People v. McCloud
| Citation | 310 N.Y.S.2d 772,62 Misc.2d 1086 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Jesse Earl. McCLOUD, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 25 May 1970 |
| Court | New York County Court |
A hearing pursuant to Chapter V of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held over a period of three days to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial as defined in Section 662--b of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Indicted for the crime of Rape, First Degree, (Indictment No. 113, filed March 12, 1969), and for the crime of Assault, First Degree, (Indictment No. 114, filed March 12, 1969), defendant has a long history of mental illness. From February 10, 1966 to April 3, 1970, the date of his last admission, defendant was hospitalized six separate times at the Rochester State Hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. On one of these occasions, March 5, 1969, he was admitted on a criminal order after being charged with assault. At that time the defendant was found unable to stand trial and the following recommendation made: 'Evident that he requires long-term hospitalization and admission to Matteawan is indicated.' On April 16, 1969 the defendant was confined at Matteawan, and not released until a year later when he was returned to the Rochester State Hospital for the most recent question of his competence to stand trial.
The court heard testimony from Dr. Daniel Davis and Dr. Wellington Reynolds, psychiatrists and members of the staff of Rochester State Hospital. Dr. Reynolds is also on the staff of Attica State Prison. Testifying on behalf of the defendant were Dr. William Libertson, Dr. David Mactye, both psychiatrists, the defendant, and his attorney, John Petrucelli.
Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds testified with respect to their report of April 15, 1970 wherein they gave it as their opinion that the defendant was able to understand the charges against him and was competent to stand trial. This report, however, further states:
Their report also states that Mr. McCloud is 'consistently deviant with respect to his reasoning since he rationalizes his improvement on ongoing adversary proceedings involving peoples' attitudes towards him and his ability to continuously cope with adversity.'
Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds agreed that defendant's illness was not difficult to bring under control as long as he was taking medication and undergoing psychotherapy, but that the illness was incurable. However, it was their opinion that under conditions of increased pressure, the defendant would be likely to relapse, and that even with medication, the defendant might and probably would decompensate under the stresses and pressure of the trial. Both doctor's candidly admitted that they were unable to render an opinion whether at the time of the competency hearing, less than one month after they had last seen him, the defendant was able to understand the charges or proceedings or able to aid in his defense. They testified it was quite possible for the defendant to have since relapsed and that they would not know, without further examination, whether or not the defendant was still logical, or if his thinking had again become disoriented and his reasoning impaired. They stated that by their language in the report that recovery was 'somewhat tenuous' was meant that the defendant would not remain improved over a period of time, particularly in periods of stress, and that the words 'consistently deviant' meant that the defendant is consistently mentally ill.
After his examination at the Rochester State Hospital and return to the jail, the defendant continued to receive the required amount of medication prescribed for him by Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds at the State Hospital, 500 mg. of Thorazine and 15 mg. of Stellazine.
It was the opinion of Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds that because of the nature of the defendant's illness, his mental competence would constantly fluctuate throughout the trial and, without continuously examining him during the court proceedings, one would not know the defendant's mental competence to stand trial at any given time.
Dr. Libertson examined the defendant on May 5, 1970, the day before the hearing, at the Monroe County Jail and made a preliminary diagnosis. Before making such diagnosis, he examined a copy of the Rochester State Hospital report, and also had an opportunity to review defense counsel's notes of the testimony of Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds. He diagnosed the defendant at the time of the examination as being obviously delusional. Some of the defendant's responses indicated that he was actively hallucinating. At one point he believed that Dr. Libertson was communicating with the guards downstairs. His thought processes were scattered, illogical, paranoid and seldom responsive to the crucial problems. It was Dr. Libertson's opinion, both in his preliminary diagnosis and in his testimony, that the defendant is mentally ill; that in the face of the current medication which defendant was still receiving, he was nevertheless mentally ill and not controlled; that he was not then in a satisfactory state of remission and that he had a defective ability to understand reality.
It was Dr. Libertson's further opinion that jail confinement and the impending judicial process had adversely affected the defendant; that he had a delusional interpretation of the law which made him unable to assist counsel in his defense and that defendant was not capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings, nor of understanding the charges against him, nor was he able to assist counsel in his defense and that, accordingly, defendant is not now competent to stand trial.
The defendant himself testified and gave a melancholy recital of the sordid conditions and depraved, brutalizing life he had experienced at Matteawan.
John Petrucelli, defendant's counsel, also testified regarding the conditions he found at Matteawan when he made a visit there and stated he felt that they were worse than those at the Monroe County Penitentiary which the State Department of Correction had ordered discontinued more than a year ago as being unfit for further use or habitation. Petrucelli's testimony seemed to make Matteawan fall within the definition given some prisons by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark as 'warehouses of degraded humanity.'
Along the same line, Dr. David Mactye, a psychiatrist and a full-time staff member and assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Rochester, as well as Assistant Director of the Court Psychiatric Clinic, testified that he had visited Matteawan in 1965 in connection with his work in the Court Psychiatric Clinic to view its facilities as well as the work being done there. He spoke to people committed there as well as those awaiting trial and to members of the staff. In addition, he took an extensive tour of the buildings, including the open wards and the closely confined quarters where people awaiting trial were kept. Dr. Mactye described the conditions there as primitive, and the situation as not adequately structured for the people there. The occupational therapists informed him that they were understaffed and overworked, and the overall picture was one of insufficient staff. Some of the inmates seemed to be poorly treated. What particularly struck the court was Dr. Mactye's unequivocal opinion that Attica Prison can and does handle people better than those who are confined to Matteawan regardless of whether such people are disturbed or not, because the inmates there get more attention and better treatment. He stated that every psychiatrist who has seen both facilities believes confinement in Attica Prison to be more beneficial for an individual than Matteawan.
Dr. Mactye also testified that there are facilities available at the Rochester State Hospital for an individual such as the defendant who is controllable by medication, who is awaiting trial, who is not violent and who has not been adjudicated criminally dangerous; further, that the defendant would be better off treated in a local facility and one with a more humane course of treatment, such as the Rochester State Hospital. He informed the court that generally, patients sent to Matteawan from the Rochester State Hospital are sent only if they are 'severely and intractably violent'.
The court finds that the defendant is in such a state of idiocy, imbecility or insanity as to be incapable of understanding the charges against him or the proceedings or of making his defense. Accordingly, the trial or proceedings must be suspended pursuant to Section 662--b.
The court finds that such transitory and fluctuating periods of remission which the defendant may have under medication does not constitute the competence which the law requires of anyone being made the subject of its process, and that the oscillating states of control described by Dr. Davis and Dr. Reynolds which appear to be temporary and subject to the continuous stresses and strains of the courtroom would be inadequate to assure the defendant the kind of trial which the law requires.
The court does not now touch upon the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of the medical, rehabilitative or remedial program at Matteawan State...
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