People v. McLaughlin
| Decision Date | 26 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 234433. |
| Citation | 258 Mich. App. 635,672 N.W.2d 860 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Xavier Dean McLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Carl J. Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert J. Berlin, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Edward L. Graham, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Gary L. Kohut, Troy, for the defendant.
Before: OWENS, P.J., and BANDSTRA and MURRAY, JJ.
Following a jury trial in the Macomb Circuit Court, defendant was convicted on three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(e) (). Defendant was sentenced to nine to twenty-five years' imprisonment for each conviction. On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, several evidentiary errors, and errors in the jury instructions. Defendant also asserts that errors occurred at sentencing. After consideration of defendant's arguments, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial and that no errors occurred at sentencing. Consequently, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.
The victim met defendant in December 1999 or January 2000, when defendant was working with the victim's daughter. The victim and defendant developed an amorous relationship, and moved in together soon after they met. The victim, her daughter, and defendant lived together in an apartment in Warren.
Approximately one month after defendant and the victim began dating, defendant told the victim that he used crack cocaine and that he was spending most of his paychecks on crack cocaine. Nonetheless, defendant and the victim sought counseling regarding their relationship and his drug problem from their pastor, Reverend James Moore, and his wife, Missionary Edythe Moore. At trial, defendant denied ever using crack cocaine.
On May 9, 2000, the victim fractured her spine and was hospitalized for three weeks following corrective surgery. The victim and her daughter both testified that defendant sold or pawned their possessions to buy drugs while the victim was in the hospital. The victim contended that she ended her relationship with defendant in May 2000, because he failed to resolve his drug addiction; however, defendant claimed the relationship continued.
Soon after leaving the hospital, the victim rented an efficiency unit in a motel in Warren for herself and her daughter. The victim remained partially immobile from the surgery and used a hospital bed to lie with her knees elevated. The victim testified that she was in too much pain to have any interest in sex during this time.
On August 2, 2000, the victim stopped taking her prescription pain medication and began to experience serious withdrawal symptoms. The victim asked her daughter to call defendant for help, and she and defendant took the victim to an emergency room. The victim spent three weeks in an inpatient drug detoxification and treatment program.
The victim was released from drug treatment around August 22, 2000. On August 27 or 28, defendant called the victim and asked if he could move in with her because he had lost his job. The victim agreed that he could stay for a week, though she had no interest in rekindling the relationship. The victim went to defendant's apartment to pick up defendant and help move his clothes to the motel. Defendant stayed with the victim for the next three nights, sleeping in the motel room bed while the victim slept in the hospital bed. The victim's daughter spent nights with a friend, but returned to the motel during the day. The victim continued to be in pain and remained partially immobile.
On August 29, 2000, defendant asked to borrow the victim's car so he could take a vinyl siding job and earn money for rent. The victim and her daughter permitted defendant's use of the car because they needed the money for rent and groceries. Defendant said he would return at 10:00 p.m., but did not return that day and the victim was unable to reach him. Defendant denied telling the victim that he would return the car that night.
Defendant returned on August 30, 2000, around 2:30 p.m. without money or groceries, smelling of alcohol. Defendant said he "messed up" or "f—ed up," which the victim and her daughter understood to mean that he had been drinking and using crack cocaine. The victim asked defendant if he had spent all his earnings on crack cocaine and alcohol; defendant admitted that he had. The victim yelled at defendant and told him to leave. Defendant became belligerent, said that he was tired of "trying to put up with [the victim's] perfect ways," squirted water in the victim's eyes, pushed her back onto the bed, and yelled at her to listen to him. Defendant threw the victim's glasses off the bed and refused to get them for her. The victim told defendant to leave, but he refused to do so. Eventually defendant and the victim calmed down, and defendant said that he really wanted to get help for his drug problem. The victim told defendant he could stay a few more days.
While they were talking, a friend of the victim's daughter came to the room and asked the victim's daughter to take her on an errand. After the victim told her daughter that she was all right, the victim's daughter left with her friend. According to the victim, after her daughter left, defendant went to the kitchenette area and picked up a butcher knife. Defendant told the victim to undress and threatened to cut off her clothes if she refused. The victim refused, and defendant told her to "do it or else." The victim continued to refuse, but complied when defendant put the knife to her throat. Defendant then pushed the victim onto the bed on her back, grabbed her ankles, pulled her legs apart, and said, "Bitch, you've asked for this for a long time." Defendant bit the victim's breasts. The victim tried to resist and told defendant he was hurting her.
Defendant sexually penetrated the victim while she was on her back. Defendant then grabbed the victim's wrist, flipped her onto her stomach, and attempted to penetrate her anally, but was unable to completely do so. Defendant then penetrated the victim vaginally a second time to the point of ejaculation. Afterwards, the victim was shaking so hard that she could not stand. Defendant dragged the victim by her hair into the shower and washed the semen off her. The victim tried to leave the shower, but defendant held her in a chokehold and pushed her back in. While defendant was washing his hair, the victim was able to escape from the shower.
The victim's daughter returned at this point, and the victim asked her to make defendant leave. Defendant came out of the bathroom, dressed, and walked out. Defendant returned a few minutes later and banged on the window, but the victim's daughter locked the door and did not allow him to enter. The victim called the police and reported that her ex-boyfriend had raped her at knifepoint.1 The police arrived while defendant was still banging on the door and arrested him.
Defendant argues that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of MCL 780.131 and MCR 6.004(D), as well as the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, U.S. Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, because the trial court denied his motion to dismiss although his trial did not commence until 185 days after he was jailed. These issues raise legal questions that we review de novo. People v. Mackle, 241 Mich.App. 583, 590, 617 N.W.2d 339 (2000).
In People v. Chavies, 234 Mich.App. 274, 280, 593 N.W.2d 655 (1999), we held that the purpose of the statutory 180-day rule was to "`dispose of untried charges against prison inmates so that sentences may run concurrently.'" Id., quoting People v. Bell, 209 Mich.App. 273, 279, 530 N.W.2d 167 (1995); see also MCL 780.131(1); MCR 6.004(D). Thus, the statute applies only to those defendants who, at the time of trial, are currently serving in one of our state penal institutions, and not to individuals awaiting trial in a county jail. People v. Chambers, 439 Mich. 111, 116, 479 N.W.2d 346 (1992); Chavies, supra at 280, 593 N.W.2d 655. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief under MCL 780.131, because he was detained in the county jail before trial.2
However, the federal and state constitutions and Michigan statutory law guarantee criminal defendants a speedy trial without reference to a fixed number of days. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; People v. Cain, 238 Mich.App. 95, 111, 605 N.W.2d 28 (1999). When a defendant claims a violation of this right, the trial court must consider four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 112, 605 N.W.2d 28. When the delay is less than eighteen months, the defendant must prove prejudice. Id. In making this argument, defendant relies solely on the 180 day rule in MCL 780.131, and never attempts to demonstrate prejudice, which is essential where, as here, the delay was less than eighteen months. Cain, supra. Thus, there was no violation of defendant's constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial.
Defendant next raises numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, which he claims either individually or collectively warrant a new trial. We conclude otherwise.
This Court reviews preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case, examining the remarks in context to determine whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v. Rodriguez, 251 Mich.App. 10, 29-30, 650 N.W.2d 96 (2002). The...
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