People v. Meyers

• Decision Date: 20 January 1994
• Docket Number: 74711 and 74712,Nos. 74710,s. 74710
• Citation: 196 Ill.Dec. 646,158 Ill.2d 46,630 N.E.2d 811
• Parties: , 196 Ill.Dec. 646 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Janet MEYERS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 811

630 N.E.2d 811

158 Ill.2d 46, 196 Ill.Dec. 646

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Janet MEYERS, et al., Appellees.

Nos. 74710, 74711 and 74712.

Supreme Court of Illinois Jan. 20, 1994.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., of Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Karen A. Covy, Jeanette Sublett, Mary T. Nicolau and Sara Dillery

[196 Ill.Dec. 649] Hynes, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Lawrence E. Morrissey, Chicago, for Janet Meyers.

Steve Senderowitz and Steven C. Daily, Greenberger, Krauss & Tenenbaum, Chtd., Chicago, for Joanne N. and Nancy J. Barnard.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing the separate misdemeanor complaints against defendants, Janet Meyers, Joanne Barnard and Nancy Barnard (defendants), for their alleged violation of section 235d of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716d).

FACTS

In July 1991, defendants participated in a scavenger sale of tax delinquent property located in Cook County. Pursuant to section 235b of the Act, each defendant filed an application for a certificate of purchase with the county clerk for property on which they had successfully bid. Each application included an affirmation that the applicant was not the owner, the party responsible for the payment of delinquent taxes on any property in Cook County, or an agent of any such person. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716b.

Defendants were subsequently charged in separate misdemeanor complaints for tax sale fraud. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716d.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints. In their motions, defendants alleged, inter alia, that the complaints were legally insufficient and, further, that section 235b of the Act was unconstitutionally vague and violative of the equal protection clause of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions.

The trial court granted defendants' motions. In its written memorandum, the court held that the complaints were legally insufficient for failure to identify the capacity of each defendant as either an owner or the agent of an owner of tax delinquent property. Further, the court held that section 235b(a)(2) of the Act is unconstitutionally vague. The court, however, rejected defendants' equal protection challenge.

The State appealed directly to this court (134 Ill.2d R. 603). We granted the State's motion to consolidate the three causes on appeal and now reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

SCAVENGER SALES

Section 235b of the Act provides the process by which interested persons may participate in a scavenger sale of tax delinquent property in Illinois. The statute explicitly provides those persons who are ineligible to participate in such sales. Section 235b(a)(2), the section at issue here, specifically states:

"(a) No person * * * shall be eligible to bid or receive a certificate of purchase at any sale under Section 235a of this Act unless that person shall have completed and delivered to the county clerk a true, accurate and complete application for certificate of purchase which shall affirm:

* * * * * *

(2) that such person is not himself, nor is he the agent for, the owner or party responsible for payment of the general taxes on any real property which is located in the same county in which the sale is held and which is tax delinquent or forfeited for all or any part of each of 2 or more years * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716b.)

Section 235b further provides that the application for a certificate of purchase must be executed by the purchaser and by any individual bidder acting in the purchaser's behalf. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716b.) Section 235d makes it a Class A misdemeanor for any person to knowingly make a false statement in any application for certificate of purchase or registration under section 235b of the Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716d.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its complaints against defendants as insufficient. We agree.

A defendant has the fundamental right, under both the Federal (U.S. Const., amend. VI) and the State Constitutions (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8), to be informed of the "nature and cause" of criminal accusations made against him. In Illinois, this general right is given substance by section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a)). Section 111-3 is "designed to inform the accused of the nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare a defense and to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to subsequent prosecution arising out of the same conduct." People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill.2d 94, 99-100, 66 Ill.Dec. 330, 442 N.E.2d 891.

When, as here, the sufficiency of the complaint is attacked in a pretrial motion, the standard of review is to determine whether the complaint complies with the stated requirements of sections 111-3. (See People v. Tuczynski (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 644, 648, 19 Ill.Dec. 325, 378 N.E.2d 1200; People v. Young (1991), 220 Ill.App.3d 488, 494, 163 Ill.Dec. 290, 581 N.E.2d 241; see also People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 29, 344 N.E.2d 456.) Section 111-3(a) demands that the charging instrument be in writing, stating the name of the offense and the relevant statutory provision violated, setting forth the nature and elements of the offense and the date and county in which the offense occurred, and naming the accused if known or a reasonably certain description. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a).) An instrument which charges an offense in the language of the statute " 'is deemed sufficient when the words of the statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged.' " People v. Dickerson (1975), 61 Ill.2d 580, 582, 338 N.E.2d 184, quoting People v. Patrick (1967), 38 Ill.2d 255, 258, 230 N.E.2d 843.

In conformity with section 111-3 requirements, each of the three complaints here alleged that the defendant committed the offense of tax sale fraud. The complaints stated the name of the defendant, the date and place of commission of the offense, and the statutory provision which had allegedly been violated. Further, the complaints recited the substance of the alleged false statement, mirroring the language in section 235b of the Act.

Specifically, each complaint stated:

"[Defendant] committed the offense of Tax Sale Fraud, in that she knowingly made a false statement in her application for certificate of purchase form submitted under Section 235b of the Revenue Act to wit: she falsely stated that neither she nor the firm identified in the registration form was an owner or agent for the owner or party or agent for a party responsible for the payment of taxes on any property in Cook County which was tax delinquent or forfeited for all or any part of 2 or more years when the registration was submitted in violation of chapter 120, par. 716d(b)(4)."

In granting defendants' motions to dismiss, the trial court held that the capacity of the alleged offenders, either as owners or as agents of owners of tax delinquent properties, is an essential element of tax sale fraud. Therefore, the court held, the State's allegations of each defendant's capacity in the disjunctive rendered the complaints legally insufficient. Defendants urge our acceptance of the court's reasoning on this point. We disagree.

Incidentally, we note that each defendant requested and received an answer to a bill of particulars (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 114-2) on the issue of capacity. They initially urge, however, that we disregard the State's answer, which is in the form of a supplemental answer to discovery. Alternatively, they argue that the State's answer failed to provide any information concerning defendant Joanne Barnard's capacity as agent for Nancy Barnard.

The object of a bill of particulars is to supplement a sufficient indictment with more specificity of detail to enable a defendant to better understand the nature of the charges against him, or to better prepare a defense to the charges. (Patrick, 38 Ill.2d at 260, 230 N.E.2d 843.) However, a bill of particulars cannot be used to cure a void charge. (People v. Blanchett (1965), 33 Ill.2d The essential elements of the type of tax sale fraud alleged in these complaints are (1) knowledge and (2) making a false statement. Clearly, where the conduct charged against the defendant is a criminal offense only when committed by a person acting in a specific capacity, the charging instrument must charge that the defendant committed the act while acting in such capacity. (See People v. Powell (1933), 353 Ill. 582, 187 N.E. 419; see also 21A Ill.L. & Prac. Indictments and Informations § 48 (1977).) However, the conduct charged here, the knowing making of a false statement, may be committed by any person, irrespective of his capacity. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 716d.) Thus, the rule espoused in Powell does not apply. The elements to state a cause of action for tax sale fraud were properly and adequately pleaded.

                [196 Ill.Dec. 651] 527, 212 N.E.2d 97.)   We, therefore, consider the sufficiency of the complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss without regard to the additional specificity supplied by the bill of particulars
                

Defendants argue that alleging capacity in the disjunctive rendered the complaint uncertain as to what false statements were made and would require them to defend against the charges as both owners and agents.

We perceive no uncertainty as to what false statements were allegedly made. Tax sale fraud is committed when an owner or an agent of an owner of tax delinquent property falsely...