People v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 10 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. S062266.,S062266.
• Citation: 22 Cal.4th 106,990 P.2d 563,91 Cal.Rptr.2d 687
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Larry Salvador MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

91 Cal.Rptr.2d 687

22 Cal.4th 106

990 P.2d 563

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Larry Salvador MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S062266.

Supreme Court of California.

January 10, 2000.

David H. Goodwin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Sanjay T. Kumar, Jaime L. Fuster, John R. Gorey and Victoria Bedrossian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, we consider whether uncertified computer printouts reporting criminal history information are admissible as evidence that a defendant alleged to be a habitual offender (Pen.Code, § 667.7)¹ served prison terms for prior felony convictions. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err in admitting the printouts under the official records exception to the hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1280). On the record of this case, we agree, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTS

On July 16, 1994, defendant choked and raped an eight-year-old girl after taking her for a bicycle ride. In connection with these events, defendant later pleaded guilty to the crimes of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), committing a forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subds. (a), (b)), and kidnapping someone under the age of 14 (§§ 207, 208, subd. (b)). He also admitted enhancement allegations for kidnapping to commit sexual assault and inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 667.8, subd. (b), 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022.8).

For sentencing purposes, the information also alleged defendant had sustained and served prison terms for the following California felony convictions: (1) in 1975, for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (case No. A438028); (2) in 1979, for false imprisonment with great bodily injury, rape by force and fear with great bodily injury, and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (case No. A447058); (3) in 1980, for assault with intent to commit rape (case No. A352194); and (4) in 1988, for assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon (case No. A789375). Defendant did not admit these allegations, but waived jury trial.

At the ensuing bench trial in April 1995, the court judicially noticed the relevant superior court case files, except the file in case No. A789375, which was not available. These files contained documents relating to both criminal history (e.g., presentence reports) and identity (defendant's signature on various documents). The prosecution also submitted under section 969b certified prison records, including copies of the abstracts of judgment in cases Nos. A352194, A447058, and A789375 (the case with the unavailable file). The certified records did not, however, contain either a photograph or a fingerprint card. Therefore, the prosecution needed to establish a link between defendant and the Larry or Lawrence Martinez who was the subject of the documentary evidence.

To establish this link, the prosecution offered live testimony and numerous exhibits, including uncertified computer printouts of criminal history information that John Helbling, a paralegal in the district attorney's office, generated on the day he testified at defendant's trial. Exhibit 7 was a printout from the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department computer system, known as the Personal History Index (PHI), which reported criminal history information for an individual identified as Larry Salvador Martinez. Exhibit 9 was a printout from the Department of Justice (Department)² computer system, known as the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which reported criminal history information relating to an individual alternatively identified as Larry Salvador Martinez, Larry Martinez, or Lawrence Salvador Martinez.

Defendant objected that these exhibits were inadmissible hearsay. The prosecution responded that the exhibits were admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1280). In support of its argument, the prosecution cited Helbling's testimony regarding the exhibits. Based on this testimony, the trial court admitted the exhibits under the official records exception to the hearsay rule.

After considering the evidence, the trial court found defendant had sustained prior convictions for the following felony offenses: (1) assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury; (2) rape with force likely to produce great bodily injury; (3) assault with intent to commit rape; and (4) assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.³ It also found that because defendant received concurrent sentences for the second and third convictions, he had served three separate prior prison terms within the meaning of the habitual offender statute. (§ 667.7.) It therefore sentenced him under that statute to a prison term of life without possibility of parole plus five years.

Defendant appealed, arguing in part that the trial court erred in admitting exhibits 7 and 9 under the official records exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling, following People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal. App.4th 1468, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 (Dunlap ) and declining to follow People v. Matthews (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 930, 280 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Matthews). We then granted review to address the admissibility of these exhibits.

DISCUSSION

I. Matthews and Dunlap

Matthews was the first published California decision to consider admission of computer printouts of criminal history information as evidence that a defendant suffered prior felony convictions and served prior prison terms. In Matthews, to prove that defendant Terrance Matthews was sentenced on May 22, 1984, for a robbery conviction, the prosecution offered a certified copy of a superior court record showing a robbery conviction for an individual named Carl Matthews. (Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 934,280 Cal.Rptr. 134.) To establish that Terrance Matthews and Carl Matthews were the same person, the prosecution offered: (1) a computer printout labeled "`San Francisco Police Department Criminal History Record' for `Terry Matthews,'" showing sentencing on May 22, 1984, for a robbery conviction; and (2) an unlabeled computer printout for "Terry Matthews," who used "Carl T. Matthews" as an alias. (Id. at p. 934, fn. 2, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134, and accompanying text.) After admitting these printouts over objections based on hearsay and lack of foundation, the trial court found Matthews had suffered the prior robbery conviction.

The First District Court of Appeal, Division One, reversed the trial court, finding that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. For two reasons, it rejected the argument that the records were admissible under either the business records or the official records exceptions to the hearsay rule. First, the court reasoned the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirements for either exception because "no testimony was adduced about how [the records] were prepared or the sources of information used for the entries made." (Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 940, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134.) Second, citing our decision in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 (Guerrero), the court asserted: "[I]n any event, without the necessary certification to admit the [documents] as prison records under section 969b, we cannot depart from the rule that, other than certified prison records, only the `record of conviction' is admissible to prove a prior conviction. [Citations.] Consequently, if the [documents] cannot be admitted as certified prison records under section 969b, and they are not part of the `record of conviction' within the meaning of Guerrero, they are not admissible as business records or under any other exception to the hearsay rule to prove [Matthews's] prior conviction." (Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940-941, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134.)

A few years after Matthews, the Fifth District Court of Appeal took up the issue in Dunlap, which involved enhancement allegations against defendant Randle Dunlap under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The prosecution offered abstracts of judgment for two prior convictions and a CLETS computer printout of criminal history information "to show [Dunlap's] aliases (in order to link [him], through various spellings of his name, to the abstracts of judgment from the prior convictions), and to demonstrate that [he] had served a separate prison term for each of the prior convictions and had not stayed free of prison custody for a five-year period [citation]." (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th at p. 1472, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.) The first page of the CLETS printout bore a stamp from the Kern County District Attorney's Office with the following statement: "`This is to certify that the above is a true and original document received from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, by the District Attorney's Discovery Unit.'" (Ibid.) "Directly under [this statement] were spaces for the date and a clerk's name; hand-written into these spaces was the date `8-18-92' and an illegible name or set of initials." (Ibid.) The trial court admitted the CLETS printout, overruling Dunlap's objections based on Matthews, hearsay, and lack of foundation. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. As a threshold issue, it rejected Matthews's assertion that "a prior conviction may be proved only through the `record of conviction' or certified prison records under section 969b." (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474,23 Cal. Rptr.2d 204, original italics.) The court first explained that this assertion in Matthews was dictum, because "the [Matthews ] court had already concluded that the [documents] were inadmissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay...