People v. Medrano

• Decision Date: 07 July 2003
• Docket Number: B161648.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JULIO CESAR MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JULIO CESAR MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.

B161648.

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four.

Filed July 7, 2003.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. BA230485. Rand S. Rubin, Judge.

Affirmed.

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Erin M. Pitman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CURRY, J.

Julio Cesar Medrano appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5) and his admission to having served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd (b)). He was sentenced to prison for the five-year upper term on his conviction, plus one year on the prior prison term enhancement.

Appellant contends he was deprived of due process and a fair trial (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.) by the prejudicial admission of evidence of his 1999 prior drug-related arrest. He also contends his prior prison term enhancement must be stricken, because when he admitted the underlying prior conviction he was not advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to confront witnesses (U.S. Const., 5th & 6th Amends.)

Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 864 P.2d 103.) The following summary is based on this appellate standard of review.

On April 18, 2002, about 10:00 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Eric Rogers was conducting surveillance in a known high narcotics traffic area when he noticed appellant appear to engage in a narcotics transaction in front of 447 South Rampart Boulevard. A male approached, engaged appellant in a brief conversation, and handed him something which he put in his pocket. After looking around, appellant walked about five feet away, reached through a wrought iron fence, and retrieved an object. After removing something from the object, he replaced it behind the fence and handed something to the male, who then walked away. As a police car approached, appellant ran off. Following a short chase, he was arrested.

Behind the fence the police found a plastic bubble container containing white wafers of cocaine base weighing about 1.25 grams and the equivalent of 12 to 25 doses of crack cocaine.

Rogers opined appellant possessed the cocaine to sell. A search of appellant produced $ 57 but no smoking paraphernalia. Also, he did not appear to be under the influence of narcotics at the time of his arrest.

Evidence was also presented that on February 2, 1999, about 7:15 p.m., undercover officer Richard Bengston observed appellant in the area of Alvarado and 6th Streets in Los Angeles, engage in what appeared to be several narcotics transactions. When he and his partner approached, appellant offered to sell them marijuana. After taking him into custody, Bengston retrieved from appellant a plastic bubble container with pieces of rock cocaine inside.

Appellant's defense was that he bought the cocaine from a male and placed the narcotics on the fence upon seeing a marked police car. He testified that he bought the narcotics for personal use and explained that he did not have any drug paraphernalia, because he planned to smoke the cocaine with cigarettes at home. He denied any intent to sell the cocaine.

DISCUSSION

1.Prior Drug-related Activity Evidence Proper

Appellant contends he was deprived of due process and a fair trial (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.), because the trial court allowed evidence of his 1999 drug-related activity. We find no abuse of discretion.

In their motion, the People sought a ruling allowing admission of evidence of appellant's prior drug-related activity to prove motive and intent (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) [section 1101, subd. (b)]). At the hearing, the prosecutor argued that such evidence was admissible for those purposes, because the expected defense was that appellant possessed the cocaine for personal use, not sale. She further argued that the charged crime was recent and similar to the prior activity. Appellant used the same bubble device in each instance, and the charged crime took place just a few blocks away.

Defense counsel acknowledged that intent was the crucial issue but urged there were insufficient similarities. He argued the use of the same type of storage container for the narcotics does not show that possession of the narcotics was for sale or personal use. He further argued that appellant's plea to possession for sale of marijuana does not reflect an intent to sell cocaine.

The prosecutor responded that in the prior case, the officers observed similar hand-to-hand transactions, and appellant offered to sell drugs to them.

The court ruled the evidence was admissible to show intent. It explained that a comparison of the incidents reflected a common plan and scheme "sufficiently similar to support an inference that [he] had the same intent in each instance"; "the source of the evidence is from an independent case with an independent witness"; and the prejudicial impact could be lessened by an instruction limiting its admission on the issue of intent and precluding the jury from considering such evidence to show appellant was a bad person or he was predisposed to commit crime.

In People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, the court explained that the admissibility of evidence pursuant to section 1101(b) depends on the degree of similarity between the uncharged act and the charged offense. The standard for admissibility of evidence to prove intent is: "The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. . . . 'The recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .' . . . In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant '" probably harbored the same intent in each instance."'" (Id. at p. 402, citations omitted.)

Once the trial court determines that a prior bad act is admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), it must conduct a balancing of the probative value against its prejudicial impact. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) A court must therefore examine whether the probative value of prior bad act evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.)

The principal factor is whether the probative value of an uncharged act is similar to the charged offense. Other factors affecting the probative value include the extent to which the source of the evidence is independent of the charged offense, and the amount of time between the uncharged acts and the charged offense. The factors affecting the prejudicial effect of uncharged acts include whether the uncharged acts resulted in criminal convictions and whether the evidence of uncharged acts is stronger or more inflammatory than the evidence of the charged offenses. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405; People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427, 867 P.2d 777; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917, 986 P.2d 182.)

Mindful of these principles, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant's prior drug-related activity. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717, 996 P.2d 46.) Intent was the pivotal issue. Evidence of such prior activity was highly probative on that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Pijal (1973) 33 Cal. App. 3d 682, 691, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230.) As noted by the trial court, there were sufficient similarities between the prior drug-related activity and the current charged crime. In each instance, there appeared to be hand-to-hand transactions which are consistent with the commission of narcotics sales, the transactions occurred within the same general vicinity, and appellant stored his narcotics for sale in the same distinctive type of container. Moreover, any prejudice flowing from the admission of such evidence was dissipated by the court's limiting instruction, which the jury is presumed to have understood and followed. (Ibid; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 253, 253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906.)

2.Any Deficiency in Prior Conviction Admonitions Harmless

Appellant contends his prior prison term enhancement must be stricken, because he was not advised of the full panoply of his constitutional rights before he admitted his two prior convictions. We conclude any deficiency in the admonitions of his right to confront adverse witnesses and his privilege against self-incrimination was harmless.

The information alleged that under section 667.5, subdivision (b) (prior prison term enhancement), "JULIO CESAR MEDRANO" had suffered two prior convictions: (1) a conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11359 (possession for sale marijuana) in Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC) case No. BA181159; and (2) a conviction for violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 (possession of cocaine base for sale) in LASC case No. BA200276.

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