People v. McWilson

• Decision Date: 16 March 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 45703
• Citation: 104 Mich.App. 550,305 N.W.2d 536
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin McWILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 536

305 N.W.2d 536

104 Mich.App. 550

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benjamin McWILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 45703.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 16, 1981.

Released for Publication May 15, 1981.

Joseph J. Jerkins, Kalamazoo, for defendant-appellant; James F. Bauhof, Kalamazoo, of counsel.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James J. Gregart, Pros. Atty., Karen L. Reynolds, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P. J., and J. H. GILLIS and WALSH, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(e). He was sentenced to 20 to 40 years imprisonment. He appeals as of right.

The crime with which defendant was charged occurred in the West Campus Apartments near Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The complainant was awakened in her apartment by a man who wore a bandana mask from the bridge of his nose to his throat. He took the complainant to the laundry room in her building and sexually assaulted her. During the assault, the man sat on a table used for folding clothes, leaned back and placed his ungloved hands, palms down, behind him.

At trial, the complainant was unable to identify defendant as her assailant. He was apparently convicted on the basis of fingerprints found on the laundry room table in a location consistent with the complainant's description of her assailant's sitting position.

On appeal, defendant raises three issues. The first issue asserts that defendant's motions for directed verdict made at the close of the prosecutor's proofs, and again after defendant rested, should have been granted. The basis for this argument is that the evidence was entirely circumstantial, requiring an impermissible pyramid of inferences in order to convict defendant. Further, defendant states that, because the evidence was circumstantial, the prosecutor was required to disprove the theory of innocence advanced by defendant in explanation of the fact that his fingerprints were found on the laundry table.

We affirm the trial court's orders denying defendant's motions for directed verdict.

First, we note our agreement with this Court's opinion in People v. Edgar, 75 Mich.App. 467, 255 N.W.2d 648 (1977). In that case, it was stated that:

"First, we believe that the implied distrust of circumstantial evidence is not warranted. Whether the evidence is 'direct' or 'circumstantial', we would not allow a conviction if we felt that the evidence was not sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that the rule requires the prosecution to disprove all negative theories, the test could never be met, even by direct evidence. Even with eye-witness testimony there are always innocent theories which are not specifically disproven. There will always be a chance that an eye-witness is honestly mistaken about an identification.

"Second, there is a tendency to classify evidence as 'direct' if the desired inference is compelling and to call it 'circumstantial' if the inference is merely the most likely of several alternatives. * * *

" * * * This is a close case, and that has forced us to examine the rule upon which the defendant's argument rests. We conclude that the rule is defective to the extent that it treats circumstantial evidence differently than direct evidence and to the extent that it requires the prosecution to specifically disprove all innocent theories. It should be sufficient if the prosecution proves its own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defense may produce.

" * * * The circumstantial evidence rule discussed and rejected herein represents one attempt to state an easily applied mechanical test for singling out those cases (which are simply too weak to go to the jury). We cannot suggest an alternative test which offers a comparable apparent ease of application. We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v. Royal, 62 Mich.App. 756, 757-758, 233 N.W.2d 860 (1975):

" 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Citations omitted.)

"See also People v. Fudge, 66 Mich.App. 625, 239 N.W.2d 686 (1976); People v. Combs, 69 Mich.App. 711, 245 N.W.2d 338 (1976)." 75 Mich.App. 467, 472-474, 255 N.W.2d 648.

On the basis of Edgar, we reject defendant's assertion that the prosecutor was required to specifically disprove defendant's theory of innocence regarding his fingerprints. All the prosecutor was required to do was prove his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt despite the evidence offered by defendant.

We further reject defendant's claim that the jury's verdict was based on an impermissible pyramid of inferences. The circumstantial evidence of defendant's fingerprints upon the laundry table clearly proves that he must have touched the laundry table at some time. The jury could reasonably believe that, because of the extensive use normally made of the laundry table, fingerprints would remain for only a short period of time. Furthermore, the jury could reasonably believe that, for the fingerprints to be left in the position where they were found, defendant must have touched the laundry table in approximately the same manner as the victim testified her assailant did. Thus, the evidence produced a question of fact which the jury could properly answer. That is, the jury could ask, if defendant sat on this table in the same manner as the victim testified her assailant did, is defendant in fact the assailant? Defendant offered an explanation why he might have sat on that particular laundry table. Apparently the jury did not believe him.

Inferences may only be drawn from established facts, and guilt cannot be found by drawing an inference from another inference. People v. Atley, 392 Mich. 298, 220 N.W.2d 465 (1974); People v. Petro, 342 Mich. 299, 70 N.W.2d 69 (1955). In People v. Orsie, 83 Mich.App. 42, 48, 268 N.W.2d 278 (1978), lv. den. 408 Mich. 857 (1980), this Court found the "inference upon inference" terminology confusing and misleading, and expressed a preference to scuttle it entirely. Citing a number of decisions, the Court found that what was really meant by the phrase was that an inference may not be based upon evidence which was merely conjectural.

Whatever is meant by the phrase "inference upon inference", the law in Michigan is that guilt may not be based upon such a foundation. However, the fact finder is not prevented from making more than one inference in reaching its decision. That is, if each inference is independently supported by established fact, any number of inferences may be combined to decide the ultimate question.

In the present case, the jury was required to make three essential inferences in order to find defendant guilty. Each of these inferences was supported by independent evidence. The evidence clearly established that defendant's fingerprints were found on the laundry room table. From this established fact,...