State v. Harmon

• Decision Date: 28 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005AP2480-CR.,2005AP2480-CR.
• Citation: 2006 WI App 214,723 N.W.2d 732
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stephen D. HARMON, Defendant-Appellant.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

723 N.W.2d 732

2006 WI App 214

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stephen D. HARMON, Defendant-Appellant.^†

No. 2005AP2480-CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs June 12, 2006.

Opinion Filed September 28, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Tim Provis, Port Washington.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the briefs of David J. Becker, asst. attorney general, and Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general.

Before LUNDSTEN, P.J., DYKMAN and VERGERONT, JJ.

¶ 1 VERGERONT, J

Stephen D. Harmon appeals a judgment of conviction for violating Wisconsin's "hit-and-run" statute, WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1).¹ Harmon contends the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury on the meaning of the word "accident" by not limiting the definition to unintentional acts. We conclude the word "accident" in § 346.67(1) means "an unexpected, undesirable event" and may encompass intentional conduct. Harmon also contends that, if we construe "accident" in § 346.67(1) to include intentional conduct, then the reporting requirements infringe his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We conclude that, under California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971), § 346.67(1) does not contravene the Fifth Amendment, even if it applies to accidents involving intentional conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On May 16, 2004, Harmon was involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of William A. Busch. According to the trial testimony, on the night of the incident, Busch, a hotel security guard, suspected Harmon, another hotel employee, of stealing food from the hotel kitchen. When Harmon attempted to leave the hotel for the night, Busch confronted him in the hotel parking lot. Initially, Busch stood in front of the driver-side door of Harmon's car, preventing Harmon from entering. Harmon then went around to the passenger side, entered the car and started it. At this point, Busch opened the driver-side door, leaned in and began grabbing Harmon and pulling on the levers of the steering column. Harmon put the car in reverse and backed up about ten or fifteen feet until the car hit a curb. Busch fell out of the car and Harmon put the car in drive and drove away.

¶ 3 Police officers were called to the scene to investigate the theft and found Busch's body. A pathologist testified the principal cause of death was a crushing of the chest that tore the aorta. The pathologist further testified that Busch's injuries were consistent with having been run over by a car.

¶ 4 Harmon was charged with violating WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1) (the "hit-and-run" statute),² and WIS. STAT. § 940.06, second-degree reckless homicide.

¶ 5 The case was tried to a jury. The jury was instructed on second-degree reckless homicide as well as the lesser-included offense of homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, WIS. STAT. § 940.10.³ On the hit-and-run count, the jury was instructed that one element was that "[t]he defendant knew that the vehicle he was operating was involved in an accident involving a person." During deliberations, the foreman posed this question to the court: "The defendant knew that the vehicle he was operating was involved in an accident involving a person. Can you please thoroughly explain or define the term `accident'? I'm questioning whether or not what happened in this case can be legally defined as an `accident'?" (Emphasis in original.) The court responded to the jury's note with the following supplemental instruction:

Your question contains 2 parts. As to whether or not what happened in this case can be legally defined as an "accident" is for you to decide.

As to the definition of the word "accident," you should rely on your common sense and everyday understanding of the word.

A dictionary definition, not a legal definition, refers to an "accident" as an incident that causes injury, loss, suffering, or death occurring outside of the usual course of events.

¶ 6 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the hit-and-run offense and on the lesser-included offense of homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 On appeal, Harmon makes two arguments. First, Harmon contends that the circuit court erred in giving the supplemental instruction on the meaning of "accident" in WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1). The correct definition, according to Harmon, is "lack of intention," a narrower definition than that given by the court. If the jury had been given this narrower definition, Harmon asserts, it might well have decided that he acted with intention, there was thus no accident, and he therefore could not be convicted of violating § 346.67(1). Second, Harmon contends that, if "accident" in § 346.67(1) does include intentional conduct, then the reporting requirements constitute compelled testimony against himself and violates the Fifth Amendment.

I. Meaning of "Accident" in WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1)

¶ 8 The circuit court has broad discretion in instructing a jury. Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis.2d 834, 849, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992). We affirm the circuit court's choice of jury instructions if the instructions accurately state the law. Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶ 42, 281 Wis.2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 194. We review de novo jury instruction issues that involve definitions of statutory words. See State v. Neumann, 179 Wis.2d 687, 699, 508 N.W.2d 54 (Ct.App.1993).

¶ 9 Harmon argues the essence of the word "accident," as it is understood by the ordinary person, is an unintended event. Harmon bases his argument in large part on Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis.2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), a case in which the supreme court addressed the meaning of "accident" in the context of an insurance policy. The issue in Doyle was whether negligent supervision of employees constituted an "event" for insurance coverage purposes; "event" was defined in the policy as "an accident," but "accident" was not defined. Id. at 289, 580 N.W.2d 245. Because terms in insurance policies are given their common, everyday meaning, the Doyle court consulted a dictionary, and defined "accident" as "`[a]n unexpected, undesirable event' or `an unforeseen incident' which is characterized by a `lack of intention.'" Id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 11 (3d ed.1992)). The Doyle court concluded that, applying this meaning, the alleged negligent acts were an event. Id. at 290, 580 N.W.2d 245. Harmon argues that, under Doyle, the common meaning of "accident" includes only conduct characterized by a lack of intention. The State responds that "accident" in the context of the hit-and-run statute includes events caused by intentional conduct.

¶ 10 When construing a statute, we begin with the language of the statute and give it its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially defined words are given their technical or special definitions. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We interpret statutory language in the context in which it is used, not in isolation but as part of a whole, in relation to the language of surrounding or closely related statutes, and we interpret it reasonably to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., ¶ 46. We also consider the scope, context, and purpose of the statute insofar as they are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself. Id., ¶ 48. We do so in part because words often have multiple meanings and the applicable definition depends upon the context in which a word is used. See id., ¶¶ 48-49. If this process of analysis yields a plain meaning, there is no ambiguity and we apply that plain meaning. Id., ¶ 46.

¶ 11 Here, the parties agree that, because "accident" is not defined by statute, it must be given its ordinary meaning. Id., ¶ 45. The common meaning of a word may be ascertained by resort to a dictionary. See State v. Denis L.R., 2005 WI 110, ¶ 40, 283 Wis.2d 358, 699 N.W.2d 154. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.2000) provides several definitions for "accident":

1.a. An unexpected, undesirable event: car accidents on icy roads. b. An unforeseen incident: went to college in England by happy accident. c. An instance of involuntary urination or defecation in one's clothing. 2. Lack of intention; chance: ran into an old friend by accident. 3. Logic. A circumstance or an attribute that is not essential to the nature of something.

¶ 12 Because "accident" has multiple dictionary definitions, we look at the context in which the word is used to determine which is the applicable meaning. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. We agree with the State that, because Doyle addressed the meaning of "accident" in a different context — an insurance contract — it is not dispositive of the meaning in WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1).

¶ 13 Being "involved in an accident" under WIS. STAT. § 346.67(1) broadly describes an event involving a motor vehicle that results in property damage, bodily injury, or death. The meaning of "accident" in this context is aptly articulated by the definition in 1.a.: "an unexpected, undesirable event." For purposes of this discussion, the definition in 1.b. does not add anything to the definition in 1.a. Harmon's proposed meaning, "lack of intention," is a narrower definition than "an unexpected, undesirable event." In order to determine which meaning is applicable, we consider the purpose of the statute.⁴ See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶¶ 48-49, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶ 14 The "two clear purposes" of Wisconsin's hit-and-run statute are:

(1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.

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