People v. Merkouris

• Decision Date: 16 September 1959
• Docket Number: Cr. 6403
• Citation: 344 P.2d 1,52 Cal.2d 672
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James MERKOURIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 1

344 P.2d 1

52 Cal.2d 672

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James MERKOURIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6403.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Sept. 16, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1959.

Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender, Richard B. Goethals, Former Deputy Public Defender, John A. Tolmasov and Richard W. Erskine, Deputy Public Defenders, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty on two counts of first degree murder and the jury fixed the penalty as death. His appeal is automatic, pursuant to section 1239, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code. ¹

On November 15, 1954, two informations were filed against defendant by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, charging him with having murdered Despine Forbes and Robert P. Forbes on or about September 20, 1954. Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge of having murdered Despine Forbes, and his counsel entered an additional plea, with respect to such charge, of not guilty by reason of insanity.

After a jury trial on the charge of having murdered Despine Forbes, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and the death penalty was imposed.

Defendant personally withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, After an automatic appeal, the judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial. People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540, 297 P.2d 999.

The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was reinstated, and the trial court declared it had a doubt as to defendant's present sanity. After trial before a jury, defendant was found presently insane, and on September 13, 1956, was committed to the state hospital at Atascadero.

In August 1957 a certificate was issued by the acting superintendent and medical director of the state hospital at Atascadero stating that defendant was sane, and he was ordered returned from the hospital to Los Angeles for retrial, the trial date being subsequently set as June 16, 1958. Defendant's counsel on August 26, 1957, and again on June 16, 1958, requested the trial court to declare that it entertained a 'doubt' as to defendant's then sanity, pursuant to the provisions of section 1368 of the Penal Code. ² On August 26, 1957, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine defendant and, after taking considerable evidence, found on June 19, 1958, that it did not entertain a 'doubt' within the meaning of the statute as to defendant's then sanity. The court then ordered that the two informations be consolidated and the case proceed to trial. Both sides stipulated that defendant be deemed to have pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the charge of having murdered Robert P. Forbes. After trial, the jury returned wo verdicts of guilty of first degree murder, and then fixed the penalty as death.

A jury trial was waived on the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. After a ten-day trial on this issue the court, on conflicting evidence, found that defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the two offenses. A defense motion to declare a doubt as to defendant's then present sanity and motion for a new trial were denied, and defendant was sentenced to death, with the resulting present automatic appeal.

These questions are presented for determination:

First. Was there substantial evidence to sustain the judgments of guilty?

Yes. The evidence is fully summarized in the prior opinion (People v. Merkouris, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 543 et seq., 297 P.2d 999). Since the evidence on the present trial, so far as the merits are concerned, is substantially the same as that previously produced, no useful purpose would be served by setting it forth herein.

From a re sume of the evidence set forth in the prior opinion, it appears that at the time the case was submitted to the jury reasonable inferences of defendant's guilt or innocence could have been drawn therefrom. Therefore, the rule set forth in People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 680(1), 104 P.2d 778, is applicable, that is: In a criminal prosecution the weight of the evidence is for the jury to determine, and if the circumstances reasonably justify a verdict of guilty by the jury, an opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with the innocence of the defendant does not warrant a reversal of a verdict of guilty by the jury. Likewise, defendant's contention that the incriminating circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt because such evidence might also be deemed compatible with innocence is not well taken. (People v. Newland, supra, 15 Cal.2d at page 684(2), 104 P.2d 778.)

Second. Did the trial court err in not holding as a matter of law that it entertained a 'doubt' as to defendant's present sanity at the time of the trial?

No. These rules are here applicable:

i. A defendant is sane, within the meaning of section 1368 of the Penal Code, if he is able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him and to conduct his own defense in a rational manner. (People v. Jensen, 43 Cal.2d 572, 576(1), 275 P.2d 25; People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal.2d 565, 567(1), 241 P.2d 221.)

ii. The 'doubt' referred to in section 1368 of the Penal Code, requiring a determination of a defendant's sanity if doubt arises during the pendency of the action or prior to judgment, is doubt in the mind of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the defendant or any third person. (People v. Jensen, supra, 43 Cal.2d at page 576(2), 27k P.2d 25.)

iii. The determination of a motion for a hearing upon the issue of a defendant's sanity at the time of trial is one which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 789(3), 161 P.2d 227; People v. Gomez, 41 Cal.2d 150, 159(5), (6), 258 P.2d 825.) It is only where as a matter of law a 'doubt' may be said to appear or where there has been an abuse of the discretion that is vested in the trial judge, in the determination of the question, that the conclusion of the latter may properly be disturbed on appeal. (People v. Jensen, supra, 43 Cal.2d at page 576(3), 275 P.2d 25.)

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present case, it appears that on August 26, 1957, when defendant's then counsel (Mr. P. Basil Lambros) requested the court to declare a doubt as to defendant's sanity, the trial court had before it the following matters bearing on that question: Statements of Mr. Lambros describing defendant's conduct when he visited defendant in the county jail after defendant's return from Atascadero; statement of Mr. Lambros that defendant's 'contention has always been one of sanity, and in my opinion he merely convinced the doctors at Atascadero that he was sane by telling them he was sane, because I checked with Atascadero, and I found that never once, in one of the staff meetings, did he ever open his mouth. They never had one psychiatric conference with him. Now, the only basis for certifying him back as sane is the fact that he had talked with various ward doctors and with the inmates in his room'; Mr. Lambros' stated opinion that defendant was not capable of consulting with an attorney to prepare and conduct his defense; defendant's conduct in the court-room; the report and certificate of Atascadero officials that defendant was presently sane and a letter to the district attorney from Atascadero officials stating the observations of the physician who had charge of the ward where defendant had been confined and the conclusions of the staff doctors; and the deputy district attorney's stated opinion that defendant behaved as he did in the jail and the courtroom because 'he just does not care to go to trial.'

With the foregoing matters before it, the trial judge was justified in concluding on August 26, 1957, as he did, that the Atascadero report was 'more persuasive than any outward manifestation as indicated by the conduct of the defendant before the court, from which the court cannot conclude at this time that it entertains a doubt as to the present sanity.'

As appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant's conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper. Conduct of the character indicated by the record here may, to the observant trial judge, be overwhelmingly suggestive of a calculated attempt at cunning deception rather than of mental weakness. It may well operate to preclude the rational entertainment of any doubt as to the actor-defendant's sanity.

The trial court's appointment (under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure) of two psychiatrists to examine defendant and report to the court, and its continuance of the matter, do not indicate that the court had a doubt as to defendant's sanity. The continuance was granted on motion of defense counsel, expressly not opposed by counsel for the People, because both counsel had lengthy litigation in another matter. The experts were appointed at the request of counsel for both parties, so that a later report on defendant's condition would be available when counsel were free to go to trial in this case.

On June 16, 1958, after continuances for various reasons, defendant, represented by the public defender, appeared for trial. The deputy district attorney, rather than defense counsel, first raised the question of defendant's sanity. The prosecutor said that Mr. Lambros, while he was still representing defendant, had informed the court (at an earlier appearance before another judge) that Dr. Frederick J. Hacker (who had been of the opinion in August 1956 that there was a question of defendant's ability to cooperate in his own defense) had thoroughly examined defendant and concluded that he was presently sane but that defendant 'claimed he had petit mals and that...