People v. Mattson

• Decision Date: 17 March 1959
• Citation: 51 Cal.2d 777,336 P.2d 937
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Herbert J. MATTSON, Appellant. Crim. 6328.

Page 937

336 P.2d 937

51 Cal.2d 777

PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Herbert J. MATTSON, Appellant.

Crim. 6328.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 17, 1959.

John T. Schall, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Carl Boronkay, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds (Pen.Code, § 476a) and found that he had suffered a prior conviction of felony. Defendant appeals from the ensuing judgment. As the sole ground for reversal he contends that an indigent defendant is entitled as a matter of constitutional and statutory right both to conduct his own defense and to be provided with the services of court-appointed counsel to advise and assist him in a subservient capacity in preparing for and during trial. We have concluded that the right to counsel does not include an absolute right to services of the character and capacity indicated; that the court should not appoint counsel to defend an indigent and require that in so doing the attorney surrender any of the substantial prerogatives traditionaly or by statute attached to his office; that a defendant for whom counsel is appointed should not be permitted both to have counsel and to actively participate in the conduct of the case unless the court in its discretion determines that in the circumstances of the case the cause of justice will thereby be served and that the orderly and expeditious conduct of the court's business will not thereby be substantially hindered, hampered or delayed; that under the circumstances of this case there was no error in refusing to appoint counsel to act in a subservient capacity; and that for the reasons aforesaid and hereinafter developed the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

The Evidence as to the Substantive Offenses. On June 20 and 21, 1955, defendant, a resident of Louisville, Kentucky, made three purchases (a typewriter, a watch, and a camera) in three San Diego shops. For each purchase he gave a check on the printed form of OK Auto Parts, signed by defendant and drawn on the Liberty National Bank and Trust Company of Louisville. Each seller deposited his check for collection and none of the checks was paid. OK Auto Parts, a firm owned by defendant's wife and managed by defendant, had had two checking accounts with the Louisville bank but those accounts were closed in 1947. Since 1947 neither defendant nor the firm had any account with that bank.

Defendant testified as follows: When he wrote the subject checks he was suffering from 'hysterical amnesia.' He has no knowledge of having been in San Diego in June, 1955, of having written the subject checks, or of having had the typewriter, watch, or camera. His wife gave him the printed forms of checks 'and the defendant was advised that there was an account at the Liberty National Bank.' At the time defendant wrote the checks he 'had many thousands of dollars' and 'could have charged any of these items. I didn't have to write a check and steal them.' (Defendant's property has since been 'tied up' because of a divorce action by his wife.)

Defendant further testified confusingly as follows concerning the Louisville bank account; '(D)uring May, 1955, just prior to the issuance of these checks, the defendant put in the bank of Louisville in one of the OK Auto Parts account(s), of his own money, over $1,000 in $100 bills' yet 'all during May, the account was closed.' 'I put over $2,000 in the Bank of Louisville during the week just before I went on this trip (to San Diego). * * * I was in the bank trying to give them trade acceptances for Mrs. Mattson and notes for collateral to be put into the account, and (a director and vice president of the bank) * * * told me to send Mrs. Mattson in with them since he couldn't give me any information on the accounts since I was not the owner.'

A psychiatrist who had examined defendant testified for the People that 'there was nothing presented by the defendant to convince me that at any time in the past that he had had a valid amnesia.'

Defendant's Insistence upon Representing Himself and at the Same Time Being Afforded the Assistance of Counsel. On August 21, 1957, defendant appeared in the superior court for arraignment. Proceedings on this and subsequent days through the time of trial (September 25 and 26, 1957), quoted and summarized in the margin, ¹ disclose the following situation: Defendant repeatedly refused to accept appointment of counsel to represent him and insisted upon representing himself. He asked and the court refused appointment of counsel to aid defendant in filing papers, preparing subpoenas, and obtaining documents.

The court of its own motion gave defendant much legal advice. Defendant was mentally competent and alert and had some knowledge of law, but either did not understand or refused to recognize some rules of procedure, particularly rules of evidence.

He clearly indicated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel because he correctly understood that if he were so represented counsel could control the presentation of the case ² and defendant would have no right to participate actively in the conduct of the trial. ³ No attempt of the prosecution to take improper advantage of defendant appears and (leaving aside for the moment the question of defendant's right to the aid of an attorney) the record discloses no unfairness in his trial and no miscarriage of justice in his conviction.

Although defendant in the superior court asked only for assistance of an attorney to prepare particular papers designated by defendant (that is, for aid in a quasi-clerical capacity), on appeal he urges that the superior court should have appointed an attorney to furnish legal advice as to the preparation and presentation of his defense. No California case has been found which discusses the question whether a defendant who insists upon representing himself has the right to have court-appointed counsel to assist and advise in preparation for or during the trial. The following rules are pertinent:

The California Constitution (art. I, § 13) provides that 'In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right * * * to appear and defend, in person and with counsel.' This right is implemented by various statutory provisions, including the following: When defendant is brought before a magistrate on an arrest, the magistrate must inform him 'of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings.' (Pen.Code, § 858.) The magistrate, and the superior court before arraignment, must ask defendant 'if he desires the aid of counsel,' and if defendant desires and is unable to employ counsel, 'must assign counsel to depend him.' (Pen.Code, §§ 859, 987; italics added.) 'In a criminal action the defendant is entitled: * * * 2. To be allowed counsel as in civil actions, or to appear and defend in person and with counsel.' (Pen.Code, § 686.)

The foregoing sections accord the accused not only a right to counsel but also a right to represent himself if he so elects. Except in certain situations not here pertinent, ⁴ the court cannot force a competent defendant to be represented by an attorney. (People v. Rose (1919), 42 Cal.App. 540, 553(7), 183 P. 874; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268.)

As has been stated (ante, footnote 3), despite the constitutional (art. I, § 13) and statutory (Pen.Code, § 686) provisions that defendant has the right to appear and defend in person and with counsel, defendant is not entitled to have his case presented in court both by himself and by counsel acting at the same time or alternating at defendant's pleasure. (People v. Northcott (1930), supra, 209 Cal. 639, 648-650(6), 651, 289 P. 634, 70 A.L.R. 806; People v. Mims (1958), 160 Cal.App.2d 589, 325 P.2d 234.) So long as defendant is represented by counsel at the trial, he has no right to be heard by himself (People v. McKinney (1957), supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 332, 336(6), 313 P.2d 163; People v. Glenn (1950), supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 859, 868, 216 P.2d 457); conversely, when defendant has intelligently declined the aid of counsel he has no right to interrupt the trial with a demand for legal assistance (In re Connor (1940), 16 Cal.2d 701, 709(8), 108 P.2d 10).

A fundamental reason for according to an accused the right to counsel is that without the aid of an attorney other protections which the law affords would often avail defendant little since it cannot be assumed that he is sufficiently articulate and adequately conversant with his constitutional and legal rights and his procedural duties to protect himself throughout the course of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the federal courts, in determining whether a state's denial of counsel amounts to a denial of federal due process, and the California courts, in determining the extent of the right to counsel under state law, consider such matters as the intricacy of the accusatory pleading, the complexity of the law as to the offense charged and included offenses, defendant's intelligence, education, experience (including familiarity with the criminal law derived from prior prosecutions), youth, mental and physical health and emotional condition, the attitude of the court and the prosecuting officials and the existence of inflamed public opinion, and also the severity of the penalty. Considering the foregoing matters, the courts have developed familiar rules, stated in the margin, as to the scope of an accused's right to representation by counsel at the trial and in the antecedent proceedings. ⁵

Correlative to a defendant's California right to have counsel (whether employed or appointed) afforded opportunity to prepare so that he can intelligently advise and represent defendant, is the public defender's...