People v. Melgosa, 87SA359

• Citation: 753 P.2d 221
• Decision Date: 04 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87SA359,87SA359
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leonard David MELGOSA and Francisco J. Rivero, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 221

753 P.2d 221

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leonard David MELGOSA and Francisco J. Rivero, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87SA359.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

April 4, 1988.

Barney Iuppa, Dist. Atty., Gordon R. Denison, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Paul R. Bratfisch, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee Leonard Melgosa.

Patrick W. Buckingham, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellee Francisco J. Rivero.

QUINN, Chief Justice.

In this interlocutory appeal, the People challenge an order suppressing a stereo unit and other items seized from the passenger compartment of an automobile during an investigatory stop and detention of the occupants of the automobile, a postarrest confession made by one of the defendants, and a stolen gearshift knob taken from the other defendant after his arrest. We conclude that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the police officers had a reasonable basis for making a protective search of the passenger compartment of the automobile in the interest of their own safety and lawfully seized the suppressed objects during the course of that protective search. We accordingly reverse the order of suppression.

I.

The defendants, Leonard David Melgosa and Francisco J. Rivero, were charged in the District Court of El Paso County with the felony of first degree criminal trespass by unlawfully and knowingly entering a motor vehicle with the intent to steal something of value on April 21, 1987. After entering a plea of not guilty to the charge, the defendants filed motions to suppress all evidence seized during a search of Melgosa's automobile, all evidence seized from their persons, and statements made by Melgosa during and subsequent to his detention and arrest. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established the following pertinent facts.

At 2:31 a.m. on April 21, 1987, a dispatcher for the Colorado Springs Police Department aired over a police radio channel the report of a possible "burglary" of a motor vehicle in progress at 729 North Union Boulevard in Colorado Springs. The transmission stated that a blue van was possibly involved in the break-in. It was unclear from the transmission whether the blue van was the vehicle broken into or whether the blue van was the vehicle which the suspects were operating. After hearing the dispatch, Officer Taylor of the Colorado Springs Police Department turned onto the street that bordered the north side of the location of the alleged break-in. Various business establishments were located in this area, including H & L Motor Company.

Upon approaching the location, Officer Taylor observed a blue two-door Pontiac automobile in a "low rider" position with two occupants. The automobile was parked on the street adjoining H & L Motor Company. As the officer drove closer to the location, he noticed the blue automobile pulling away from the curb. Believing that this might be the "blue van" that was reported in the transmission, Officer Taylor turned on his siren and overhead lights and stopped the automobile. He ordered the driver, Melgosa, to get out of the automobile and to come over to his police vehicle. The defendant did so and presented a Colorado driver's license identifying himself. In response to the officer's inquiry as to why he was in the area, Melgosa stated that he had just dropped off his girlfriend. Melgosa, however, was unable to provide the officer with the address of his girlfriend's house.

In conducting a pat down search of Melgosa, Officer Taylor felt what he believed were cassette tapes in Melgosa's rear pocket. The officer removed one of the tapes to verify that it was a tape. Officer Taylor testified at the suppression hearing that the presence of the tapes in Melgosa's pocket "led me to believe that this possibly could be our suspect" due to the report of a possible vehicular break-in. The officer placed Melgosa in the rear seat of the police vehicle as a safety precaution.

While Officer Taylor was questioning and frisking Melgosa, Officer Kruse arrived on the scene and parked behind Melgosa's automobile. Officer Kruse then positioned himself at the right rear of the automobile and observed Rivero, the passenger, place both of his hands on an object, which the officer could not then identify, and place it under the right front seat of the automobile. The officer ordered Rivero out of the automobile and put him in the rear seat of his police vehicle. Officer Kruse testified at the suppression hearing that he took this action because he believed that the object placed under the front seat could have been a weapon.

Officer Kruse informed Sergeant Robertson, who had also arrived on the scene, that he had seen the passenger place something under the right front seat of the automobile. Sergeant Robertson went up to the automobile and looked inside with his flashlight. After observing some loose wires protruding from under the seat on the passenger side, he entered the automobile and removed an AM-FM stereo unit from under the front passenger seat as well as several knobs which appeared to be from the stereo. Officer Taylor then joined Sergeant Robertson and removed a pair of wire cutters and similar tools, such as a pair of pliers, ¹ from the floorboard directly behind the driver's seat and a metal plate for the stereo from the area under the front passenger seat.

Moments after the discovery of these items in Melgosa's automobile, another police officer reported to Officer Taylor that a Chevrolet pick-up truck on the car lot had been broken into. Taylor examined the Chevrolet pick-up and saw that the tape player had been removed from the dashboard of the pick-up and that a gearshift knob was missing.

The officers placed Melgosa and Rivero under arrest and transported them in separate vehicles to the El Paso County jail. On the way to the jail, Melgosa was advised of his Miranda rights. Subsequent to the advisement and prior to arriving at the jail, Melgosa described to Officer Taylor the method he had used to enter the pick-up truck and admitted that he took the stereo from the truck. While Rivero was being processed at the jail, a gearshift knob was taken from his pocket.

In granting the defendants' motion to suppress, the district court ruled that the investigatory stop and temporary detention of the defendants were constitutionally justified. The court accordingly refused to suppress the statement made by Melgosa to Officer Taylor prior to the officer's placement of Melgosa in the police vehicle ² and likewise refused to suppress the cassette tapes recovered from Melgosa during the initial frisk. The district court next ruled that Sergeant Robertson's conduct in looking under the passenger seat of the automobile constituted an illegal warrantless search unsupported by probable cause to believe that the occupants had committed a crime and, on that basis, suppressed the stereo unit and other objects found in Melgosa's automobile. ³ The court thus concluded that the arrest of the defendants was based on illegally seized evidence and suppressed Melgosa's postarrest confession and the gearshift knob taken from Rivero at the jail as the fruits of unconstitutionally seized evidence and the unconstitutional arrest of the defendants.

In challenging the order of suppression, the People place primary reliance on the proposition that Sergeant Robertson's act of looking in the passenger compartment of the automobile was a constitutionally permissible protective search conducted in the interest of securing the officers' safety during the investigatory stop and detention of the defendants. If the People's claim is correct, we must then consider whether the police officers were constitutionally justified in seizing the items which they discovered in the course of the protective search. The answer to this latter question will determine whether the district court erred in suppressing Melgosa's postarrest statement and the gearshift knob recovered from Rivero as the fruits of an unconstitutional seizure. Before considering these questions, we review the basic principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which provide the framework for our analysis.

II.

Probable cause, which is the traditional constitutional standard for a formal arrest or a full-scale search, is designed to "safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy" and, at the same time, "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). As such, probable cause is a flexible standard which is to be measured not by a "more likely true than false" level of certitude but by a common-sense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302 (Colo.1982). This requirement of "reasonableness" provides "the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to the implementation of a workable rule." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2257, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Thus, in the case of an arrest, probable cause means reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed or is committing a crime. E.g., Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-11. In the case of a search, probable cause means reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located in the area to be searched. E.g., Hearty, 644 P.2d at 309-10; People v. Ball, 639 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Colo.1982). "[D]ue consideration should be given to a law enforcement officer's experience and training in determining the significance of his observations in the context of probable cause." Ball, 639 P.2d at 1082.

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