People v. McClain

• Citation: 226 Ill.Dec. 66,684 N.E.2d 1062,292 Ill.App.3d 185
• Parties: , 226 Ill.Dec. 66 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie L. McCLAIN, Defendant-Appellant. NO. 4-96-0277.
• Decision Date: 11 September 1997
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1062

684 N.E.2d 1062

292 Ill.App.3d 185, 226 Ill.Dec. 66

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie L. McCLAIN, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-96-0277.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Sept. 11, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1997.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender (Court-Appointed) (John Anthony Palombi, of counsel), Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Willie McClain.

John C. Piland, Champaign County State's Attorney, Urbana, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, James Majors, Staff Atty., State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.

Presiding Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 1996, defendant, Willie L. McClain, was serving a sentence of natural life in prison upon his conviction of two counts of first degree murder when he filed pro se a post-conviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)). Because defendant filed his petition late under section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West Supp.1995)), he also filed a motion to file a late petition for postconviction relief. In that motion, defendant alleged that his delay in timely filing his postconviction petition should be excused because it was not due to his culpable negligence, but was due instead to a "lockdown" at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac), where he was incarcerated.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to file his late postconviction petition. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 1993, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder stemming from the deaths of two victims, and in March 1993, the trial court sentenced him to natural life imprisonment on each conviction. He appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. People v. McClain, 269 Ill.App.3d 500, 206 Ill.Dec. 580, 645 N.E.2d 585 (1995). He filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which was denied on April 5, 1995. People v. McClain, 161 Ill.2d 535, 208 Ill.Dec. 366, 649 N.E.2d 422 (1995).

On March 18, 1996, defendant filed his postconviction petition and accompanying documents (which included his motion to file a late petition for postconviction relief instanter, an affidavit in support of that motion, an affidavit in support of his postconviction petition, a document entitled "memorandum of law/finding of facts," a motion for appointment of counsel, and a motion to proceed as a poor person).

In defendant's motion to file a late petition for post-conviction relief, he asserted that Pontiac, where he was incarcerated, was on "lockdown" for reasons unknown to defendant during the following times: 16 days of January 1995; five days in February 1995; 17 days of March 1995; three days of April 1995; 12 days of May 1995; 13 days of June 1995; 24 days of July 1995; no days of August 1995; 12 days of September 1995; all of October 1995; 12 days of November 1995; 21 days of December 1995; 20 days of January 1996; all of February 1996; and March 1 through 14 of 1996. Defendant further alleged that during such "lockdowns," the prison severely restricted the movement of inmates, including prohibiting them from using the prison's law library. Defendant also asserted that continuous "lockdowns" adversely affected his ability to investigate aspects of his postconviction petition and to prepare it. As a result, he sought assistance from a prominent Chicago law firm which--defendant alleges--"held on to petitioner's transcripts given [sic ] the petitioner the false belief that they was [sic ] going to assist him only to tell him six-months [sic ] later that they wouldn't help him."

After defendant learned the law firm was not going to assist him, he "finally got assistance from [a] jail house lawyer." He concluded the motion by asserting that he had put forth his best good-faith effort to file a timely petition and the delay was not due to his own culpable negligence.

Defendant attached to that motion a letter dated September 26, 1995, from the pro bono coordinator of the Chicago law firm, which informed defendant that the law firm would be unable to handle his case due to the large number of similar requests it receives. Although the letter indicated that the law firm was returning defendant's "documents" to him (without specifying what those documents were), the letter did not indicate how long the law firm had possessed those documents.

II. ANALYSIS

Resolution of defendant's argument that the trial court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition on the ground that it was not timely filed requires a careful analysis of section 122-1 of the Act, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West Supp.1995).

The supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal on April 5, 1995. Therefore, he had six months from that date--or until October 5, 1995--in which to file his post-conviction petition. (Note that this October 1995 deadline is "sooner" than February 1996, which would be three years from the date of defendant's conviction.) However, defendant filed his postconviction petition (and its accompanying documents) on March 18, 1996, approximately 5 1/2 months late. Defendant has attempted to excuse this 5 1/2-month delay by showing that it was not due to his "culpable negligence," as that term is used in section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West Supp.1995)). We are unpersuaded.

Section 122-1 of the Act sets forth the time period in which a defendant must file a postconviction petition and then places the burden upon a defendant who files after that time period has expired to allege facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West Supp.1995). That language demonstrates that the late-filing defendant has the burden of proof at any evidentiary hearing conducted on the issue of whether the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. However, section 122-1 of the Act does not address how strong a showing a defendant must make when alleging facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence in order to warrant evidentiary hearing. Because the language at issue in section 122-1 of the Act constitutes part of a comprehensive statutory scheme addressing postconviction attacks on convictions, we conclude that a defendant's burden to allege facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence should be the same burden the Act otherwise imposes on a defendant who seeks an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claims. As the Supreme Court of Illinois recently explained, that burden is the following:

"A defendant [who has filed a postconviction petition] is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. [Citations.] Instead, an evidentiary hearing should be conducted where a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights has been made, supported by the record or affidavits." People v. Thomas, 164 Ill.2d 410, 416, 207 Ill.Dec. 490, 494, 647 N.E.2d 983, 987 (1995).

Thus, we hold that before a trial court need conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding defendant's claim that his delay in timely filing a postconviction petition was not due to his culpable negligence, he must make a "substantial showing" by alleging facts demonstrating that to be the case. Defendant here has failed to make such a showing.

As previously pointed out, defendant filed his post-conviction petition 5 1/2 months later than section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West Supp.1995)) requires. Assuming the accuracy of his claim that Pontiac was on "lockdown" during a substantial portion of that 5 1/2-month period, resulting in prohibitions on inmates using the prison's law library, it does not follow that these circumstances justified defendant's tardy filing. Implicit in defendant's argument is the assumption that in order to prepare his postconviction petition, he needed to do research in the prison law library. However, that assumption is false.

As the supreme court recently explained in People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 199, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996):

"[A] post-conviction proceeding [under the Act] that does not involve the death penalty has three distinct stages. In the first stage, the defendant files a petition and the circuit court determines whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. At this stage, the Act does not permit any further pleadings from the defendant or any motions or responsive pleadings from the State. Instead, the circuit court considers the petition independently, without any input from either side. To survive dismissal at this stage, a petition need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. [Citation.] This is a low threshold and a defendant need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition. At this stage, a defendant need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority. [Citation.] The Act provides that the petition must be supported by 'affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations' or the petition 'shall state why the same are not attached.' 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 1992). If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition pursuant to section 122-2.1, it is then docketed for further...