People v. McElvaine

• Decision Date: 29 April 1890
• Citation: 121 N.Y. 250,24 N.E. 465
• Parties: PEOPLE v. McELVAINE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

121 N.Y. 250

24 N.E. 465

PEOPLE

v.McELVAINE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 29, 1890.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Kings county.

George M. Curtis, for appellant.

James W. Ridgway, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

RUGER, C. J.

The defendant upon trial was convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, for having killed one Luca in his own house, in Brooklyn, about 3 o'clock in the morning of the 23d day of August, 1889. The evidence showed that the defendant entered the house through a window in the second floor, by means of a ladder, which he found on the premises, and that such entrance was effected by forcibly removing a wire screen from the window. Access to this window was obtained from a back yard, into which an unlocked gate opened from the street. The deceased was killed by stabs with a knife inflicted upon him while endeavoring to forcibly prevent the escape of the accused from the room which he first entered. Tweleve stabs were given, of which four were described to have been mortal. The defendant was positively identified by two persons who saw him in the act of inflicting the wounds, and was immediately arrested by the police officers in the street near the gate, within 100 feet of the premises, with a bloody knife in his possession. Independent of the confessions subsequently made by the defendant to the police officers and others, no doubt could possibly be entertained, on the evidence, as to the identification of the accused as the person who committed the homicide. No effort was therefore made on the trial to show that he was not the person who caused the death of Luca.Thesole defense attempted was the alleged insanity of the accused. Considerable evidence was given on the trial in his behalf, tending to show that he possessed a defective mental organization, and was subject to delusions and hallucinations, which were claimed to be evidence of his insanity. Two witnesses were called on his behalf, as experts, who respectively gave evidence tending to show a belief that he was, to a certain degree, insane. Two expert witnesses were also called on behalf of the prosecution, to give opinions upon the question of the defendant's sanity, and each testified that he was, in their opinion, sane. It cannot be questioned but that the evidence of these witnesses was material, and had weight with the jury, upon the question of the defendant's mental condition. If these opinions were based upon an erroneous hypothesis, and were founded in any material respect upon indefinite or unascertainable conditions, or upon considerations which were not the proper subject of expert evidence, they must be regarded as having been erroneously admitted.

The only serious objection to the conviction arises upon an exception to the ruling of the court permitting Dr. Gray, a witness for the prosecution, and an expert of high reputation and character, to answer, against objection, a hypothetical question as to the defendant's sanity. The question put by the district attorney, and the proceedings accompanying the question, were as follows: ‘Question. Now, are you able to say whether, in your judgment, based upon all the testimony, the acts of the defendant on the night of this homicide, the testimony as to his past life given by the witnesses in his defense, and based upon the whole case, whether this young man is sane or insane? Mr. Curtis. I object, as it is not a question properly put. The Court. Why not? Mr. Curtis. It is too vague and indefinite. In order to put an hypothetical question properly, so say the court of appeals, it must consist of specifically proven facts, which come within the pale of the proof; not where a person, for instance, is permitted to give an anomalous opinion. The Court. You had better frame the question. Mr. Ridgway. Then I will ask the stenographer to real all the evidence to this witness. The Court. I don't see why the question is not competent. Mr. Curtis. The way is, to take compact, substantial, concentrated oral proof,-what the learned counsel relies on to prove the defendant is sane. The Court. Where a medical witness, who is called as an expert, has been in court during the whole trial, and heard all the testimony in the case, everything that has been done and said by everybody, I don't see why it is not competent to ask him whether, upon those facts, all he heard testified to, he thinks the defendant is sane or insane. This witness has heard all that has been sworn to by everybody. To the Witness. You have heard all the testimony in the case? The District Attorney. Pass the whole testimony of the prosecution and the defense, including the hypothetical question put by Judge Curtis, and everything that you heard sworn to here,-now will you answer the question? (The defense excepts.) A. I have formed an opinion. Q. State it. (The defense excepts.) A. I believe the defendant is sane. Q. What do you believe he was at the time of the commission of the offense? A. I believe he was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.’ We cannot doubt but that this question was improper. The witness was thus permitted to take into consideration all the evidence in the case given upon a long trial, extending over nine days, and, upon so much of it as he could recollect, determine for himself the credibility of the witnesses, the probability or improbability of their statements, and, drawing therefrom such inferences as, in his judgment, were...