People v. Mead

• Decision Date: 22 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 156376,156376
• Citation: 503 Mich. 205,931 N.W.2d 557
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Gerald MEAD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

503 Mich. 205

931 N.W.2d 557

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Larry Gerald MEAD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 156376

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal October 24, 2018.

Decided April 22, 2019.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Jerard M. Jarzynka, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.

Michael A. Faraone, PC, Lansing (by Michael A. Faraone ) for defendant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except Cavanagh, J.)

McCormack, C.J.

The defendant was a passenger in a car when the police pulled it over, ordered him out, and searched his backpack. He thinks that search was unconstitutional. A straightforward application of well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—complicated only by a peremptory order of this court, People v. LaBelle , 478 Mich. 891, 732 N.W.2d 114 (2007) —says he’s right.

We overrule LaBelle , conclude that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his backpack, and hold that the warrantless search of the defendant’s backpack was unreasonable because the driver lacked apparent common authority to consent to the search. And we therefore reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, and remand the case to the Jackson Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2014, Jackson Police Officer Richard Burkart pulled over Rachel Taylor for driving with an expired plate. As he approached the car to ask for Taylor’s license and registration, Burkart observed the defendant, Larry Gerald Mead, in the passenger seat, clutching a black backpack on his lap.

Burkart asked for identification from both and determined through a database search that neither had an outstanding warrant. Although Taylor had admitted that she did not have a valid driver’s license, Burkart decided that he would not arrest her but would try to get her permission to search the car. Burkart asked Taylor to step out of the car, out of the defendant’s earshot. (Burkart later testified that he "typically" pulls the driver aside to obtain consent because "that way you can get an answer from them that’s not influenced by the other people that may be in [the] car.") After a brief conversation, Burkart learned that Taylor had just met the defendant—they were traveling the same direction, and she had agreed to drop the defendant off on her way. Burkart obtained Taylor’s consent to search her person and the vehicle.

Once Burkart had obtained Taylor’s consent to search, he returned to the car and asked the defendant to get out. The defendant left his backpack on the passenger floorboard before stepping outside.¹ He permitted Burkart to frisk him for narcotics and weapons. Burkart also asked the defendant how he knew Taylor. The defendant confirmed that they had met that night at a mutual friend’s home and that Taylor had let him hitch a ride.

Burkart requested that the defendant step away from the vehicle, and Burkart then began to search the passenger side. He opened the defendant’s backpack and inside found a digital scale, 5 prescription pills, 9.8 grams of marijuana, and 4.03 grams of methamphetamine. The defendant acknowledged the backpack was his and was arrested. He was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i ).

Officer Burkart testified at the defendant’s preliminary examination that Taylor did not give explicit consent to search the backpack (only the vehicle) and that he did not separately seek the defendant’s consent to search the backpack. Burkart also testified that he believed (but did not confirm) that the backpack belonged to defendant because he was hugging it in his lap.

The defendant was bound over for trial. In the circuit court, he moved to suppress the evidence of methamphetamine in his backpack as the fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied his motion, citing this Court’s peremptory order in People v. LaBelle , 478 Mich. 891, 732 N.W.2d 114. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve 2 to 10 years in prison.

The defendant appealed. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence because our LaBelle order held that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the backpack after the driver consented to the search of the car. People v. Mead , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 13, 2016 (Docket No. 327881), 2016 WL 4804081. The defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that Court with directions to consider: "(1) whether this Court’s peremptory order in People v. LaBelle , 478 Mich. 891, 732 N.W.2d 114 (2007), is distinguishable; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the police officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver’s consent to justify the search, see Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) ; and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified." People v. Mead , 500 Mich. 967, 967, 892 N.W.2d 379 (2017).

On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that the defendant’s case could not be distinguished from LaBelle , that Rodriguez ’s common-authority framework does not apply to third-party consent searches of containers in automobiles in Michigan, and that no other grounds justified the search. People v. Mead (On Remand) , 320 Mich. App. 613, 617, 621, 627, 908 N.W.2d 555 (2017). Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application and directed supplemental briefing on these issues:

(1) whether Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), should control the resolution of the question whether the police officer had lawful consent to search the backpack found in the vehicle; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver’s consent to justify the search; and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified or the evidence may be deemed admissible. [ People v. Mead , 501 Mich. 1029, 1030, 908 N.W.2d 546 (2018).]

II. ANALYSIS

To resolve this case, we must determine whether the challenged search infringed an interest the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect, and if so, whether the search complied with the Fourth Amendment. But we cannot address those questions without first ironing out a wrinkle in our jurisprudence—our peremptory order in People v. LaBelle . In LaBelle , we held that passengers categorically lack "standing" to challenge a search of the vehicle in which they were traveling. We also held that the search of LaBelle’s (the passenger’s) backpack was valid because the officer had authority to search the passenger compartment (based on either the driver’s consent or, in the alternative, as a search incident to arrest) and "[a]uthority to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle includes any unlocked containers located therein, including the backpack in this case." LaBelle , 478 Mich. at 892, 732 N.W.2d 114. In so holding, LaBelle announced two black-and-white rules in an area of the law full of shades of gray. The Fourth Amendment demands nothing more or less than reasonableness. And reasonableness does not lend itself to bright-line rules.

A. "STANDING"

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution—like Article 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, whose protections have been construed as coextensive with its federal counterpart, see People v. Slaughter , 489 Mich. 302, 311, 803 N.W.2d 171 (2011) —protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. To invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protections, a defendant must first establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.² Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 148-149, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) ; People v. Smith , 420 Mich. 1, 17-18, 360 N.W.2d 841 (1984) (adopting the Rakas "legitimate expectation of privacy" test). Moreover, the expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith , 420 Mich. at 28, 360 N.W.2d 841. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id .

In the usual case, a passenger will not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in someone else’s car. As Rakas explained, "a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy" in areas like the glove compartment or trunk. Rakas , 439 U.S. at 148-149, 99 S.Ct. 421. But " Rakas did not hold that passengers cannot have an expectation of privacy in automobiles." Byrd v. United States , 584 U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1528, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018) (emphasis added). In short, the usual case is not every case; normally does not mean never.

Thus, we overrule LaBelle ’s holding that "[b]ecause the stop of the vehicle was legal, the defendant, a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the subsequent search of the vehicle." LaBelle , 478 Mich. at 892, 732 N.W.2d 114. In its place, we reaffirm that a person—whether she is a passenger in a vehicle, or a pedestrian, or a homeowner, or a hotel guest—may challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation if she can show under the totality of the circumstances that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that her expectation of privacy was one that society is prepared to...