People v. Masper
Decision Date | 22 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. AO59721,AO59721 |
Citation | 24 Cal.App.4th 367,29 Cal.Rptr.2d 335 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Previously published at 24 Cal.App.4th 367 24 Cal.App.4th 367 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Claude Christian MASPER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Sharon G. Birenbaum, Michael E. Banister, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent/plaintiff.
Defendant was charged with stealing his girlfriend's car (Veh.Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In proceedings in municipal court, defendant declined the assistance of counsel and chose to represent himself. He pled guilty to the charge, and the matter was certified to superior court for sentencing. The superior court judge sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant and the victim, Connie Hartert, had been dating for about a year when Ms. Hartert decided to end the relationship. Defendant, however, continued to try to see Ms. Hartert, and his intrusive behavior led Hartert to call the Walnut Creek Police on February 22 and again on February 23, 1992, to have him removed from her apartment. On February 26, 1992, Hartert obtained a temporary restraining order to keep defendant away from her apartment, but on February 27, about 11 p.m., defendant appeared at the
apartment anyway. He eventually left voluntarily, but the next morning about 5:30, Hartert discovered her car was gone. Two days later, on March [24 Cal.App.4th 370] 1, 1992, defendant was arrested in Oakland in possession of Hartert's car, and he freely admitted taking it.
At his arraignment in municipal court on March 5, 1992, defendant declined to speak to the public defender and asked to represent himself. The municipal court judge (Judge Gifford) asked defendant about his education, and defendant replied that he had received his Ph.D. in Europe. Judge Gifford explained the effects of defendant's stated intention to plead guilty to the charge and the benefits of having an attorney to negotiate the plea. Judge Gifford ultimately concluded that defendant's education and intelligence qualified him to represent himself. Despite defendant's eagerness to plead guilty, Judge Gifford put the matter over for one day to allow defendant the opportunity to discuss his intended plea with the district attorney.
At his appearance the following day, defendant again asked to represent himself, and the municipal court judge (Judge Wheatley) inquired a little further into his background.
The court then accepted defendant's guilty plea.
Before the sentencing proceeding was held, defendant wrote a four-page letter to the superior court explaining his reasons for the crime ("reasons of my heart") and his reasons for pleading guilty and declining an attorney ("reasons of my spirit"). The probation report recommended a diagnostic study pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03, and the superior court judge (Judge Golde) so ordered. Upon completion of the evaluation period, Judge Golde sentenced defendant to three years in prison.
Penal Code section 1200 sets forth the procedure for arraignment for judgment: "When the defendant appears for judgment he must be informed by the court, or by the clerk, under its discretion, of the nature of the charge against him and of his plea, and the verdict, if any thereon, and must be asked whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him."
Defendant complains that the trial court failed to make the inquiry required by this statute as to whether there was any legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced. 1 The Attorney General concedes the omission but contends the ultimate question in this appeal is whether defendant effectively waived his right to counsel: if he did, the error was waived by his failure to object to the procedure. We do not agree with the Attorney General's contention that the error was waived, but we nevertheless find the error was harmless.
There is no dispute that defendant was entitled, pursuant to Penal Code section 1200, to be asked whether there was legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced. Some courts have found the trial court's error in failing to inquire about legal cause waived by the defendant's failure to object to the procedure. (People v. Thomas (1955) 45 Cal.2d 433, 438-439, 290 P.2d 491; People v. Nelson (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 282, 285, 64 Cal.Rptr. 801; People v. Straw (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 565, 567, 26 Cal.Rptr. 461; People v. Williams (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 328, 333, 318 P.2d 106, cert. den. 356 U.S. 977, 78 S.Ct. 1142, 2 L.Ed.2d 1150; People v. Rocha (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 656, 663-664, 279 P.2d 836.) In People v. Rocha, supra, the court explained:
In the present case, we decline to conclude that defendant waived the error. As his attorney points out, defendant tried to address the court immediately after sentence was imposed. Nevertheless, as discussed below, we concl...
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