People v. Metellus

Decision Date09 May 2014
Citation44 Misc.3d 13,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24134,988 N.Y.S.2d 409
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Etzer METELLUS, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Judah Maltz, Kew Gardens, for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (John M. Castellano and Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott of counsel), for respondent.

Present: WESTON, J.P., PESCE and ALIOTTA, JJ.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Salvatore J. Modica, J.), rendered June 18, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50(5).

Defendant, who was an employee of a cargo and mail handling company at John F. Kennedy International Airport, was convicted of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 165.40), and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.05[1] ), in connection with a theft of United States mail. Defendant and co-defendant Kevin Richens placed a quantity of mail in a company minivan, with the intent to steal the mail. Shortly thereafter, defendant, who was driving the minivan, was apprehended.

The Criminal Court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to present evidence that, in 2006, defendant, who at the time was employed by Jet Blue Airlines, had committed an act similar to the alleged acts in this case. Notwithstanding the similarity of the acts, “knowledge and intent could not be easily inferred from mere possession” of the mail by defendant ( People v. Bailey, 21 A.D.3d 383, 384, 799 N.Y.S.2d 572 [2005];see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 [1901];People v. Brown, 107 A.D.3d 1145, 1146–1147, 967 N.Y.S.2d 206 [2013];People v. Taylor, 71 A.D.3d 1467, 897 N.Y.S.2d 359 [2010];People v. Versage, 48 A.D.3d 254, 255, 851 N.Y.S.2d 475 [2008];People v. Bourne, 46 A.D.3d 1101, 847 N.Y.S.2d 738 [2007] ). The court minimized the potential for prejudice against defendant by providing the jury with explicit limiting instructions that the prior bad act evidence could not be considered to prove that defendant had a propensity or predisposition to commit the crimes with which he was charged ( see People v. Garrett, 88 A.D.3d 1253, 1254, 930 N.Y.S.2d 738 [2011];People v. Versage, 48 A.D.3d at 255, 851 N.Y.S.2d 475;People v. Dickson, 21 A.D.3d 646, 647, 799 N.Y.S.2d 657 [2005];cf. People v. Sayers, 64 A.D.3d 728, 730–731, 883 N.Y.S.2d 142 [2009] ). The claim that the court should have limited the prior bad act evidence, and that counsel was ineffective based on her failure to request that such evidence be limited, is without merit ( see People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d 588, 596, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160 [2013];cf. People v. Resek, 3 N.Y.3d 385, 389–390, 787 N.Y.S.2d 683, 821 N.E.2d 108 [2004] ).

Defendant contends that he was...

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