People v. Masloski

• Decision Date: 05 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. S088091.,S088091.
• Citation: 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 484,25 Cal.4th 1212,25 P.3d 681
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Linda Jean MASLOSKI, Defendant and Appellant.

108 Cal.Rptr.2d 484

25 Cal.4th 1212

25 P.3d 681

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Linda Jean MASLOSKI, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S088091.

Supreme Court of California.

July 5, 2001.

Ivy K. Kessel, Encino, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Brad D. Levenson, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Susan Sullivan Pithey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

The issue in this case is whether a plea agreement may provide for an increased sentence in the event the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. We conclude that a plea agreement properly may contain such a provision.

FACTS

Defendant Linda Jean Masloski was charged by information with possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). The information further alleged that defendant had suffered three prior convictions for burglary (Pen.Code, § 459),¹ a "serious felony" within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law. (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12.)

Following a hearing conducted pursuant to People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628, the court struck two of defendant's three alleged prior convictions. At a subsequent hearing, the court noted that a plea agreement had been negotiated:

"THE COURT: ... I have had a conversation with counsel. I understand that the defendant is willing to plead to the charge and admit the one prior strike conviction. [¶] The promise is that defendant would be sentenced to the low term of 16 months. It would be doubled to two years and eight months [pursuant to the Three Strikes law]. I would take what is known as a Cruz waive[r²] and set sentencing for two weeks. And I'll explain on the record what a Cruz waiver is. Is this the understanding that you have, [defense counsel]?

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.... [¶] ... [¶]

"THE COURT: Is this the understanding of the plea bargain by the People?

"[PROSECUTOR]: Yes....

"THE COURT: Ms. Masloski, is this what you wish to do?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

"THE COURT: All right. Now I'm about to take what is known as a Cruz waiver. What a Cruz waiver is, I make sure that you show up on the date of sentencing. What I want is your permission that we enter into a contract. [¶] What this means is that you show up on time and I will follow the plea bargain. If you are late, or heaven forbid, you don't show up at all, then I want your permission to treat this as an open plea which means I am not bound by the low term doubled, that I can give you as much as six years in state prison if the facts warrant it. [¶] Do you understand now what this contract is?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Are you willing to engage and enter into this contract?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do we have a contract?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Done."

The court then advised defendant of her constitutional rights, obtained her waiver of those rights, and accepted her plea of no contest. The case was continued for sentencing until July 8, 1999.

Defendant appeared on July 8, but requested and was granted a continuance to July 19, 1999. Defendant failed to appear on July 19, but did appear the following day, July 20. When asked by the court where defendant was on July 19, defense counsel said he understood defendant "was initially out of town," adding that she "was scared." Defense counsel asked the court to impose the lower term that would have been provided under the plea agreement had defendant appeared on July 19 as ordered by the court.³ The court declined to do so, instead sentencing defendant to the middle term of two years, which was doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law to four years in prison.

On July 27, 1999, defendant filed a motion to recall and modify the four-year state prison sentence and resentence defendant to the lower term provided under the plea agreement, alleging that defendant had not been fully advised of her rights under section 1192.5 and had not expressly waived those rights. The court denied the motion on the ground that "there is no violation of the plea bargain."

Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, in a split decision, reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the superior court with directions to permit defendant to withdraw her guilty plea if she elects to do so.

DISCUSSION

We often have noted that plea agreements are a recognized procedure under our judicial system (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 942, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409) and a desirable and essential component of the administration of justice. (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747; People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1247, 246 Cal.Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 859-860, 187 Cal.Rptr. 441, 654 P.2d 211; In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 828, 63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919.) Commentators are in accord, noting that "[b]oth the state and the defendant benefit from plea bargains, the defendant by lessened punishment, the state by savings in cost of trial, increased efficiency, and flexibility of the criminal process." (4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed.2000) Pretrial Proceedings § 304, p. 523.) Additionally, the enactment of sections 1192.3 and 1192.5, governing plea agreements, reflects the Legislature's approval of the practice.

Under section 1192.5, if a plea agreement is accepted by the prosecution and approved by the court, the defendant "cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea...." The statute further provides that if the court subsequently withdraws its approval of the plea agreement, "the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his or her plea if he or she desires to do so."⁴ (§ 1192.5; People v. Johnson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 868, 872, 112 Cal.Rptr. 556, 519 P.2d 604.)

In People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1249, 246 Cal.Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439, we held that a defendant who fails to appear for sentencing does not lose the protections of section 1192.5. The defendant in that case pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that gave him the option of a sentence of up to one year in the county jail with a maximum of five years' probation or 16 months in prison without probation. The defendant failed to appear for sentencing. When he was apprehended more than six months later, the superior court refused to abide by the plea agreement, denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and sentenced him to a term of two years in prison. The Court of Appeal affirmed the resulting judgment, concluding that by failing to appear for sentencing, the defendant "`breached the bargain ... [and] is not entitled to either specific enforcement of that bargain or withdrawal of his guilty plea.'" (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1250, 246 Cal.Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439, fn. omitted.) We granted review and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, relying upon a line of Court of Appeal opinions that began with People v. Morris (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 358, 158 Cal.Rptr. 722.

In People v. Morris, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in exchange for the dismissal of the three remaining counts of aggravated assault and a promise that a prison term would not be imposed. Defense counsel noted that the court had agreed to release the defendant on his own recognizance pending sentencing. The court stated that, in order to ensure that defendants who had been released on their own recognizance appeared for sentencing, it had adopted a practice of sentencing such defendants to prison but staying execution of the sentence until the date set for formal sentencing. As the court explained to the defendant: "`That way, you see, I don't have to get the O.R. people to interview you and all that. All I do is say if you come back, we'll do what the probation report recommends and what I decide is appropriate on those two counts. But if you don't come back, a wan-ant will go out, you'll go to State Prison. And that means you're sure to come back, right?'" (People v. Morris, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 361, fn. 1, 158 Cal.Rptr. 722.)

The defendant agreed to this arrangement, entered his plea, and was sentenced to prison. Execution of the sentence was stayed, and the defendant was released on his own recognizance until the date set for sentencing. The court reiterated that if the defendant appeared for sentencing, "`I will rescind the State Prison sentence and proceed in accordance with the plea bargain. If he doesn't appear, I'll leave the State Prison sentence outstanding and issue a warrant and send everybody out to find him.'" (People v. Morris, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 358, 361, fn. 3, italics omitted, 158 Cal.Rptr. 722.) The defendant failed to appear for sentencing and was apprehended two months later. The superior court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and remanded him to begin serving the previously imposed prison sentence.

The Court of Appeal in Morris reversed, concluding that the superior court lacked the authority to impose "such an unusual sentencing-release procedure" and that the lower court's authority to approve the terms of the plea agreement "did not sanction the wholly unrelated and unbargained condition interjected by the court concerning defendant's candidacy for immediate O.R. release pending contemplated formal sentencing proceedings." (People v. Morris, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 358, 363, 158 Cal.Rptr. 722.) The court in Morris concluded that the defendant was entitled under section 1192.5 to withdraw his plea in the event the terms of the plea agreement were not enforced.

Similarly, in People v. Barrero (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1080, 210 Cal.Rptr. 70, the...