People v. Mayes

• Decision Date: 09 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. D004405,D004405
• Citation: 202 Cal.App.3d 908,248 Cal.Rptr. 899
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Vincent MAYES, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 899

248 Cal.Rptr. 899

202 Cal.App.3d 908

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Vincent MAYES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D004405.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

June 9, 1988.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

July 8, 1988.

Review Denied Sept. 22, 1988.

Allen R. Bloom, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael D. Wellington, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen. and Lilia E. Garcia, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

Defendant Richard Vincent Mayes appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 211/211a) ¹ and one count of kidnapping ( § 207) as a lesser included offense of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery ( § 209, subd. (b)) and finding affirmatively on the allegation he personally used a firearm in the commission of the second robbery and

kidnapping ( § 12022.5). The court sentenced Mayes to 19 years in prison. In addition to challenging various rulings made during the criminal trial and sentencing, Mayes contends he was denied due process in section 1368 proceedings to determine his competency to stand trial. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A

In May 1985 an information charged Mayes with the robberies of two taxicab drivers, Ronald Ellis and Brian Royal (counts I and II). A third count charged Mayes with the kidnapping of Royal for the purpose of robbery. Counts IV, V and VI charged Mayes with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon in a separate incident involving a third taxicab driver. Mayes successfully moved to sever counts IV and V. Count VI was dismissed.

B

The case was assigned out for trial on December 10, 1985. After the proceedings commenced, Mayes made several verbal outbursts. The court asked the bailiff to silence him. The bailiff applied a sleeper hold and finally removed Mayes from the courtroom. Mayes was later taken to the hospital. The court continued the criminal proceedings and ordered Mayes to undergo a section 1368 examination by a psychiatrist the next morning to determine his competency to stand trial.

The court convened on Wednesday, December 11, 1985, to make an initial competency evaluation. Mayes appeared wearing a cervical collar. Bernard Hansen, a psychiatrist employed by the County of San Diego, testified he had been unable to complete his examination of Mayes. He spent a total of five or six minutes with the defendant during which time Mayes' only words were "My lawyer told me not to talk to nobody" and "Can we go now?" The court continued to question Dr. Hansen:

"Q. [By the court] Were you able to form any opinion as to his present mental competence to stand trial?

"A. Well, he--the few words he spoke didn't show any evidence of blocking or tangential thinking. Certainly, his facial expression did not look like he was bewildered or perplexed. He moved with good coordination. Didn't look like he was having any problems physically or with psycho motor control.

"Q. Before we get to the reasoning behind it, did you form any opinion?

"A. Yes, I did form an opinion.

"Q. And the opinion is?

"A. I felt he was mainly being uncooperative."

The clear inference from Hansen's brief testimony was that Mayes was competent and merely uncooperative. Shortly after defense counsel began to question Dr. Hansen, the transcript recounts the following:

"Q. [By Mr. Bloom] Do you know anything about Mr. Mayes' psychiatric history?

"A. I have read the reports about his behavior. I don't know much about his psychiatric history. He was examined at one of the correctional facilities, but I don't have that report with me. I didn't--in this package of material.

"(The bailiffs are examining the defendant)

"The bailiff: Your honor, we are having some problems with him. He is starting to slip in and out. His eyes--

"The court: Perhaps, we can shorten the procedure here. Mr. Bloom, a trial on the question of mental competency is to be had; do you wish the trial to be by jury or by court?"

The court set a jury trial on Mayes' competency for Monday, December 16.

On December 13 defense counsel informed the court he had been unable to find a mental health expert to examine Mayes on such short notice and requested a three-week continuance. The court denied the request for continuance pointing out that Dr. Hansen was available and "the fact that Mr. Mayes chose not to be cooperative with that psychiatrist is not the Defense counsel immediately filed a petition for writ of prohibition and stay of proceedings. (Mayes v. Superior Court, D003972.) We issued the stay.

                court's fault."   The court stated that to give Mayes a psychiatrist of his choice "violates the statutory scheme ... [and] exacerbates the costs to the people of the State of California, ..."
                

C

On December 16 the court granted Mayes' request for continuance and set the competency trial for January 13, 1986. However, the court stated it would not authorize payment of taxpayers' money for another psychiatrist because it had already appointed Dr. Hansen. It initially refused to authorize defense counsel to solicit other psychiatrists or psychologists. The court then explained: "If your client wishes to hire an expert, that's fine. You can hire all the experts you wish or bring in anybody you wish. I'm simply suggesting--in fact, I'm saying that the court is not going to approve the expenditure of taxpayers' money for your client to pick and choose any psychiatrist he wants." Moments later the bailiffs gagged and removed Mayes from the courtroom because he persisted in interrupting the proceedings.

The court and defense counsel continued their discussion of expert witnesses in Mayes' absence. Defense counsel explained he would obtain an expert through the Office of Defense Services and would not seek payment directly through the court. The following exchange then occurred between the court and defense counsel:

"[Mr. Bloom:] Is the court ordering me at this point not to go to the Office of Defense Services to request fees so I may retain a mental health expert to examine Mr. Mayes? I wasn't sure if that was--

"The Court: I'm suggesting that the court is not going to allow an expert to testify that is paid for by the taxpayers other than Dr. Hansen.

"Mr. Bloom: All right, so the court isn't stopping me from getting such an expert even through the Office of Defense Services, but the court is saying it won't allow such an expert to testify?

"The Court: That's what I'm saying."

The court minutes reflect the court's order that "the defendant shall not be allowed to call as a witness experts other than Dr. Hansen unless defendant cooperates with Dr. Hansen."

Defense counsel again sought extraordinary relief, this time unsuccessfully. (Mayes v. Superior Court, D004009.) We concluded the order did not deny Mayes the opportunity to present his own expert: "The order is uncertain as to content and meaning. As reasonably interpreted by us, the order allows Mayes' expert to testify without Mayes cooperating with Dr. Hansen. As so interpreted, the petition is denied." (Order dated January 10, 1986.)

D

The competency trial began on January 22 with jury selection and continued on January 23 with the examination of witnesses, jury instructions, argument, jury deliberation and verdict. Before jury selection began on January 22, defense counsel asked for clarification of the court's earlier order regarding testimony by a psychiatric expert other than Dr. Hansen. The court stated the issue was an evidentiary matter which would be taken up before opening statements the next day.

When the issue was raised again the next day, the court acknowledged its difficulty in interpreting our order. "I'm satisfied that the reasonable interpretation ... is that the order allows Mr. Mayes' expert to testify without Mayes cooperating with Dr. Hansen, and the only rational explanation I can come up with is that Mayes' expert is Dr. Hansen because the order that I made was very specific." Because of Mayes' refusal to cooperate with Dr. Hansen and in light of his declaration in open court that he would not talk to anyone other than a black person, the court concluded that to allow him to call a psychiatrist of his own choosing "would be tantamount to giving him the authority to "Accordingly, the court's ruling is that in his case in chief, he may only call as a psychiatrist Dr. Hansen. Now, the code section also provides that each party may offer rebutting testimony. It may be--I don't know because I haven't heard any of the evidence at all, but it may be that if the prosecution puts in some evidence which requires rebutting, that such an expert would be available for that purpose, but again, we're premature on that issue because I don't know. I haven't heard any of the evidence nor any suggestion as to what would be forthcoming that would require rebutting."

                appoint his own psychiatrist."   The court continued
                

In order to establish Mayes' incompetence his counsel called Mayes' mother and Dr. Hansen as witnesses. ² At the close of the section 1368 trial, the jury found Mayes competent to stand trial.

DISCUSSION

The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process. ( § 1367; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 539, 244 Cal.Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 282, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228.) The error is jurisdictional in the sense the court lacks the power to render judgment in such a case. ( People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 282, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228; People v. Sundberg (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 944, 956, 177 Cal.Rptr. 734.)

For more than 100 years California has recognized the need to safeguard the...