People v. McCray

Decision Date03 October 2014
Docket Number953 KA 11-01376.
Citation2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 06720,993 N.Y.S.2d 413,121 A.D.3d 1549
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ricardo McCRAY, also known as “Murder,” also known as “Murder Matt,” also known as “Matt,” also known as “Mac,” Defendant-appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Susan C. Ministero of Counsel), for DefendantAppellant.

Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Donna A. Milling of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.

OpinionMEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of three counts of murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27 [1 ] [a] [viii] ), two counts of attempted murder in the first degree (§§ 110.00, 125.27[1][a] [viii] ) and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that his right to counsel indelibly attached when several people informed the police that he was represented by an attorney, and that County Court therefore erred in refusing to suppress the statements that he thereafter made to the police. We reject that contention. The evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, which includes video recordings, establishes that defendant, accompanied by a community activist and others, went to a television station in order to surrender himself to the police. Before the attorney arrived, however, the police placed defendant in custody. The community activist who had accompanied defendant to the television station informed the police that an attorney was on the way to that location. The police nevertheless took defendant to a police station and administered Miranda warnings, after which defendant made the statements at issue. The above evidence also establishes, unequivocally, that defendant did not inform the police that he wished to speak with an attorney, and that no attorney contacted the police department before defendant made the statements at issue. An attorney contacted the police department approximately 15 minutes after defendant arrived at the police station, and there is no dispute that the police stopped questioning defendant at that time.

We reject defendant's contention that his right to counsel indelibly attached when the community activist told the arresting police officers at the television station that defendant had an attorney who was on his way. “It is well settled that ‘the right to counsel is personal’ to the accused (People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 350, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 558 N.E.2d 1011 [1990] ) and thus cannot be invoked by a third party on behalf of an adult defendant (People v. Brown, 309 A.D.2d 1258, 1258, 765 N.Y.S.2d 562, lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 595, 776 N.Y.S.2d 227, 808 N.E.2d 363 ; see People v. Mitchell, 2 N.Y.3d 272, 275, 778 N.Y.S.2d 427, 810 N.E.2d 879 ; People v. Grice, 100 N.Y.2d 318, 324 n. 2, 763 N.Y.S.2d 227, 794 N.E.2d 9 ). Thus, where, as here, a third party not affiliated with a lawyer or law firm indicates that defendant may have an attorney, “it would be unreasonable to require the police to cease a criminal investigation and begin a separate inquiry to verify whether the defendant is actually represented by counsel. Direct communication by an attorney or a professional associate of the attorney to the police assures that the suspect ‘has actually retained a lawyer in the matter at issue’ (Grice, 100 N.Y.2d at 324, 763 N.Y.S.2d 227, 794 N.E.2d 9 ). Absent such direct communication, the police herein had no duty to investigate whether defendant was represented by counsel, and defendant's right to counsel did not indelibly attach until an attorney later called the police directly. Inasmuch as all questioning ceased at that time, we conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the statements defendant made before that time. Defendant's reliance upon People v. Lopez is misplaced (16 N.Y.3d 375, 923 N.Y.S.2d 377, 947 N.E.2d 1155 ). There, the defendant was held in custody on another, unrelated matter, and the Court of Appeals clearly stated that its “decision [was] premised on the fact that the right to counsel was violated on the particular matter for which the defendant was in custody” ( id., at 386, 923 N.Y.S.2d 377, 947 N.E.2d 1155 ), whereas in the case before us defendant was not in custody on another matter.

Defendant failed to make a recusal motion and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court displayed actual bias in favor of the prosecution by issuing a gag order without first determining whether defendant's right to a fair trial was in danger of being impacted, by making evidentiary rulings unfavorable to defendant, and by making sarcastic comments to defense counsel (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Prado, 4 N.Y.3d 725, 726, 790 N.Y.S.2d 418, 823 N.E.2d 824, rearg. denied 4 N.Y.3d 795, 795 N.Y.S.2d 170, 828 N.E.2d 86 ; People v. Charleston, 56 N.Y.2d 886, 887–888, 453 N.Y.S.2d 399, 438 N.E.2d 1114 ). In any event, the record does not support defendant's contention that the court displayed actual bias in its evidentiary rulings or made sarcastic comments (see People v. Persaud, 98 A.D.3d 527, 529, 949 N.Y.S.2d 431, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1014, 960 N.Y.S.2d 357, 984 N.E.2d 332, reconsideration denied 21 N.Y.3d 913, 966 N.Y.S.2d 365, 988 N.E.2d 894 ; People v. Marino, 21 A.D.3d 430, 432, 800 N.Y.S.2d 439, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 883, 808 N.Y.S.2d 586, 842 N.E.2d 484, cert. denied 548 U.S. 908, 126 S.Ct. 2930, 165 L.Ed.2d 958 ), and the court did not err in prohibiting all counsel from making extrajudicial statements in violation of Rule 3.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct as set forth in 22 NYCRR 1200.0(a) and (b)(1) (see e.g. People v. Buttafuoco, 158 Misc.2d 174, 180–181, 599 N.Y.S.2d 419 ; see generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358–363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 ).

The majority of defendant's contentions with respect to the elicitation of testimony regarding his nickname, i.e., Murder or Murder Matt, are not preserved for our review. Although defendant objected to the use of those nicknames, the court gave curative instructions and defendant failed to seek a mistrial or otherwise object to those instructions. Under those circumstances, “the curative instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant's satisfaction” (People v. Heide, 84 N.Y.2d 943, 944, 620 N.Y.S.2d 814, 644 N.E.2d 1370 ; see People v. Lane, 106 A.D.3d 1478, 1480–1481, 966 N.Y.S.2d 307, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1043, 972 N.Y.S.2d 540, 995 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Adams, 90 A.D.3d 1508, 1509, 936 N.Y.S.2d 406, lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 954, 944 N.Y.S.2d 483, 967 N.E.2d 708 ). In any event, defendant's preserved and unpreserved contentions are without merit. Where, as here, “several of the People's witnesses knew defendant only by his nicknames, it was permissible for the People to elicit testimony regarding those nicknames at trial for identification purposes” (People v. Tolliver, 93 A.D.3d 1150, 1150, 940 N.Y.S.2d 398, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 968, 950 N.Y.S.2d 120, 973 N.E.2d 218 ; see People v. Hoffler, 41 A.D.3d 891, 892, 837 N.Y.S.2d 750, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 962, 848 N.Y.S.2d 30, 878 N.E.2d 614 ; cf. People v. Collier, 114 A.D.3d 1136, 1137, 979 N.Y.S.2d 726 ).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct during summation inasmuch as he failed to object to any of the challenged comments (see People v. Ward, 107 A.D.3d 1605, 1606, 966 N.Y.S.2d 805, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1078, 974 N.Y.S.2d 327, 997 N.E.2d 152 ). In any event, although we agree with defendant that the prosecutor improperly commented that the “real Murder Matt” is the person who committed the shootings rather than the mild-mannered man depicted in the video recordings at the television studio or wearing glasses at trial (see People v. Webb, 90 A.D.3d 1563, 1565, 935 N.Y.S.2d 423, amended on rearg. 92 A.D.3d 1268, 937 N.Y.S.2d 911 ; People v. Lauderdale, 295 A.D.2d 539, 540–541, 746 N.Y.S.2d 163 ), we nevertheless conclude that such ‘improprieties were not so pervasive or egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial’ (People v. Johnson, 303 A.D.2d 967, 968, 759 N.Y.S.2d 260, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 583, 764 N.Y.S.2d 393, 796 N.E.2d 485 ). We further conclude that “any error with respect to the prosecutor's use of the nicknames is harmless inasmuch as the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but for the alleged error, especially in light of the court's instruction to the jury” (Tolliver, 93 A.D.3d at 1151, 940 N.Y.S.2d 398 ; People v. Santiago, 255 A.D.2d 63, 66, 691 N.Y.S.2d 22, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 829, 702 N.Y.S.2d 599, 724 N.E.2d 391 ). The remaining instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct on summation were ‘either a fair response to defense counsel's summation or fair comment on the evidence’ (People v. Green, 60 A.D.3d 1320, 1322, 875 N.Y.S.2d 390, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 915, 884 N.Y.S.2d 696, 912 N.E.2d 1077 ).

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  • People v. McCray
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 3 Octubre 2014
    ...?121 A.D.3d 1549993 N.Y.S.2d 4132014 N.Y. Slip Op. 06720The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,v.Ricardo McCRAY, also known as “Murder,” also known as “Murder Matt,” also known as “Matt,” also known as “Mac,” defendant-appellant.Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,......

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