People v. McFaddin

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: A165843
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. REAFFORD EUGENE OLIVER McFADDIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. REAFFORD EUGENE OLIVER McFADDIN, Defendant and Appellant.

A165843

California Court of Appeals, First District, Third Division

September 28, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Stanislaus County Super. Ct. No. 1222648

PETROU, J.

Reafford Eugene Oliver McFaddin^[1] appeals from an order extending his involuntary commitment to the Department of State Hospitals for one year to October 19, 2021 as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972.^[2] While this appeal was pending, the challenged one-year involuntary commitment expired. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

On February 9, 2007, McFaddin pleaded guilty to a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), and was sentenced to a mitigated three-year term in state prison. In October of 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) certified that McFaddin met the criteria for certification as an MDO. As a condition of his parole McFaddin was transferred to the custody of the Department of State Hospitals to receive mental health treatment, and since that time he has continuously received treatment in a state hospital setting.

On April 23, 2020, before McFaddin's recommitment was to terminate on October 19, 2020, the district attorney filed a new petition to recommit McFaddin for one year, seeking to extend the commitment to October 19, 2021. In November 2020 a two-day trial was held and a jury found true the petition alleging McFaddin to be an MDO. On November 6, 2020, the trial court ordered McFaddin committed for another year until October 19, 2021. McFaddin timely appealed from the recommitment order issued on November 6, 2020.

During the pendency of this appeal, McFaddin's appellate counsel was granted one extension of time to file appellant's opening brief, respondent was granted five extensions of time to file respondent's opening brief, and McFaddin's appellate counsel was granted three extensions of time to file appellant's reply brief. The parties were also directed to file briefs addressing whether the appeal was moot since the one-year commitment order under review would expire before briefing was completed. In response, the Attorney General stated that as of November 18, 2021, McFaddin's next recommitment trial was scheduled to begin on December 7, 2021.^[3]

DISCUSSION

The Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (§ 2960 et seq.) provides that "[a]s a condition of parole, a prisoner may be designated and civilly committed as an MDO for involuntary treatment of a 'severe mental disorder' if certain conditions are met." (People v Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 99, fn. omitted (Allen); see §§ 2962, subds. (a)-(f), 2966; see People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442, fns. omitted (Dunley).) The commitment term is one year and, prior to the expiration of each commitment period, the district attorney may file an extension petition for an additional one-year term. (Allen, supra, at p. 99; §§ 2970, 2972, subds. (a), (b), (c).)

McFaddin challenges the now-expired order of commitment on the following grounds: (1) the trial court erroneously allowed into evidence inadmissible hearsay evidence in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), and to the extent the issue is not adequately preserved, that failure constituted ineffective assistance of defense counsel; (2) there was no substantial evidence to support the determination that he was an MDO; (3) the trial court improperly intervened to support the prosecutor's case by the manner in which it made its evidentiary rulings regarding the admission of evidence, questioned prosecution witnesses, and sustained objections to portions of defense counsel's closing argument; (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial on all appropriate grounds; and (5) cumulative error.

However, "[b]y the nature of MDO proceedings, in which a new commitment must be sought every year," an appeal from a given commitment order may be rendered moot because the "issues arising in such proceedings can most often not be decided on appeal quickly enough to provide any relief to the person committed. That is the case here." (Dunley, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445; see People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380 [" 'a case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief' "].)

McFaddin argues that a successful resolution of his claim of legally insufficient evidence "could affect the trial court's jurisdiction over subsequent recommitment proceedings." According to McFaddin, if he were successful in securing a reversal based on legally insufficient evidence, he would be entitled to be released from custody as he was never legally committed, and any subsequent commitment would, itself, be void because the government failed to prove he suffered from a severe mental disorder that made him dangerous at the time of the trial in November 2020. We disagree.

When an MDO is not properly committed within a given year, the MDO is not entitled to be released from continued confinement, so long as the district attorney has filed a new petition for recommitment before the end of the one-year commitment period, thereby continuing the trial court's jurisdiction under the MDO Act. (People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 885-886.) As applied here, while McFaddin's commitment order under review expired on October 19, 2021, he would not be entitled to be released if his appeal were meritorious because the district attorney filed a new petition for recommitment for which a trial was scheduled to begin on December 7, 2021. The pending petition continued the trial court's jurisdiction to act under the MDO Act. (Alsafar, supra, at p. 886; see also Dunley, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445 [appeal is moot due to expiration of MDO recommitment order under review as "[a] reversal of appellant's current commitment order would have no effect on the pending petition" for a new recommitment order].)

We recognize that had this appeal been decided before the commitment order expired, and we found the appeal to be meritorious, McFaddin would have been entitled to a reversal and we could have ordered a new hearing. (See Alsafar, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 886 [appeal rendered moot due to expiration of the recommitment order under review; "[i]f this appeal had been heard and decided before the one-year timeline, we could have given Alsafar the effective remedy of a rehearing on the petition"].) However, because McFaddin's recommitment order under review has expired, a reversal would have no practical effect. If the outcome of the new petition for recommitment resulted in the release of McFaddin, then this appeal would be moot. If the outcome of the new petition resulted in a new recommitment order, McFaddin would not be entitled to immediate release as he would now be subject to a new recommitment order. In other words, regardless of the outcome of the new petition for recommitment (McFaddin's release or recommitment), a reversal of the expired commitment order under review can have no practical effect or provide effective relief. ^[4]

In addition, we see no merit to McFaddin's argument that the appeal should not be deemed moot because mootness was caused by the long delay in the filing of respondent's opening brief. McFaddin acknowledges some of the delay was due to reasonable time taken to file the notice of appeal and to file the record. He further concedes some of the delay was due to one extension of time granted for the filing of appellant's opening brief and three extensions of time granted for filing of appellant's reply brief, but asserts those extensions "did not delay the case excessively," rather it was the circumstance that by the time respondent filed respondent's opening brief, it was already too late to have the appeal "resolved in a timely fashion."

In support of his argument, McFaddin challenges the reasons given for the requests to extend time to file respondent's opening brief. However, the record reflects respondent's requests were granted without any opposition by McFaddin's appellate counsel on the grounds now asserted in the reply brief. McFaddin does not contend that individually any of the extension requests were not valid and he concedes counsel for respondent did not do anything specifically wrong. Rather, his complaint is that the government "cannot be permitted to assign the case such as this one with a tight deadline to an attorney who cannot complete work in a timely fashion and then argue that the appellant should not receive appellate review on the basis of mootness when the mootness was caused by the government's own actions."

We are not persuaded. Nothing precluded McFaddin's appellate counsel from opposing any extension of time due to the time-sensitive nature of the appeal and the effect a delay in filing respondent's opening brief would have on mootness. Had an objection been made, the Fifth Appellate District would have been in the position to address any concerns regarding the delay in the briefing of the appeal. The failure to object deprived the Fifth Appellate District of an opportunity to address the issue and results in the absence of any record to support McFaddin's assertion that the government's delay in...