People v. Medure

• Decision Date: 11 September 1998
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98,654 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Gary MEDURE, Vincent Ciardello, John Carlatone and Linda Russoti, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 697

683 N.Y.S.2d 697

178 Misc.2d 878, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98,654

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Gary MEDURE, Vincent Ciardello, John Carlatone and Linda Russoti, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Bronx County.

Sept. 11, 1998.

Murray Richman, New York City, for Gary Medure, defendant.

Thomas Lee, for Vincent Ciardello, defendant.

Anthony Siriano, New York City, for John Carlatone, defendant.

Lawrence Di Giansante, Yonkers, for Linda Russoti, defendant.

Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney of Bronx County (Hannah Holmes Freilich of counsel), for plaintiff.

DOMINIC R. MASSARO, J.

The question interposed during this hearing is whether an expert should be exempted from the general rule of excluding witnesses from the courtroom. In the context of essentiality, such an expert should be so exempted.

Factual Background

Under Indictment No. 7189/96, Gary Medure, Vincent Ciardello, John Carlatone and Linda Russoti are charged with multiple counts of promoting gambling in the first degree (Penal Law, Sec. 225.10[1] ) and possession of gambling records in the first degree (Penal Law, Sec. 225.20[1] ). The indictment is based, in part, on evidence derived from the electronic monitoring of various telephone lines allegedly utilized by them at different locations over a period of time in furtherance of an illegal bookmaking enterprise.

In granting defendants' request for the within hearing to consider the underlying issue of whether the evidence obtained as a result of the use of a "pen register" should be suppressed (see People v. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d 738, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701, 610 N.E.2d 374 [1993] ), the Court must first determine if the pen registers here utilized, as maintained by Defendants, were in fact fully operational "eavesdropping" devices. If so, this could constitute investigatory intrusion into Defendants' legitimate expectation of privacy.

Specialized Knowledge

A "pen register" is a "device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on a telephone line to which such device is attached" (C.P.L. 705.00[1] ). In the relevant statutory scheme, the police are required to obtain an order based on reasonable suspicion before they can install such a register (see C.P.L. 705.10). By way of contrast, before the police can install "eavesdropping" equipment they must obtain a warrant based on the more demanding standard of probable cause (see C.P.L. 700.15). " 'Eavesdropping' means 'wiretapping' or 'mechanical overhearing of conversation,' as those terms are defined in section 250.00 of the penal law" (C.P.L. 700.05[1] ). " 'Wiretapping' is defined, in relevant part, as 'intentional overhearing or recording of a telephone ... communication' " (Penal Law, Sec. 250.00[1] ).

In this case, the Bronx District Attorney acquired three pen register orders for four telephone lines and, in furtherance thereof, installed equipment on each line to identify the numbers dialed on the lines and other information. The equipment, manufactured by Voice Identification, Inc., consists of a "dialed number recorder," a device resembling a laptop computer, and a "slave," a device about the size of a cigarette box. ¹ Whether this equipment constitutes a pen register, requiring only an order based on reasonable suspicion, or is actually an eavesdropping device, requiring a warrant based on probable cause, is to be decided on another day. The nature of the pen register(s)--its function, engineering components and technological capabilities--is central to said decision. Only expert testimony is adequate to appropriate consideration, a fact not lost on either the People or the defense, both having indicated their intention to bring forth expert witnesses. Defendants now move the Court to permit their expert witness to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of the People's expert witness; the People oppose.

Sequestration of Witnesses

A motion for exclusion of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26, 436 N.E.2d 476 [1982] ). Since New York has no controlling statute, it seems always to have been so treated (see People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 54 N.E.2d 357 [1944]; People v. Greene, 1 Park Cr.Cas. 11 [1845] ). This is one way in which New York practice differs from its federal counterpart (cf. Fed.R.Evid. 615[3] ). Ordinarily, exclusion should not be denied (People v. Felder, 39 A.D.2d 373, 334 N.Y.S.2d 992 [2d Dept., 1972], aff'd. 32 N.Y.2d 747, 344 N.Y.S.2d 643, 297 N.E.2d 522, appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 948, 94 S.Ct. 299, 38 L.Ed.2d 204 [1973], reargument denied 39 N.Y.2d 743, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 349 N.E.2d 892 [1976]; Richardson, Evidence, Sec. 6-203 [11th ed., 1995] ).

"The process of sequestration consists merely in preventing one prospective witness from being taught by hearing another's testimony ... if the hearing of an opposing witness were permitted, the listening witness could then ascertain the precise points of difference between their testimonies, and could shape his own testimony to better advantage for his cause" (6 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1838, at 461 [Chadbourn rev., 1976]).

See also, People v. Mitchell, 224 A.D.2d 551, 638 N.Y.S.2d 172 [2d Dept., 1996]. A cross-examiner will thus find it more difficult to expose inconsistencies, inaccuracies and falsehoods with respect to a witness who has heard another's testimony.

While the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a fact witness must be excluded on the request of a party as a matter of right, an expert witness, that is "a person whose presence is shown ... to be essential" may not be so excluded (Fed.R.Evid., Rule 615[3] ). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that an expert may base his opinion on facts or data obtained "at or before the hearing" (Fed.R.Evid. 703; see also, Mayo v. Tri-Bell Industries, 787 F.2d 1007 [5th Cir., 1986] ). This permits expert witnesses to base opinions on the testimony of other witnesses.

Theoretically at least, the presence in the courtroom of an expert witness who does not testify to the facts of the case but rather gives his opinion based upon the testimony of others hardly seems suspect and will in most cases be beneficial, for he will be more likely to base his expert opinion on a more accurate understanding of the testimony as it evolves before the jury (Morvant v. Construction Aggregates, Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 629 [6th Cir., 1978], cert. dismissed 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 44, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 [1978] ).

See also, United States v. Kosko, 870 F.2d 162 [4th Cir., 1989]. Thus, it has been held that the presence in the courtroom of one who is "not a fact witness whose recollection might have been colored by accounts of prior witnesses ... [makes for] no prejudice ..." (Trans World Metals v. Southwire, 769 F.2d 902, 911 [2d Cir., 1985] ).

The Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New York [1991-19...