People v. Maynard
| Decision Date | 19 February 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 20858.,20858. |
| Citation | 179 N.E. 833,347 Ill. 422 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. MAYNARD. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Philip J. Finnegan, Judge.
Julius Frank Maynard was convicted of murder, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.Brumfield & Lawrence and Benjamin G. Pollard, all of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, Greville Beardsley, Harry J. Busch, and Euclid Taylor, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the people.
Plaintiff in error was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county with one Sylvester Springer and one William H. A. Moore, for the murder of Julia Hawkins. Springer and Moore obtained a separate trial. Plaintiff in error was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. The defense was insanity. Plaintiff in error brings the cause here, assigning as error the refusal of the court to grant the petitionof his counsel for appointment of a guardian ad litem for him for the purpose of filing a petition for change of venue, and certain assigned errors on rulings concerning the admissibility of testimony and in instructing the jury.
On July 5, 1930, the body of Julia Hawkins was found in a room on the third floor in the rear of the premises known as 4753 South parkway, in the city of Chicago. These rooms had formerly been occupied by Moore. The body was removed to a morgue and identified. Plaintiff in error was arrested at his office at Forty-Seventh street and South parkway, together with Springer and Moore, who had offices in the same suite. They were taken to the morgue, where plaintiff in error stated that he had never seen the deceased. He was taken to the police station and then to the detective bureau about 5 o'clock, where he was questioned until about 1:30 the next morning and the next day between 12:30 and 4:30, at which latter time he signed a confession in the presence of the chief of detectives and five other police officers. The evidence showed that Julia Hawkins came to her death as result of shock and hemorrhage following an extensive skull fracture.
It is stipulated between counsel for the state and for plaintiff in error that the records of the probate court of Cook county show that the last will and testament of William N. Hawkins, husband of Julia Hawkins, had been probated, and that it devised and bequeathed to Julia Hawkins and to plaintiff in error all of the testator's estate after the payments of debts and funeral expenses and after the death of Julia Hawkins to plaintiff in error in fee simple. This will appointed plaintiff in error executor thereof without bond and was drawn by him.
The record shows that on arraignment a plea of not guilty was entered in behalf of plaintiff in error. It does not show whether the plea was entered by him in his own person or by his counsel for him. His counsel presented to the court, prior to the commencement of the trial, a petitionfor the appointment of a guardian ad litem for plaintiff in error, which set out that in the month of March, 1918, he was discharged from the United States Army as surgically unfit for duty; his ailment being a form of insanity known as dementia praecox. The petition stated that plaintiff in error had been an inmate of the Elgin State Hospital for the Insane; that he had been examined at numerous times since his discharge from the army and the same ailment was found to be present; and that according to said records and examinations defendant is now an insane person. The petition prayed that a guardian ad litem be appointed for plaintiff in error with full powers incident to such appointment. The record shows that on presentation of this petition the court inquired of counsel the purpose for which it was presented,and was informed that it was for all purposes for the protection of the rights of plaintiff in error. The court then inquired whether the petition was presented for the purpose of obtaining a change of venue, and counsel replied that it was. The petition was denied.
On the trial of the cause the state offered in evidence the confession of plaintiff in error. On objection thereto the jury was excused and the court heard testimony as to whether plaintiff in error was abused or mistreated or promised immunity at the time the confession was procured, but refused to hear evidence on the objection that statements made by plaintiff in error in the form of a confession were incompetent because he had been adjudged insane in the county court of Cook county in 1921 and no record existed of his restoration. On the trial numerous witnesses were introduced on behalf of plaintiff in error who testified that in their opinion in is insane. The state in rebuttal offered witnesses testifying that in 1928 he attended the Chicago College of Law and thereafter conducted a legal aid bureau. Those witnesses testified that in their opinion he is sane. The police officers who were present at the time the statement of plaintiff in error was taken all testified that he was not in any way mistreated and that no promise of immunity was made to him.
The first question here presented is whether the court erred in denying the petition for appointment of a guardian ad litem for the purpose of presenting a motion for change of venue. Section 20 of the act in relation to change of venue (Cahill's Rev. St. 1931, p. 2748, c. 146, par. 20) applies to criminal cases and is as follows: ‘Every application for a change of venue shall be by petition setting forth the cause of the application and praying a change of venue, which petition shall be verified by the affidavit of the defendant.’ In McCauley v. People, 88 Ill. 578, it was held that a petition for change of venue not signed and sworn to by the defendant was properly denied. It was there stated: ‘There is no statute that authorizes any other person to petition for a change of venue on behalf of defendant.’
[1] The petition requesting the appointment of a guardian ad litem alleged that plaintiff in error was at the time of filing the petition an insane person. Section 12 of division 2 of the Criminal Code () provides that an insane person without lucid intervals shall not be found guilty of any crime, provided the act charged be found to be committed in the condition of insanity. This section also provides that where it appears on the trial of the charge that the act was committed as charged but defendant was lunatic or insane when the act was committed, the jury shall so find and also find whether accused has recovered. If the jury find such person has not thoroughly and permanently recovered, he shall be committed to a hospital for the insane until fully and permanently recovered; but if the jury shall also find that the accused has fully and permanently recovered, he shall be discharged. There is nothing in this section, either in its provisions or the apparent purpose of it, requiring a guardian ad litem on a trial of the charge. The jury, under that section, is to determine not only whether the charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but also, if so proved, whether the accused was at the time of the commission of the crime lunatic or insane, and, if so, whether he has entirely or permanently recovered. Thus the question of the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is directly placed in the hands of the jury on the trial of the charge. By section 13 of division 2 of the Criminal Code (Cahill's Rev. St. 1931, c. 38, par. 622) it is provided that where the accused becomes lunatic or insane after the commission of the crime he shall not be tried for the offense during such lunacy or insanity. If he become insane after verdict of guilty and before judgment, no judgment shall be entered while such insanity continues, and if after judgment and before execution, in capital cases, execution shall be stayed until the recovery of the accused from such insanity. This section provides that in all these cases it shall be the duty of the court to impanel a jury to try the question whether the accused be, at the time...
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