People v. McLeod

• Citation: 407 Mich. 632,288 N.W.2d 909
• Decision Date: 04 March 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 60368,No. 5,5
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph McLEOD, Defendant and Appellant. Calendar407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 909

288 N.W.2d 909

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph McLEOD, Defendant and Appellant.

Docket No. 60368.

Calendar No. 5.

407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Feb. 1, 1979.

Decided March 4, 1980.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Atty., Appeals, Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff and appellee.

Bruce T. Leitman, P. C., Bloomfield Hills, Lawrence J. Russ of the Illinois Bar, Chicago, Ill., Leslie D. Page, 3rd year Law Student of Wayne State University, for defendant and appellant.

RYAN, Justice (to affirm).

Leave to appeal was granted in this case to address several challenges to the constitutionality of the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict established by 1975 P.A. 180. We agree with the Court of Appeals that on the record in this case there is no showing of a clear and inevitable conflict between this new verdict and either the United States or Michigan constitution. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 77 Mich.App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214.

I. THE STATUTE

1975 P.A. 180 established a new verdict heretofore unknown to the jurisprudence of our state guilty but mentally ill.

The statute provides, in pertinent part, that

"(1) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a, the defendant may be found 'guilty but mentally ill' if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

"(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.

"(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense.

"(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that offense." M.C.L. § 768.36(1); M.S.A. § 28.1059(1).

Section 20a, M.C.L. § 768.20a; M.S.A. § 28.1043(1), establishes certain procedures and rules that are applicable when a defendant in a felony case proposes to offer a defense of insanity.

Mental illness, as used in this statute,

"(M)eans a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." M.C.L. § 330.1400a; M.S.A. § 14.800(400a).

Once a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill, M.C.L. § 768.36(3); M.S.A. § 28.1059(3) authorizes the court to impose any sentence which could lawfully be imposed upon any defendant who is found guilty of the same offense. The statute provides that upon commitment to the custody of the Department of Corrections, the defendant shall undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment for his mental illness or retardation as is psychiatrically indicated. Treatment is to be provided by the Department of Corrections or by the Department of Mental Health after transfer to that agency, pursuant to certain statutory procedures. ¹ M.C.L. § 768.36(4); M.S.A. § 28.1059(4) establishes certain conditions and procedures for placing a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill on probation.

The instant challenge to this statute concerns the sentencing provisions of M.C.L. § 768.36, subdivisions (3) and (4); M.S.A. § 28.1059, subdivisions (3) and (4).

II. FACTS

The defendant, Joseph McLeod, was charged with arson, a felony, in violation of M.C.L. § 750.72; M.S.A. § 28.267. He waived a jury trial and asserted a defense of insanity. At the conclusion of his bench trial on May 17, 1976, he was found guilty of arson but mentally ill. The trial court made the three specific findings required under M.C.L. § 768.36(1); M.S.A. § 28.1059(1). ²

Thereafter the trial court, on its own motion, conducted three hearings to obtain the testimony of certain psychiatrists in an attempt to determine the type of treatment that might be provided to the defendant under the new statute's sentencing alternatives. The court called the assistant director of the Office of Health Care for the Michigan Department of Corrections, the director of the Forensic Department, Northville State Hospital, Michigan Department of Mental Health, and an associate professor of psychiatry at Wayne State University.

After hearing the testimony of these three psychiatrists, obtaining some figures on the rate of transfer of mentally ill patients from the Department of Corrections to the Department of Mental Health, and receiving a post-conviction report concerning the defendant's present mental health from the Recorder's Court Psychiatric Clinic, the trial court filed a written opinion on September 21, 1976.

In its opinion the court found that defendant was presently and chronically mentally ill and required continued care, but held that the treatment mandated by M.C.L. § 768.36(3); M.S.A. § 28.1059(3) would not be provided if defendant was committed to the Department of Corrections. The court found that the conditions within the Department of Corrections, as described by the psychiatrist from that department posed an immediate threat of irreparable harm to defendant.

The court also found that probation, conditioned on continued in-patient treatment by the Department of Mental Health, was not "a viable (sentencing) alternative because the State will not provide such care". In that connection, the court concluded from testimony by a representative of the Department of Mental Health that the department's policies would require the defendant's release "as soon as the administration of strong anti-psychotic drugs masked the overtly gross symptoms" of his mental illness. ³

The court found further that the statutory provisions for probationary sentences for persons found guilty but mentally ill, M.C.L. § 768.36(4); M.S.A. § 28.1059(4), violated state and Federal guarantees of equal protection of the laws by mandating a minimum five-year term of probation for such persons without regard to the existence or extent of their mental illness or the time needed for treatment, while other persons convicted of the same probationable crimes face no such minimum term of probation.

The court held that M.C.L. § 768.36(3); M.S.A. § 28.1059(3) "is legally inert and cannot be given judicial implementation for the reason that compliance with its provisions as to treatment is impossible and the court is thereby deprived of its authority to enter a judgment of guilty but mentally ill or to sentence (defendant) thereunder". ⁴ The court, Sua sponte, set aside the verdict of guilty but mentally ill, declared it a nullity and granted defendant a new trial, despite the fact that none was requested.

The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor's emergency petition for leave to appeal, reversed the order of the trial court granting a new trial and remanded the case for sentencing. 77 Mich.App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977). The Court of Appeals held that the reasons asserted by the trial court to support the finding of unconstitutionality were premature because they all involved speculation that neither the Department of Corrections nor the Department of Mental Health would heed the mandate of the statute. Consequently, the Court of Appeals found no clear and inevitable conflict between the statute and the Constitution on the record presented at that time and remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of sentence.

Following this decision, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years probation with psychiatric treatment to be provided by the Department of Mental Health as a condition of probation. The trial court's written order specifically acknowledged defense counsel's objection to the five-year term of probation. The court stated that it was of the opinion that neither defendant's nor society's needs would be well served by the five-year term of probation and that it would have sentenced defendant to a shorter period of probation but for the mandate of the statute. M.C.L. § 768.36(4); M.S.A. § 28.1059(4).

Subsequently, this Court granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal on the following issues:

"(1) Whether the failure of the Court of Appeals to consider the trial court's factual finding of immediate and irreparable injury to the defendant impairs the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the trial court's action was premature;

"(2) Whether under the circumstances of this case the sentencing court was an appropriate forum for determining that the sentencing provisions of M.C.L. 768.36; M.S.A. 28.1059 cannot be implemented "(3) Whether M.C.L. 768.36; M.S.A. 28.1059 violates due process of law because the act itself gives the defendant an undeniable right to such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness, when it is shown factually that defendant will not be afforded such psychiatric treatment;

"(4) Whether the actual operation of M.C.L. 768.36; M.S.A. 28.1059 violates the Eight Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment;

"(5) Whether subsection (4) of M.C.L. 768.36; M.S.A. 28.1059 which provides a period of probation for those found guilty but mentally ill shall be not less than five years, violates equal protection and due process clauses of the constitutions?" 402 Mich. 927-928 (1978).

III. THE AVAILABILITY OF TREATMENT

The first four issues on which leave was granted are considered together because they are each related to the trial court's determination that the treatment mandated by M.C.L. § 768.36; M.S.A. § 28.1059 would not be provided to defendant.

After careful consideration of the proceedings below, as well as the able argument and enlightening brief of defense counsel, we find ourselves in agreement with the Court of Appeals

"that matters relating to post-sentence treatment, or lack of treatment, are prematurely raised. The reasons asserted by the trial judge for her finding of unconstitutionality are premature in that they all relate to speculation that the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health will not pay heed to the statute. While future events may prove the trial...