People v. May

• Decision Date: 26 March 1886
• Citation: 10 P. 641,9 Colo. 80
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE, etc., ex rel. SEELEY v. MAY, Treasurer, etc.

10 P. 641

9 Colo. 80

PEOPLE, etc., ex rel. SEELEY v. MAY, Treasurer, etc.

Supreme Court of Colorado

March 26, 1886

Mandamus.

This was an original action in the supreme court, asking for mandamus on defendant to accept and receive a county warrant issued prior to July, 1885, in payment of county taxes. To the complaint defendant demurred, and, on argument the court held that county warrants were in so far contracts of the county that when a law, in force at the time of their issuance, provided that such warrants should be received in payment of county and road taxes, a subsequent act providing that all such taxes should be paid in cash only was unconstitutional as to warrants issued prior thereto; that the effect of the law as to such warrants was to impair the obligation of the contract. People v. Hull, 9 P. 34, (December term, 1885.) On overruling the demurrer, defendant asked and obtained leave to answer.

The answer denies:

'(1) That the relator was the legal holder of the certain county warrant or order of said alleged county of Lake, No. 12 119, mentioned and described in said petition and alternative writ, as alleged therein; that the said warrant or order was, on the ninth day of May, A. D. 1884, or at any other time before or since, for value received or otherwise, sold, assigned, transferred, or delivered to the said petitioner, and denies that the said petitioner was or is the owner of said county warrant or order, or entitled to receive payment therefor from the county treasurer of said county of Lake.

'(2) And for a second and separate defense to this action, and the matters and things alleged and set forth in the said relator's petition and the alternative mandamus herein, the said defendant and respondent, further answering, alleges that said supposed and alleged county warrant or order No. 12, 119, issued to William L. Ledford for $15.40, mentioned and set forth in the said relator's petition and the alternative mandamus herein, was made and issued, or attempted to be made and issued, and the debt and obligation thereof assumed to be contracted, or attempted to be contracted, by the said county of Lake, in direct violation and contravention of the provisions of section six (6) of article eleven (11) of the constitution of the state of Colorado in such case made and provided, and at a time, to-wit, the fifth (5th) day of July, A. D. 1883, when the limitation of the aggregate amount of debt or indebtedness which could lawfully be contracted or incurred by the said county of Lake, for all purposes, as prescribed by said constitutional provision, had been reached and exceeded by said county, and in this, to-wit: First, that at said time the total valuation of the taxable real and personal property of said county of Lake was not less than one million dollars, ($1,000,000,) and, in fact and truth, at such time such valuation, as assessed in pursuance of the laws of the state of Colorado, amounted to the sum of, to-wit, four millions two hundred and forty-one thousand five hundred and thirty-five dollars, ($4,241,535;) second, that at said time the aggregate amount of the indebtedness of said county of Lake, for all purposes, exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of the constitution of the state of Colorado, exceeded the sum of fifty thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight dollars, ($50,898,) and, in fact, exceeded the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, ($100,000;) and that at such time said indebtedness exceeded twice the rate upon the whole valuation of the taxable property, real and personal, of said county of Lake, as specified in and by said constitutional provision: by reason of all which the said county warrant or order is of no validity, force, or effect whatever against said county of Lake, and ought not to be received for, or in payment of, the taxes in said petition and alternative writ of mandamus mentioned and alleged.'

Teller & Orahood and Markham & Dillon, for plaintiffs.

Danl. E. Parks, Co. Atty., ( H. B. Johnson, of counsel,) for respondent.

ELBERT J.

We treat the first defense to the answer as amounting to a traverse of the allegations of the complaint, and do not notice it further.

The principal contention is over the second defense interposed. Its sufficiency is submitted on demurrer, and its determination requires the construction of section 6, art. 9, of the constitution. The section is as follows:

'No county shall contract any debt by loan, in any form, except for the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, making or repairing public roads and bridges, and such indebtedness contracted in any one year shall not exceed the rates upon the taxable property in such county, following, towit: Counties in which the assessed valuation of taxable property shall exceed $5,000,000, $1.50 on each $1,000 thereof. Counties in which such valuation shall be less than $5,000,000, $3 on each $1,000 thereof, and the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county, for all purposes, exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of this constitution, shall not at any time exceed twice the amount above herein limited, unless when, in manner provided by law, the question of incurring such debt shall, at a general election, be submitted to such of the qualified electors of such county as in the year last preceding such election shall have paid a tax upon property assessed to them in such county, and a majority of those voting thereon shall vote in favor of incurring the debt; but the bonds, if any be issued therefor, shall not run less than ten years, and the aggregate amount of debt so contracted shall not at any time exceed twice the rate upon the valuation last herein mentioned: provided, that this section shall not apply to counties having a valuation of less than $1,000,000.'

Upon its face this looks like a plain limitation of the aggregate amount of county indebtedness, irrespective of its form. It is contended, however, with great earnestness and ability, that it is to be regarded only as a limitation of county indebtedness 'by loan.' The leading considerations urged in this behalf we will notice in their proper place as we proceed.

The large interests indirectly involved, upon the one hand, and the importance of preserving inviolate constitutional limitations upon the other, demand a careful consideration of the question raised. Rules of construction have for their object the discovery of the true intent and meaning of the instrument to be construed. If applicable, they are supposed to lead to the truth; if not applicable, and are, notwithstanding, applied, they lead astray. If we reject any of the many rules appealed to in this discussion, it is not because they are unsound, but inapplicable. We place at the beginning of the inquiry a few familiar propositions, which, taken together, constitute what we regard as the leading and controlling rule which is to guide us in this case:

'Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If, thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures have a right to add to or take away from that meaning.' Cooley, Const. Lim. 69, 70.

The article in which the section occurs is entitled 'Public Indebtedness,' and the section opens with a general and leading declaration that 'no county shall contract any debt by loan, in any form.' From this general prohibition, however, the section excepts loans 'for the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, making or repairing public roads and bridges; and such indebtedness, contracted in any one year, is limited by specified rates on the assessed valuation of taxable property. Having prohibited indebtedness 'by loan,' and provided for the exceptions named, the section follows with another and second general declaration, to-wit: 'The aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county for all purposes, exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of this constitution, shall not, at any time, exceed twice the amount above herein limited.' To this general declaration there is also an exception, namely, when 'the question of incurring such debt shall, at a general election, be submitted' to the qualified tax-paying electors of the county; and this power to vote an indebtedness is likewise limited by a fixed rate on the assessed valuation of taxable property. There is a provision that bonds, If any be issued, shall not run less then 10 years. There is also a provision that the section shall not apply to counties having a valuation of less than $1,000,000.

We construe the section without reference to these last two provisions. If there be anything in their language hostile to the construction given to the rest of the section, it is not apparent. Seeking the meaning of the framers of the constitution from the words they have used, and giving these words their plain and ordinary signification, it is a fair analysis of the section to say that it consists of two leading declarations of legislative will, with exceptions to each: (1) 'That no county shall contract any debt by...