People v. Matozzo
| Decision Date | 20 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | 2014NA024166 |
| Court | New York District Court |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York, v. Teodoro Matozzo, Defendant. |
Hon Madeline Singas, Acting Nassau County District Attorney
Michael Biniakewitz, Esq, Attorney for the Defendant
The Defendant is charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs, Operating an Uninsured Motor Vehicle and Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle, all in violation of Penal Law § 220.03 and Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192(4), 319(1) and 509(1), respectively.
The Defendant now moves for an order (1) dismissing the charge of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Ability Impaired by Drugs; (2) suppressing any statements allegedly made by the Defendant to law enforcement personnel or, in the alternative, directing that a Huntley 1 hearing be held; (3) suppressing all physical evidence, observations made by police officers and chemical test results or, in the alternative directing that an Ingle/Dunaway 2 hearing be held; (4) precluding the introduction of evidence at that time of trial of any statements made by, or identification of, theDefendant which were not properly noticed pursuant to CPL § 710.30; (5) directing the People to provide the Defendant with all specific instances of prior uncharged conduct which the People will seek to offer against the Defendant on their direct case, during cross-examination of the Defendant or on their rebuttal case, and further directing that a pre-trial hearing he held to determine the admissibility of same; (6) directing the People to disclose all exculpatory material to the Defendant; (7) directing the People to preserve and maintain written notes, memos, drawings, summaries and/or other documents made or prepared in connection with this case; (8) directing that any hearing which may be conducted in this matter be held at least forty-five (45) days prior to trial; and, (9) granting the Defendant leave to make future motions.
The People consent to the court conducting a hearing addressing the voluntariness of any statements made by the Defendant to law enforcement personnel. The People also consent to the court conducting a Sandoval/Ventimiglia 3 hearing immediately before the commencement of trial. The People oppose the Defendant's motion in all other respects.
In seeking dismissal of the charge of Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs the Defendant argues that "the elements of the charged offenses (sic) are not supported by non-hearsay allegations, and the supporting deposition fails to cure the defect." (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15, ¶ 6) The Defendant further argues that the factual allegations asserted "are insufficient because they do not support every element of VTL § 1192(4), nor the defendant's commission thereof." (Biniakewitz Affirmation 1/12/15, ¶ 8) Specifically, the Defendant alleges that the supporting deposition accompanying the charging simplified traffic information fails to sufficiently support allegations concerning the Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle and that the Defendant was impaired by a drug listed in PHL § 3306.
In opposition to this branch of the Defendant's motion the People argue that the Defendant failed to timely demand a supporting deposition in accordance with CPL § 100.25 and, as a consequence, the simplified traffic information need only "include all pertinent information as required by the Department of Motor Vehicles, including the defendant's name, date of birth, address, driver's license identification, date of offense, time of offense, charge and location of the offense." (DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 12) Nevertheless, the People further argue that they have annexed a supporting deposition to the simplified traffic information and that, contrary to the Defendant's argument, "there is no requirement that a simplified traffic information be based upon non-hearsay allegations ." (DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 14) Addressing the specifics of the Defendant's arguments, the People allege that the Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle is demonstrated through allegations of a motor vehicle accident and the Defendant's admission to having driven the vehicle. The People do not directly address the Defendant's argument that the supporting deposition fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that the Defendant was impaired by a drug listed in PHL § 3306, and only argue that they "should be granted time to allow a Drug Recognition Expert to evaluate the facts of this case, the symptoms Officer Butts observed, and match them to a drug consistent with a violation of VTL §1192(4), making the complaint sufficient."( DePalo Affirmation 2/2/15, ¶ 23)
As indicated, the Defendant is charged with Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs by way of a simplified traffic information accompanied by a supporting deposition. Contrary to the Defendant's suggestion, the facial sufficiency of this accusatory instrument is not to be determined by the standards applicable to informations or misdemeanor complaints, as set forth in CPL §§ 100.15(1) and (3) and 100.40(1) and (4). Likewise, contrary to the People's suggestion, the facial sufficiency of this accusatory instrument is not to be determined by the standards of a bare simplified traffic information, as set forth in CPL §§ 100.25(1) and 100.40(2).
"The simplified information is a statutory creation designed to provide an uncomplicated form for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses for which it is principally used." People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 571 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1991) As such, the pleading requirements of CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40(1) do not apply. See: People v. DeRojas, 180 Misc 2d 690, 693 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Term, 2nd Dept.1999) Where a supporting deposition in support of the offense charged has been neither demanded nor provided, a simplified traffic information must be substantially in the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, See: CPL §§ 100.10, 100.25 and 100.40(2), and will be found facially sufficient if it so complies. See: People v. Nuccio, supra.; People v. Bize, 30 Misc 3d 68, 918 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Term 9th & 10th Dept. 2010); People v. Weinert, 178 Misc 2d 675, 683 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 1998) Under such circumstances, a simplified traffic information "need not provide on its face reasonable cause to believe defendant committed the offense charged (CPL 100.25, 100.40, subd. 2)." People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 408 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1978)
Where, however, a supporting deposition is provided with a simplified traffic information, either in response to a timely demand by a defendant, pursuant to CPL ' 100.25(2), or voluntarily by the People in the absence of such a demand, the accusatory instrument will be found facially sufficient Awhen, as provided by subdivision one of section 100.25, [the simplified traffic information] substantially conforms to the requirements therefor prescribed by or pursuant to law;@ See: CPL ' 100.40(2), and when the supporting depositions Acontain allegations of fact, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged.@ CPL ' 100.25(2); See: People v. Key, supra; People v. Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 517 N.Y.S2d 448 (1987); People v. Titus, 178 Misc 2d 687, 682 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 1998); People v. Chittaranjans, 185 Misc 2d 871, 714 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 2000) ">Reasonable cause to believe that a person committed an offense= exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it. CPL ' 70.10(2).
Applying the foregoing to the matter sub judice, the accusatory instrument charging a violation of VTL § 1192(4) will be found facially sufficient if it sets forth facts providing reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant (1) ingested a drug; (2) that the drug ingested is one proscribed by PHL § 3306; (3) that the Defendant operated a motor vehicle after ingesting the drug; and, (4) that the Defendant's ability to operate the motor vehicle was impaired by the ingestion of the drug. See: People v. Kahn, 160 Misc 2d 594, 610 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Dist.Ct. Nassau Co.1994); Property Clerk v. Lizziano, 302 AD2d 235, 754 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1st Dept. 2003)
The supporting deposition of Police Officer Arline E. Butts alleges, in pertinent part, that on November 5, 2014 she received a radio assignment for a motor vehicle accident in the vicinity of Midway Court and Franklin Avenue, in Franklin Square. Upon arriving at that scene, after observing a red motor vehicle with rear end damage in the middle of Midway Court, and being told by its driver that the vehicle was struck in the rear while waiting at a red light, Officer Butts walked over to and spoke with the Defendant, who was standing to the passenger's side of a white motor vehicle, previously identified as the offending vehicle by the driver of the red vehicle. At that time, Officer Butts "observed subject Matozzo with glassy eyes, slurred speech, his body was shaking, the pupils of his eyes were small, and he was unsteady on his feet." Officer Butts then "asked subject Matozzo what happened and he stated I was looking down and hit the car in front of me.'" Thereafter, a Police Officer Hernon administered standardized field sobriety tests to the Defendant and appears to have advised Officer Butts that "[t]here were positive signs of impairment." Following the Defendant's arrest, a search of his left pant pocket resulted in the recovery of "a small glass envelope believed to be heroin[.]"
Contrary to the...
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