People v. Michalek

• Decision Date: 01 June 1993
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Anton MICHALEK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 565

598 N.Y.S.2d 565

194 A.D.2d 568

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Anton MICHALEK, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

June 1, 1993.

McKenna & Schneier, Valley Stream (Alan Schneier, of counsel), for appellant and appellant pro se.

James M. Catterson, Jr., Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Michael J. Miller, of counsel, Steven Gershowitz, on the brief), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and ROSENBLATT, MILLER and PIZZUTO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rohl, J.), rendered September 29, 1989, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

There is no merit to the defendant's contention that his arrest was predicated upon less than probable cause. When police questioned the defendant's companion, believing that he might be stealing a car radio, this individual informed the police that the defendant would be returning shortly to the car after having purchased cocaine at a nearby house. Even assuming that this individual could be considered an accomplice, the information he provided to the police clearly endowed them with probable cause to place the defendant under arrest upon his return to the car (see, People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 426 N.Y.S.2d 253, 402 N.E.2d 1155; People v. Rodriguez, 188 A.D.2d 564, 591 N.Y.S.2d 460; People v. Herrin, 187 A.D.2d 670, 590 N.Y.S.2d 523). To the extent that the defendant asserts that the police improperly elicited the incriminating statements from his companion, he lacks standing to raise this claim (see, People v. Henley, 53 N.Y.2d 403, 442 N.Y.S.2d 428, 425 N.E.2d 816; People v. Irby, 162 A.D.2d 714, 557 N.Y.S.2d 416; People v. Williams, 115 A.D.2d 627, 496 N.Y.S.2d 285).

The defendant further argues that his conviction must be vacated because he was absent from a material stage of his trial when the court conducted a Sandoval hearing in his absence. It is settled that a Sandoval hearing can constitute a material stage of the proceedings at which the defendant's presence is mandatory (see, People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 595 N.E.2d 836). However, even crediting the defendant's argument that he was absent from the pretrial Sandoval hearing, the court's ruling regarding a prior New York conviction constituted a "Sandoval compromise", holding only the fact of a prior felony conviction admissible without exploration of underlying facts. As the Court of Appeals explained in Dokes, a defendant's presence at a Sandoval hearing is necessary to enable him to controvert factual allegations and provide details as to alleged criminal acts so that a Sandoval ruling will not rest upon the prosecutor's unrebutted version of the facts (People v. Dokes, supra, at 661, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 595 N.E.2d 836). However, in this case the defendant admitted his prior New York felony conviction, and the court's ruling ...