People v. Meehan

• Decision Date: 18 July 1996
• Citation: 646 N.Y.S.2d 716,229 A.D.2d 715
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dennis T. MEEHAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 716

646 N.Y.S.2d 716

229 A.D.2d 715

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dennis T. MEEHAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

July 18, 1996.

Cynthia Feathers, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney (Kevin P. Dooley, of counsel), Binghamton, for respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MERCURE, WHITE, CASEY and PETERS, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.), rendered on or about December 3, 1992, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree.

Defendant's conviction arises out of his participation, along with two accomplices, in the brutal murder of a companion and the theft of the companion's car. One of the accomplices entered a plea of guilty to one count of manslaughter in the first degree in satisfaction of the charges against him and testified at defendant's trial. We recently affirmed the judgment convicting the second accomplice of the same crimes as defendant herein upon a verdict in a separate trial (see, People v. Gonsa, 220 A.D.2d 27, 644 N.Y.S.2d 346).

Defendant first contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Appellate counsel focuses on trial counsel's failure to adequately prepare and pursue a defense based on defendant's possible posttraumatic stress syndrome. Trial counsel first raised the question of posttraumatic stress syndrome at trial, explaining that he had only recently learned that defendant had suffered from blackouts and that defendant's father had been diagnosed with the syndrome. County Court granted counsel's request for a brief adjournment and an examination of defendant was conducted by a physician. No evidence on the issue was thereafter presented on defendant's behalf.

The record establishes that trial counsel diligently pursued the issue when he first learned of the relevant facts and there appears to be no basis to criticize counsel for not discovering the facts earlier. After having defendant examined by a physician, trial counsel decided not to pursue the issue at trial. The decision clearly involved a matter of trial strategy, which will not be second guessed at this juncture (see, e.g., People v. Frayer, 215 A.D.2d 862, 864, 627 N.Y.S.2d 107, lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 794, 632 N.Y.S.2d 507, 656 N.E.2d 606). Noticeably absent is anything in the record to suggest a legitimate or colorable basis for trial counsel's continued pursuit of the matter (see, People v. Gonsa, supra, 220 A.D.2d at 31-32, 644 N.Y.S.2d 346).

In his pro se brief, defendant argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to adequately prepare for the hearing on the admissibility of certain DNA evidence and in failing to seek suppression of certain physical evidence. Defendant faults trial counsel for failing to present any evidence to refute the testimony of the People's expert regarding the reliability of the DNA evidence, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that such evidence existed. Trial counsel argued knowledgeably on the legal issues at the hearing and thoroughly cross-examined the People's expert. As to the physical evidence, trial counsel objected to its admission into evidence on several grounds including the one referred to by defendant on this appeal, but the objection was overruled. In short, defendant failed to meet "the well-settled, high burden of demonstrating that he was deprived of a fair trial by less than meaningful representation" (People v. Hobot, 84 N.Y.2d 1021, 1022, 622 N.Y.S.2d 675, 646 N.E.2d 1102).

Defendant next argues that the testimony of the accomplice Michael Lussier was incredible as a matter of law. According to defendant, the only evidence of his participation in the crimes came from Lussier, and defendant contends that Lussier's testimony is "involved in hopeless contradiction" (People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 270, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138, 480 N.E.2d 727). It is the general rule that "[w]hen all of the evidence of guilt comes from a single prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence, the jury is left without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of either" (id., at 272, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138, 480 N.E.2d 727). Lussier's testimony at trial did not point both to guilt and innocence. To the contrary, Lussier's trial testimony consistently pointed only to guilt. The "hopeless contradiction" upon which defendant relies was not based on any internal inconsistencies in Lussier's trial testimony, but arose out of various pretrial statements given by Lussier.

In People v. Shedrick, 104 A.D.2d 263, 482 N.Y.S.2d 939, affd 66 N.Y.2d 1015, 499 N.Y.S.2d 388, 489 N.E.2d 1290, the Fourth Department affirmed a conviction based primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who admitted to several prior convictions, admitted drinking and taking drugs immediately prior to the commission of the crimes, admitted that he had struck a plea bargain based upon his agreement to testify, and also admitted having changed his story several times prior to trial and having lied to investigators. The court held that the accomplice's testimony was not incredible as a matter of law and that the matter was one for the jury to resolve as an issue of credibility (see, id., at 273-274, 482 N.Y.S.2d 939). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that "it was for the jury to determine whether to believe or disbelieve his testimony" (66 N.Y.2d 1015, 1018, 499...