People v. Matous
| Decision Date | 15 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-06-0634.,No. 3-06-0633.,No. 3-06-0635.,3-06-0633.,3-06-0634.,3-06-0635. |
| Citation | 886 N.E.2d 1278 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher A. MATOUS, Wesley E. Miller, and Bruce E. Egley, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Terry A. Mertel, Deputy Director, Thomas D. Arado, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, James Hoyle, State's Attorney, Macomb, for the People.
Jay Wiegman (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for Bruce Egley, Christopher Matous, Wesley Miller.
In separate cases, the State charged each of the defendants, Christopher A. Matous, Wesley E. Miller, and Bruce E. Egley, with two counts of unlawful possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals (pseudoephedrine) (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2004)). Each of the defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence in their respective cases. The trial court held a consolidated hearing on the motions, which the court granted. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting the defendants' motions to suppress. We reverse and remand.
The event in question took place in Macomb on August 29, 2005. At the suppression hearing, Joseph Moon testified that on August 29, he was an Illinois state trooper and a canine handler. At approximately 6 p.m., Moon was on patrol when he heard a dispatch from the McDonough County sheriff's office over his squad car's radio concerning "possible methamphetamine chemical purchases." The dispatcher said "that a Hy-Vee Pharmacy had called them advising that two males had purchased boxes of pseudoephedrine pills and got into the same vehicle, which was a purple Mercury Tracer with Iowa registration." The dispatcher then stated the vehicle's Iowa license plate number.
Moon said that the dispatcher reported that the men "each purchased pseudoephedrine, a box of pseudoephedrine pills and got into the same vehicle." When Moon was asked, "How many boxes of pseudoephedrine?," Moon replied, "I believe two total." The dispatcher described the two individuals as (1) a white male in his forties with grey or white hair in a ponytail, wearing a white tee-shirt; and (2) a white male in his twenties. During the hearing, Moon noted that he met with the Hy-Vee pharmacist and viewed videotapes of the defendants after their arrest.
At approximately 7 or 7:30 p.m., Moon observed a purple Mercury Tracer traveling on U.S. 136. The vehicle's Iowa license plate number matched the number given by the dispatcher. Moon said the car had three occupants, two of whom matched the dispatcher's descriptions of the individuals at the Hy-Vee store. Moon noted that the driver of the car appeared to be in his forties, had a white ponytail, and was wearing a white tee-shirt. According to Moon, the rear passenger was "a younger white male."
Moon followed the Mercury in his squad car. Moon said, "I observed the vehicle make a traffic violation and called in a stop and activated my emergency lights." When he was asked to describe the violation, Moon stated that the vehicle "[c]rossed the center line." Later, Moon testified that there were two solid yellow lines in the center of the highway. Moon observed the vehicle drive "over the far right yellow line at the time of the offense." He said that the vehicle did not cross the second yellow line but, rather, crossed "just one of them." Moon asserted that he would have stopped the vehicle on the basis of the information from the dispatcher regardless of the traffic violation.
After the vehicle stopped, Moon asked the driver for his driver's license and proof of insurance, which the driver produced. The driver was defendant Egley. Moon advised Egley that he had stopped the vehicle because of improper lane usage and "the intelligence information of the * * * possible manufacturing of methamphetamine." Egley replied that "his windshield was dirty, and when he rounded the corner and the sunlight caught the windshield, it was obstructed and he couldn't see out of it."
Moon asked Egley to join him in the squad car, where Moon began to write warning tickets for improper lane usage and an obstructed view. While writing the warnings, Moon asked Egley if he had stopped anywhere in Macomb. Egley asserted that he had not stopped anywhere. Moon testified that he considered Egley's answer to be deceptive because of the information from the dispatcher that the vehicle had stopped at the Hy-Vee.
Before completing the warning tickets, Moon advised Egley that he was going to have his dog sniff the exterior of the Mercury. At that time, the two passengers were still inside the car. When the dog sniffed the outside of the car, it alerted to the driver's side door seam, the trunk lid, and the passenger side door seam. Moon asked the passengers to exit the vehicle, and he searched the car's passenger area. The officer found two bags containing a total of approximately 28 or 29 boxes of pseudoephedrine. One bag was on the front passenger floorboard, and the other bag was on the rear passenger floorboard. Moon then arrested the three defendants and advised them of their Miranda rights.
Moon stated that he was writing the warning tickets for approximately 10 to 12 minutes. He said that about 15 to 20 minutes elapsed from the time he stopped the vehicle until he took the defendants into custody. Moon testified that during the stop he did not tell any of the three defendants that he was free to go.
The officer acknowledged that the dog was not trained to alert to pseudoephedrine. The dog was trained, however, to alert to methamphetamine, among other illegal drugs. After he was arrested, defendant Matous admitted to Moon "that he had used methamphetamine sometime within the [previous] 24 hours." Moon speculated that the dog may have alerted to the residual odor of methamphetamine while Matous was in the car.
After the presentation of the evidence, the court heard closing arguments. The attorney for defendant Miller argued, in part, that Moon was not justified in relying on the information from the dispatcher because of what the attorney called "the Lawson and Willock doctrine." Defense counsel cited the holdings of People v. Lawson, 298 Ill.App.3d 997, 233 Ill.Dec. 24, 700 N.E.2d 125 (1998), and People v. Willock, No. 3-99-0227, 316 Ill.App.3d 1304, 268 Ill.Dec. 914, 779 N.E.2d 528 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), for this doctrine. The court overruled the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's reliance upon a Rule 23 decision.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. The court first issued an opinion letter. Later, the court issued its written final order, in which it incorporated the opinion letter by reference. In the letter, the judge said, "My decision is primarily based on [Miller's attorney's] * * * `Lawson-Willock Doctrine.'" The court then stated the following:
Next, the judge quoted facts and analysis from Willock, for which he had been the trial judge. The judge noted that in Willock, this court said that when an officer relies upon a radio dispatch in arresting a defendant, at a suppression hearing the State must produce evidence that the officer who issued the dispatch had probable cause to arrest the defendant.
The judge then stated the following:
The court granted the motions to suppress, and the State appealed.
The State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motions to suppress.
Initially, we note that neither defense counsel nor the trial court should have relied on our unpublished Rule 23 order in Willock as precedential authority. Rule 23(e) states that "[a]n unpublished order of the court is not precedential and may not be cited by any party except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case." 166 Ill.2d R. 23(e). In this case defense counsel was not citing Willock to support a contention of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. Therefore, it was improper for defense counsel to cite, and for the court to consider, Willock as precedential authority. There can be no "Lawson-Willock doctrine."
On appeal, a trial court's factual findings concerning a motion to suppress will be upheld unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill.2d 109, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006). The ultimate decision, however, concerning whether the evidence should have been suppressed is a question of law, which we review de novo. McCarty, 223 Ill.2d 109, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15.
A peace officer may conduct a lawful traffic stop based on probable cause that the driver of the vehicle has committed a traffic violation. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). An officer also may temporarily detain a person with less than probable cause, for the officer's safety, if the officer has...
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