People v. Mccauley

• Decision Date: 01 April 1851
• Citation: 1 Cal. 379
• Parties: THE PEOPLE v. McCAULEY.
• Court: California Supreme Court

1 Cal. 379

THE PEOPLE v. McCAULEY.

Supreme Court of the State of California

April Term, 1851

April 1, 1851

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District. The facts, so far as the points of law decided in the case are concerned, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

James A. McDougall (Attorney-General), for the People.

Gregory Yale and Mr. Lee, for Defendant.

By the Court, BENNETT, J. The defendant was convicted of the crime of murder at the March term of the District Court held in and for the County of Napa, and from the judgment rendered on such conviction an appeal is taken to this Court. Numerous causes have been argued by counsel for the appellant, as constituting error in the proceedings of the District Court, some of which are plausible, but none of which do we deem tenable.

The first point made by the appellant is, that the Judge before whom the cause was tried had no authority to preside at the trial, and that, consequently, all the proceedings before him were coram non judice and void. This objection is based upon the assumption that the Judge, who is conceded to be the legally appointed and qualified Judge for the Ninth Judicial District, had no power to exercise any of the functions of his office beyond the limits of his own district. The argument in support of this proposition is upon constitutional grounds solely. So far as statutory authority is concerned, it is not denied that the Court was regularly held by an officer exercising the powers conferred upon him by an Act of the Legislature. The question is, therefore, a question purely of constitutional interpretation.

Section one of Article six of the Constitution declares that the judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Justices of the Peace, and in municipal and other inferior Courts which the Legislature should see fit to establish. Section five of the same Article declares that the State shall be divided by the first Legislature into a convenient number of districts subject to such alteration from time to time as the public good may require, for each of which a District Judge shall be appointed by the joint vote of the Legislature, at its first meeting, who shall hold his office for two years from the first day of January next after his election; after which, said Judges shall be elected by the qualified electors of their respective districts, at the general election, and shall hold their office for the term of six years.

It is urged that, inasmuch as a District Judge is required to be appointed for each District, the Legislature can neither require nor empower him to perform any judicial duties beyond the prescribed territorial limits of his district. The reason given for this construction is, that the people of each district have the constitutional right to have justice administered between them by such Judges only as they have themselves elected. This seems, however, to have been, in no respect, the intention of the Constitution, for that instrument subjects the districts to "such alteration from time to time as the public good may require." Had it been the intention of the Constitution that no Judge should hold a District Court in any counties except in those which had participated in his election, this power to alter the districts in such manner and at such times as the Legislature should deem conducive to the public good, could scarcely have been conferred. The reason given in support of the appellant's proposition, we apprehend, is overthrown by the very section of the Constitution from which his argument is deduced.

Our Constitution must be construed with reference to the known changes in the organic laws of the respective States. In most of the States there are District or Circuit Judges, having powers and jurisdiction corresponding to the powers and jurisdiction of the District Judges under the Constitution of this State. In some of the States, these Judges are appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; in others, by the Legislature, and in some, they are elected by the people. The tendency of modern constitutions is to give the election of Judges to the people; and this, we think, is the only change, so far as District Judges are concerned, contemplated by the Constitution. It was not intended to abridge the power of the Legislature to prescribe the territorial extent of the jurisdiction of District Judges. And it is, we believe, an almost, if not quite, universal rule in all the States, that a District Judge of one district is competent to exercise the functions of his office in any other district according to the requirements of legislative provisions. Were a construction different from this to be put upon the Constitution, it would lead to insupportable delays in the business of the District Courts. For these reasons we think that the Court was held by a competent Judge. Had the Court been held by a person assuming to be a District Judge, but who had not been appointed or elected to office in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, the case would have presented a different aspect, which it is unnecessary now to consider.

Numerous objections are raised to the proceedings on the trial, to which the answer is apparent, that no objection was made at the time, and the defendant must be deemed to have assented. Such are the objections to the empanelling of the grand jury, the endorsement of the bill of indictment by the foreman, the want of signature thereof by the District Attorney, the irregularity in the arraignment of the defendant and in the summoning and empanelling of the trial jury, the form of the verdict, and the time within which the sentence was pronounced. Even if any irregularities were committed in these respects, a Court of Appeal cannot review them, where no objection was made to them in the Court below, and more especially where this Court cannot see that such irregularities affected, in the slightest degree, the administration of substantial justice.

A motion was made to change the place of trial from Napa County to one of the adjoining counties. The motion was founded on affidavits made by the defendant and others. The defendant states in his affidavit, in general terms, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the County of Napa, and the other deponents state that they verily believe that the defendant cannot have a fair and impartial trial in Napa County, on account of the popular excitement and feeling manifested against the accused, and on account of the many false reports in circulation prejudicial to...