People v. Mikula
| Decision Date | 19 October 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 22508.,22508. |
| Citation | 192 N.E. 546,357 Ill. 481 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. MIKULA. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; John Prystolski, Judge.
Stanley Mikula was convicted of robbery, and he brings error.
Cause remanded, with directions.Thaddeus C. Toudor, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, J. Albert Woll, and Henry E. Seyfarth, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Stanley Mikula and Joe Lukio were jointly indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the robbery of Ella Hanson. Mikula waived a jury and was tried by the court. He was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to ‘the penitentiary of this State at Joliet.’ A writ of error was sued out to reverse the judgment.
It is claimed that the judgment is erroneous because it fails to designate the specific place of confinement in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of the Sentence and Parole Act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 38, § 801 et seq., Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 38, par. 795 et seq., p. 1089), which provide that the sentence shall be to ‘the Illinois State Penitentiary.’ Section 1 of the act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 38, § 801) relates only to definite sentences for the crimes of treason, murder, rape, and kidnaping. Obviously it has no application to this case. Sections 2 and 3 (sections 802, 803) provide for indeterminate sentences (except to jail) for all crimes not enumerated in section 1. Section 2 provides that every such sentence ‘shall be a general sentence of imprisonment.’ Section 3 requires that persons convicted of felony or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary (other than minors of certain ages) shall ‘be sentenced to the penitentiary.’ Neither section requires the court to fix a specific place of confinement.
Section 1 of the act in relation to the Illinois State Penitentiary, approved June 30, 1933 (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 108, § 105, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, par. 113, p. 2138), provides: Section 3 of the same act (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 108, § 107) provides: ‘All commitments which under the law heretofore in force would have been made to the Illinois State Penitentiary, at Joliet, to the Southern Illinois Penitentiary, at Chester, or to the Illinois State Reformatory, at Pontiac, shall hereafter be made to the penitentiary generally, and the Department of Public Welfare shall have full power to assign the committed person to the division of the penitentiary system appropriated to his class.’ This statute not only makes no requirement that the judgment shall definitely name the particular penitentiary to which the convicted person shall be committed, but expressly provides that the sentence shall be to the penitentiary, generally. The Department of Public Welfare has the power to determine in which penitentiary he shall be confined.
It is urged that the judgment of conviction ought to be reversed because the Sentence and Parole Act, under which plaintiff in error was sentenced, is unconstitutional. Three objections to the validity of the act are advanced. They are: (1) The Departmentof Public Welfare may parole a nonresident prisoner whose family, relatives, or friends reside out of the state, to a person, firm, or company in some state other than Illinois, whereas a prisoner whose residence is in this state may not be paroled to anyone outside of Illinois; (2) the provision of the act which permits the warden of the penitentiary to issue his warrant without any preliminary affidavit showing probable cause contravenes section 6 of the Bill of Rights, which declares that no warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavits; and (3) the act clothes the Department of Public Welfare with judicial power to determine when and at what time a convict should be paroled.
The third objection has been definitely disposed of by our decisions in People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188, 125 N. E. 2;People v. Connors, 291 Ill. 614, 126 N. E. 595;People v. Simmons, 299 Ill. 201, 132 N. E. 423;People v. Bernstein, 304 Ill. 351, 136 N. E. 683; and People v. Cohen, 307 Ill. 87, 138 N. E. 294. A sentence under the act is for the maximum term provided by...
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... ... their respective departments, are equal and coordinate. Each ... derives its authority, mediately or immediately, from the ... people; and each is responsible, mediately or immediately, to ... the people for the exercise of it. When either shall have ... usurped the powers of one ... Ill. 447, 47 N.E. 741; People v. Joyce, 246 Ill ... 124, 92 N.E. 607; People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 ... N.E. 953; People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N.E ... 546; Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N.E. 894; ... State v. Page, 60 Kan. 664, 57 P. 514; George v ... ...
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...Federal or State constitutions. People v. Rohde, 403 Ill. 41, 85 N.E.2d 24; People v. Roche, 389 Ill. 361, 59 N.E.2d 866; People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N.E. 546; People v. Connors, 291 Ill. 614, 126 N.E. 595. Neither prisoner had the legal right to release prior to the expiration of h......
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