People v. Milea

• Decision Date: 12 August 1985
• Citation: 112 A.D.2d 1011,492 N.Y.S.2d 650
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Daniel MILEA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 650

492 N.Y.S.2d 650

112 A.D.2d 1011

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Daniel MILEA, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Aug. 12, 1985.

Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Kew Gardens, for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Steven J. Rappaport, Kew Gardens, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and NIEHOFF, RUBIN and LAWRENCE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered February 7, 1984, convicting him of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), and reckless endangerment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

On this appeal, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the indictment must be dismissed because the People's case, which was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In People v. Way, 59 N.Y.2d 361, 365, 465 N.Y.S.2d 853, 452 N.E.2d 1181 (1983), the Court of Appeals stated that,

"When a defendant's conviction is based * * * entirely upon circumstantial evidence of his guilt, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, not because of any inherent weakness in this form of evidence, but to ensure that the jury has not relied upon equivocal evidence to draw unwarranted inferences or to make unsupported assumptions * * * The well-settled standard of proof in such cases is that the facts from which the inference of defendant's guilt is drawn must be 'inconsistent with his innocence and must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis' " (see, People v. Marin, 65 N.Y.2d 741, 492 N.Y.S.2d 16, 481 N.E.2d 556 ).

It is not necessary for each piece of circumstantial evidence to rule out any hypothesis other than guilt, but the totality must (People v. Cathey, 38 A.D.2d 976, 331 N.Y.S.2d 837).

Viewing the evidence, as we must, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom (People v. Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1111, 1112, 490 N.Y.S.2d 166, 479 N.E.2d 802), we conclude that the defendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Review of the record before us discloses that, moments after it crashed, the defendant was seen by law enforcement officers fleeing from a silver vehicle, which they had been chasing at a high rate of speed (90 to 100 miles per hour) along the Van Wyck Expressway. The defendant was shortly thereafter apprehended and arrested. Found in the vehicle's rear seat were the codefendant (Antonio Nieves) and Juan Pion Baez, who had been shot eight times, twice in the head. Before he was removed from the scene in an ambulance, Baez told one of the officers in English and Spanish, "I shot, he shoot me, white guy, el blanco, I'm dying, blood, sangre". Significantly, the defendant was the only white person of the three connected with the silver vehicle, thereby fitting Baez's description, "white guy, el blanco". Baez died on his way to Jamaica Hospital.

The defendant's presence in the vehicle was also established by the discovery therein of a wallet containing a birth certificate and an application for a driver's license bearing the name Daniel Martinez. Shortly after his arrest, the defendant identified himself to a police officer as Daniel Martinez. Later, the defendant identified himself as Daniel Milea.

Two revolvers, a .32 and a...