People v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 06 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1-03-3027.,1-03-3027.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deon MATHIS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

827 N.E.2d 932

357 Ill. App.3d 45

293 Ill.Dec. 51

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deon MATHIS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-03-3027.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

April 6, 2005.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica Calderon and Noah Montague, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Appellant.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Chicago (Vanessa Caleb, Assistant Appellate Defender, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following the entry of a guilty plea, the defendant, Deon Mathis, was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 18 months of probation. The defendant subsequently filed a petition to vacate the judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). The circuit court granted the petition and vacated the judgment entered on the guilty plea. On denial of reconsideration, the State now appeals, contending that: (1) the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant section 2-1401 relief; (2) the petition improperly asserted a legal argument rather than errors of fact; and (3) the circuit court erred in applying Public Act 92-665 (P.A., 92-665 eff. January 1, 2003) retroactively to the defendant's case. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the circuit court's order granting the defendant's section 2-1401 petition and remand this cause with directions.

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school (count No. 1) and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (count No. 2). The defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense. Because of his age and the nature of the first charge, the defendant's case was automatically transferred from juvenile court to criminal court pursuant to section 5-130(2)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-130(2)(a) (West 2002)).

On April 26, 2002, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining charge and a recommendation of 18 months of probation. Because the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver did not, by itself, trigger application of the automatic transfer provision in section 5-130(2)(a) of the Act, defense counsel stated that the defendant would be "waiving juvenile jurisdiction" so that the matter could proceed in criminal court. Defense counsel also stated that he had explained to the defendant the ramifications of waiving his right to have the matter heard in juvenile court, that the "recommended sentence was for 18 months probation", and that the defendant still wanted to enter a plea of guilty. Before accepting the defendant's guilty plea, the court asked the defendant's mother if she agreed with the offer that was made "[r]ealizing that this would be an adult conviction" to which she answered in the affirmative. The following colloquy then took place:

"THE COURT: All right. There were 2 charges against you. The prosecutor is going to drop the first count against you, which is a higher class of offense. That was a Class 1, and they are going to dismiss that count, and proceed on Count 2.

Is that your understanding?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. And Count 2 requires you to waive juvenile court jurisdiction over this matter. Is that what you want to do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. And your attorney explained to you all of what that means; is that right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. That this is a—considered an adult conviction."

The court acknowledged that the defendant "waives juvenile jurisdiction", accepted his guilty plea, and entered judgment thereon. The matter proceeded to sentencing and the defendant was sentenced to 18 months of probation.

On July 18, 2002, while on probation, the defendant was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Predicated on this charge, the following day the State filed a petition for violation of probation.

On June 27, 2003, the defendant filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), styled as a "motion to vacate judgment". The defendant contended that Public Act, 92-665, which became effective on January 1, 2003, should apply retroactively to him and, therefore, the judgment entered on his guilty plea should be vacated. Public Act 92-665 added the following language to section 5-130 of the Act:

"(10) If a minor is subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this Section, other than a minor charged with a Class X felony violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, any party including the minor or the court sua sponte may, before trial, move for a hearing for the purpose of trying and sentencing the minor as a delinquent minor. To request a hearing, the party must file a motion prior to trial. * * * " P.A., 92-665 eff. January 1, 2003, (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002)).

Following arguments, the circuit court granted the defendant's section 2-1401 petition and vacated its judgment of April 26, 2002. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. This timely appeal followed.

The State first contends that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the judgment entered on the defendant's guilty plea because the defendant, although properly admonished, failed to first file a motion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(d)) to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment within 30 days of the date on which the sentence was imposed. In other words, the State argues that the defendant was required to withdraw his guilty plea before filing a section 2-1401 petition in the circuit court and his failure to do so rendered the circuit court's order granting such relief void. We disagree.

Supreme Court Rule 604(d), requiring that a defendant wishing to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea must first move within 30 days to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment, applies only to direct appeals. 188 Ill.2d R. 604(d); see People v. Flowers, 208 Ill.2d 291, 302, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174 (2004); People v. Brumas, 142 Ill.App.3d 178, 180, 96 Ill.Dec. 494, 491 N.E.2d 773 (1986). Rule 604(d) is inapplicable to collateral proceedings brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)) (Flowers, 208 Ill.2d at 302,280 Ill.Dec. 653,802 N.E.2d 1174) and, contrary to the State's assertion, we do not believe that it is applicable to petitions brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code.

Section 2-1401 of the Code is a comprehensive statutory procedure by which final orders and judgments may be challenged more than 30 days after their entry and its remedial powers extend to criminal cases. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill.2d 555, 562, 280 Ill.Dec. 311, 802 N.E.2d 236 (2003); People v. Haynes, 192 Ill.2d 437, 460-61, 249 Ill.Dec. 779, 737 N.E.2d 169 (2000). Although a section 2-1401 petition arises out of the same proceeding in which the order or judgment that it is directed to was entered, it is a collateral attack on the judgment. People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295, 269 Ill.Dec. 350, 780 N.E.2d 822 (2002); Krain v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 295 Ill.App.3d 577, 579-80, 231 Ill.Dec. 396, 696 N.E.2d 692 (1998); Ptaszek v. Michalik, 238 Ill.App.3d 72, 76, 179 Ill.Dec. 283, 606 N.E.2d 115 (1992).

Failure to comply with Rule 604(d) prevents a defendant from perfecting a direct appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea. "But the rule does not purport to do more than that." People v. Parker, 57 Ill.App.3d 697, 700, 15 Ill.Dec. 391, 373 N.E.2d 737 (1978). Like a petition brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a section 2-1401 petition is a collateral attack on a judgment, not a direct appeal. Consequently, just as in the case of a petition brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Rule 604(d) is inapplicable to proceedings brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. We, therefore, reject the State's argument that the defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) prevented the circuit court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court attached when the defendant filed his timely section 2-1401 petition.

The State next contends that the circuit court erred in granting the defendant's section 2-1401 petition because he failed to allege any errors of fact and instead made a legal argument, namely, that the amendment contained in Public Act 92-665 should be applied retroactively. The State acknowledges that it failed to raise this issue in the circuit court, but urges us to review the issue under the plain error rule. Waiver aside, we will address the State's contention in this regard.

Recently, our supreme court in People v. Lawton, 212 Ill.2d 285, 297, 288 Ill.Dec. 638, 818 N.E.2d 326 (2004), stated that, although petitions brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code are ordinarily used to correct errors of fact, "nothing in the language of section 2-1401 limits its applicability to such matters." In Lawton, the defendant had filed a section 2-1401 petition challenging the competency of the attorney who represented him in proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)), as well as on direct appeal. The Lawton court first noted that the defendant could not raise his claim in a post-conviction petition, as proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are civil in nature and the Post-Conviction Hearing Act only applies to persons imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction. Having no...