People v. Mendoza

• Decision Date: 05 March 1974
• Docket Number: Cr. 23151
• Citation: 112 Cal.Rptr. 565,37 Cal.App.3d 717
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joaquin MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 565

112 Cal.Rptr. 565

37 Cal.App.3d 717

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joaquin MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 23151.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

March 5, 1974.

As Modified March 12, 1974.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Harold E. Shabo, Alan C. Oberstein, and Martin Stein, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Appeals Section, Norman H. Sokolow and Lawrence P. Scherb, II, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

FLEMING, Associae Justice.

Joaquin Mendoza appeals the judgment (order granting probation) after a jury convicted him of committing a lewd act upon a child under fourteen years of age. (Pen.Code, § 288.)

FACTS

Tad S. testified that on the afternoon of 1 February 1972 he, then thirteen years old, and his friend Jim M. were delivering newspapers at an apartment house on Tamarand Avenue in Hollywood. Tad saw Mendoza on the apartment house stairs and asked him to buy a paper. Mendoza bought one and told Tad he would like to subscribe. He then invited Tad and Jim into his apartment, where he gave the boys candy and pointed out a Playboy magazine centerfold photograph of a nude girl on the wall. As Tad and Jim were leaving the apartment, Mendoza stopped Tad, held him by the shoulder, and mumbled something in his ear. Then he held Tad's cheeks in his hands and kissed him on the lips. As Tad pulled away Mendoza asked him to return when he finished his route. When Tad said he could not come back, Mendoza reached between Tad's legs and grabbed at his genitals through his clothes. Tad then left the apartment house.

ISSUES

As grounds for reversal of the conviction, Mendoza claims (1) erroneous admission of evidence of a prior similar act, (2) misleading instruction on the specific acts constituting the crime, (3) undue limitation on his argument to the jury, and (4) inflammatory argument to the jury by the prosecutor.

DISCUSSION

1. Prior Similar Act.

The jury heard evidence of a prior act by Mendoza similar to that charged as the crime. David F. testified that he was almost thirteen years old on 21 June 1969. That afternoon Mendoza approached him in MacArthur Park in Los Angeles and invited him to his apartment for potato chips. Inside the apartment Mendoza showed David several Playboy foldouts of nude women on the wall. Mendoza then started to feel David's genitals and asked him to commit various lewd acts. When David resisted, Mendoza said they should return to the park. As they left the apartment, Mendoza put his arm around David and kissed him on the cheek. Several contentions cluster around the admission of David's testimony.

First, Mendoza contends the presentation of evidence of the prior offense against David surprised him and the court should have granted his motion for a continuance of 'two or three days' to prepare a defense. We find no abuse of discretion or prejudice resulting to Mendoza from the denial of the motion. Although the prosecutor did not decide to produce evidence of a prior incident until the day before the commencement of the trial, Mendoza had four days to prepare for David's testimony. The court allowed Mendoza to hear David's testimony and to cross-examine him prior to the time the jury heard the testimony. Mendoza had available for his use in cross-examination police and victim reports of David's charge, and he called as witnesses two police officers who had investigated David's charge. Mendoza offered the court no specific reason why a continuance of two or three days should have been granted. Although he could not locate one of the police officers who investigated David's charge, Mendoza did not show that the officer would have been located in two or three more days or that the officer's testimony would have contributed substantially to his defense. (Pen.Code, § 1050; see People v. Mason, 183 Cal.App.2d 168, 172--173, 6 Cal.Rptr. 649.) 'In the lack of a showing of an abuse of discretion or of prejudice to the defendant, a denial of his motion for a continuance cannot result in a reversal of a judgment of conviction.' (People v. Laursen, 8 Cal.3d 192, 204, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 433, 501 P.2d 1145, 1153.)

Second, Mendoza contends the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by suppressing police and victim reports relating to David's charge that were favorable to the defense. The record discloses no intentional suppression of evidence: the prosecutor stated to the court she could not locate reports on David's charge and she believed the reports did not exist. Later, Mendoza's investigator succeeded in locating the reports. Since Mendoza had these reports available to him for potential impeachment purposes, since he failed to show that earlier disclosure of the reports would have led to other material evidence, and since the reports related only to impeachment of a witness who testified on a subsidiary issue, we conclude that the prosecutor's conduct could not have been prejudicial. (People v. Cohen, 12 Cal.App.3d 298, 324, 90 Cal.Rptr. 612.)

Third, Mendoza contends the court should have excluded David's testimony because it merely proved criminal disposition. This contention lacks merit. Evidence of another sex offense is admissible to show a common scheme or plan if the offense is proximate in time, similar to the offense charged, and committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness. (People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 243, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947; People v. Cramer, 67 Cal.2d 126, 129, 60 Cal.Rptr. 230, 429 P.2d 582.) Admissibility lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (People v. Wells, 13 Cal.App.3d 265, 270, 91 Cal.Rptr. 460; People v. Armstrong, 275 Cal.App.2d 30, 34, 79 Cal.Rptr. 668), and we see no abuse of discretion here. The prior act is not too remote in time (see People v. Thoman, 27 Cal.App.3d 436, 440, 103 Cal.Rptr. 746 (offense three years before); People v. Pierce, 269 Cal.App.2d 193, 75 Cal.Rptr. 257 (course of conduct going back seven years)), and it is strikingly similar in circumstance: in each instance during the afternoon Mendoza lured his victim, a boy about thirteen years old, to his apartment, offered him food, showed him photographs of nude women from Playboy magazine, touched the boy's genitals, desisted when the boy resisted, put his arm around him and kissed the boy as they left the apartment.

Fourth, assuming the admissibility of David's testimony, Mendoza contends he should have been allowed to impeach that testimony with a police officer's opinion of David's veracity and with evidence that no criminal complaint or arrest had resulted from David's charge.

We find no error in the trial court's rulings. A police officer who investigated David's charge would have testified that in his opinion David lied about Mendoza. This officer never talked to David, but arrived at his opinion on the basis of his experience in similar cases, on notes made by other officers, and on the fact that David delayed nine days before bringing his charge and then did not respond to police requests for an interview. This officer did not qualify as a competent witness on David's credibility. (People v. Bugg, 204 Cal.App.2d 811, 813, 22 Cal.Rptr. 896.) He neither knew David (People v. Harris, 270 Cal.App.2d 863, 873, 76 Cal.Rptr. 130) nor professed knowledge of David's reputation for honesty and veracity in the community. (People v. Paisley, 214 Cal.App.2d 225, 232--233, 29 Cal.Rptr. 307.)

With reference to the disposition of David's charge against Mendoza, the trial court instructed the jury that 'for reasons with which you are not to concern yourselves, there is no prosecution relating to the alleged 1969 acts.' This instruction sufficiently covered the point (People v. Jenkins,3 Cal.App.3d 529, 534--535, 83 Cal.Rptr. 525) and avoided diverting the trial's focus from its principal issues. (Evid.Code, § 352.)

Fifth, Mendoza contends the court erred in instructing the jury that the prior act could be proved by a 'preponderance of the evidence' rather than 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' He concedes the California cases are against him (see People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal.2d 403, 429--432, 94 P.2d 569), but he argues that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, compels a different result. We disagree. Winship merely notes the longstanding rule that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required (397 U.S. at 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068) and applies that standard of proof to the adjudicative stage of juvenile proceedings when the juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. (397 U.S. at 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068.) The logic of the California rule on proof of other crimes still applies: facts regarding another offense are simply evidentiary facts to be considered along with other evidence in the case on the question of knowledge, plan, or intent; although the jury may entertain some reasonable doubt as to the proof of the other offense or of particular items of evidence, it is sufficient if they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the ultimate fact of knowledge, plan, or intent. (People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal.2d 403, 94 P.2d 569; People v. McClellan, 71 Cal.2d 793, 804, 80 Cal.Rptr. 31, 457 P.2d 871; see also, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618; Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368.)

2. Instructions on Specific Acts.

The court instructed the jury: 'Every person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of fourteen years, with the specific intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, is guilty of a crime.' (CALJIC...