell restaurant on Niles Street and Mount Vernon Avenue in Bakersfield on March 28, 1983, at approximately 9:40 p.m. Theresa drove her vehicle into the Taco Bell parking lot and parked next to a Ford Thunderbird. As Theresa entered the vacant parking space she noticed several people standing near the front of the...
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