People v. Martinson, Docket No. 91960

• Decision Date: 19 August 1987
• Docket Number: Docket No. 91960
• Citation: 161 Mich.App. 55,409 N.W.2d 754
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Christopher Robert MARTINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 754

409 N.W.2d 754

161 Mich.App. 55

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Christopher Robert MARTINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 91960.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 8, 1987.

Decided June 16, 1987.

Released for Publication Aug. 19, 1987.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Steven L. Pence, Pros. Atty., and Thomas C. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by Fred E. Bell, Lansing, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before WEAVER, P.J., and HOLBROOK and GILLESPIE , JJ.

WEAVER, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with a dangerous weapon, M.C.L. Sec. 750.82; M.S.A. Sec. 28.277, and failure to stop at the scene of a personal injury accident, M.C.L. Sec. 257.617a; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2317(1), and was sentenced to one year of probation with six months to be spent in the county jail. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.

The facts leading to defendant's conviction arose from an argument and fistfight between defendant and Gary Joseph Harris, Jr., during which defendant sprayed Harris with a fire extinguisher. Harris then covered his eyes and went back to his own car and was leaning against the car when defendant drove up in his car and pinned Harris between the two cars. After Harris shouted and pounded on the hoods of both cars, defendant finally backed off and drove away. As a result of the incident, Harris was hospitalized for eight days. Defendant claimed that the incident was an accident. On appeal, he argues trial court error (1) in allowing two convictions and (2) in instructing the jury.

Defendant first argues that it is contrary to legislative intent and the rules of statutory construction to convict, on the same facts, first of committing an intentional assault and then of leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, since the word "accident" only applies to unintentional injury. We disagree.

We know of no cases deciding whether M.C.L. Sec. 257.617a; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2317(1) ¹ defines "accident" to include intentional or unintentional conduct. However, when holding an automobile insurer liable to pay damages incurred by its insured in an accident, this Court has found "accident" to include a defendant's intentional behavior so long as the injured person is not the aggressor. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Coon, 46 Mich.App. 503, 507-508, 208 N.W.2d 532 (1973). Where the term "accident" appears in criminal statutes which forbid leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted "accident" to include intentional conduct, reasoning that such statutes are not concerned with the cause of an accident but are intended to include all automobile collisions. State v. Smyth, 121 R.I. 188, 397 A.2d 497, 499 (1979); State v. Parker, 299 Or. 534, 542-543, 704 P.2d 1144, 1148-1149 (1985). See also People v. Laursen, 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 6-7, 222 Cal.Rptr. 122, 125-126 (1985); State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928). We agree with this interpretation. Therefore, we are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the verdicts were inconsistent or illegal and find that a new trial is unwarranted.

Defendant also argues that the trial court had stated that the charge of leaving the scene could be submitted to the jury as an alternative theory, and that error requiring reversal occurred when the trial court did not so instruct the jury. We find no merit in this argument.

At trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the basis that charges of felonious assault ² and leaving the scene of a personal injury accident were inconsistent. The trial court denied this motion, stating that the word "accident" did not relieve the charge from being submitted to the jury as an alternative theory; if the jury should find the incident not to be an assault, there was still evidence that it was an accident and that defendant had fled from...