People v. Meyers
| Decision Date | 17 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | 62451,Docket Nos. 62450 |
| Citation | 335 N.W.2d 189,124 Mich.App. 148 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel Wayne MEYERS, Defendants-Appellees. and PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles Allan MEYERS, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel Asst. Pros. Atty., and Thomas S. Richards, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.
Lawrence G. Kaluzny, Birmingham, for Daniel Meyers.
Cooper, Shifman & Gabe by Philip H. Seymour, Royal Oak, for Charles Meyers.
ON REMAND
Before DANHOF, C.J., and CAVANAGH and CYNAR, JJ.
Defendants were charged with armed robbery, a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). From convictions of armed robbery, the defendants appealed to this Court, which dismissed the charges against the defendants on the basis that Art. IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act had been violated because the defendants were not brought to trial within 120 days of their arrival in Michigan. People v. Meyers, 109 Mich.App. 719, 311 N.W.2d 454 (1981). The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court which, in lieu of granting the application, vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the case, instructing this Court to remand the matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and findings as to whether there was good cause for not bringing the defendants to trial within the 120 day period and whether the resulting continuances were reasonable and necessary. 412 Mich. 916 (1982). We remanded, as directed, and now have the matter before us for resolution.
As we stated previously in Meyers, supra, 109 Mich.App. p. 721, 311 N.W.2d 454, the purpose of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, M.C.L. Sec. 780.601; M.S.A. Sec. 4.147(1), is to facilitate the disposition of charges in one jurisdiction when an accused is incarcerated in another jurisdiction. Thus, Art. IV(c) of the act requires the trial court to dismiss any charges brought against a defendant under the act if the defendant has not been brought to trial within the specified 120-day period. However, the 120-day time period may be tolled: (1) for any period which is the result of any necessary and reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court with the defendant or his counsel present, (2) for any period during which the defendant is unable to stand trial, and (3) for any period of delay caused by the defendant's request or in order to accommodate the defendant. Meyers, supra, p. 722, 311 N.W.2d 454; People v. Cook, 95 Mich.App. 645, 652-653, 291 N.W.2d 152 (1980).
Upon a review of the circuit court's findings, we now conclude that, in this case, necessary and reasonable continuances resulted in good cause for not bringing the defendants to trial within 120 days of their arrival in Michigan.
Defendants were returned to Michigan on a detainer agreement on March 14, 1979. On March 15, 1979, they were arraigned in district court. The preliminary examination was held on March 26, 1979, and the defendants were bound over for trial to the circuit court. The first problem causing a delay occurred at this time. The proofs offered at the preliminary examination indicated that defendant Charles Meyers was the principal involved in the armed robbery and the felony firearm. However, the preliminary transcript shows that the magistrate bound over defendant Daniel Meyers on charges of armed robbery and felony firearm but bound over defendant Charles Meyers only on the charge of armed robbery. To complicate matters, the magistrate's signed return stated that both the defendants were bound over on both charges.
On April 10, 1979, both the defendants were arraigned in circuit court. Defendant Charles Meyers objected to the filed information, arguing that he had only been bound over on a single count of armed robbery. After the prosecutor informed the court that the return indicated that defendant Charles Meyers had been bound over on both charges, counsel for defendant Charles Meyers stated: "Well, we'll probably have to wait for the filing of the transcript." The following day the prosecutor contacted the court reporter in attendance at the preliminary examination and requested preparation of the preliminary examination transcript.
We agree with the circuit court's finding that the ensuing delay was necessary and reasonable and find that, under this peculiar set of facts, the act's 120-day period was properly tolled during the time it took to obtain the transcript, i.e., from April 10, 1979, to June 11, 1979. Our conclusion is based upon a consideration of the following factors: (1) counsel for defendant Charles Meyers objected to the filed information, (2) the case could not proceed to trial while the parties were uncertain regarding the nature of the outstanding charges, (3) the defense counsel conceded that the examination transcript itself was necessary to clarify the problem, and (4) the prosecutor acted immediately to resolve the defendant's objection. In addition, although only defendant Charles Meyers objected to the information at the arraignment, we hold that the 120-day period was tolled with respect to defendant Daniel Meyers as well because he was present at the arraignment when the objection was made and made no objection to the obvious delay that was to ensue. Foran v. Metz, 463 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y.1979).
Our further review of the circuit court's decision on remand leads us to conclude that the court properly tolled the statute for other delays that were necessary and reasonable, and thus we reinstate the charges against the defendants. In light of our disposition of this issue, we will now address the remaining issues the defendants raised on appeal.
Defendants argue that reversal is mandated because the trial court erred in denial of their motions for separate trials. We find no merit in this assertion. There is a strong public policy in favor of joint trials, and the general rule is that a defendant does not have a right to a separate trial. People v. Hurst, 396 Mich. 1, 6, 238 N.W.2d 6 (1976); People v. Carroll, 396 Mich. 408, 414, 240 N.W.2d 722 (1976). Although a defendant's motion for severance should be granted when the defenses of the defendants joined for trial are antagonistic to one another, Hurst, supra, the defendants in the instant case both alleged that they were neither present at the scene of the robbery nor involved in the commission of the robbery in any fashion. Since their defenses were consistent with one another, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to order separate trials.
Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to introduce admissions allegedly made by each defendant which tended to inculpate the other. Defendants argue that the admission of these statements was prejudicial and violated the rule set forth in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the admission in a joint trial of significantly incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant who is not subject to cross-examination impermissibly infringes upon the other defendant's right of cross-examination guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The Bruton Court also held that a limiting instruction to the jury that the statement could only be used against its maker was insufficient to cure the prejudice inherent in such circumstances.
However, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), the Court held that a violation of the Bruton rule does not require reversal if such error is found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In People v. Miller, 88 Mich.App. 210, 221, 276 N.W.2d 558 (1979), rev'd on other grounds 411 Mich. 321, 307 N.W.2d 335 (1981), this Court invoked the harmless error doctrine where interlocking or substantially similar confessions were involved. The Court stated:
We agree that the admission of the defendants' statements was error under Bruton, since they tended to implicate a codefendant, even though neither codefendant was mentioned by name in the statements. However, we find that under the circumstances of this case, the admission of such testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant Charles Meyers made statements, which were admitted, to the effect that he and another person had just robbed a business. Although these admissions may have implicated defendant Daniel Meyers, similar incriminating statements were made by Daniel Meyers himself. He allegedly told a witness that he drove the "getaway car" during the robbery and mentioned that a person inside the store had seen him and might be able to identify him. Since none of the statements by defendant Charles Meyers specifically referred to defendant Daniel Meyers by name, since defendant Daniel Meyers's own admissions were substantially similar to those attributed to defendant Charles Meyers, and since the court repeatedly instructed the jury that a statement or admission of a codefendant could not be used or considered in any way against the other defendant, we conclude that the admission of the statements made by defendant Charles...
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