People v. Miller

• Citation: 349 N.E.2d 841,384 N.Y.S.2d 741,39 N.Y.2d 543
• Parties: , 349 N.E.2d 841 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Willie MILLER, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 11 May 1976
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 741

384 N.Y.S.2d 741

39 N.Y.2d 543, 349 N.E.2d 841

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Willie MILLER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 11, 1976.

Betty D. Friedlander, Waverly and Victor J. Rubino, New York City, for appellant.

D. Bruce Crew, III, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

JASEN, Judge.

The principal issue presented for our consideration is whether, in a prosecution for homicide, ¹ a defendant, in support of his contention that he had reasonable grounds to believe himself in imminent danger from an assault by the deceased, may offer evidence to show that, prior to the homicide, the deceased committed specific acts of violence of which the defendant had knowledge.

Defendant Willie Miller was charged with fatally shooting his sister Minnie in the course of a violent family quarrel. After work on October 12, 1972, the members of the Miller family returned home from their various places of employment. Among the persons present in the home were the defendant, then 20 years old, the deceased, 22 years old, their mother, Mrs. Mae Miller, their sister and the deceased's boyfriend, a man named Eddie Brooks. Brooks came prepared with a quantity of Seconal capsules which he distributed to the members of the family. Both Willie and Minnie ingested at least two pills apiece. Brooks also had marijuana, which was proffered to a number of persons, again including the defendant and the deceased. After Brooks left the house, Willie and Minnie went out to cash her paycheck, using some of the cash thus obtained to purchase liquor. During the course of the next few hours, the family and friends played some records, danced and drank quantities of 'screwdrivers', wine and beer. At some point in the evening, Minnie announced that she was drunk and retired upstairs to take a nap. Sometime after midnight, Minnie awakened and discovered that the remaining money from her cashed paycheck was missing. She became extremely distraught and accused her mother of stealing the money. After Minnie had left the party, Mae Miller had gone out to visit a nearby friend. Willie brought her back to the house so that she might deny the accusation. As soon as Mae Miller returned home, Minnie stridently repeated her allegations and endeavored to strike her mother Willie grabbed her arm and forced her down to her side. The mother started to cry and frightened, she sat down out of harm's way. Minnie, however, directed her attentions at her brother. She began to punch, kick and grab him, cursing and swearing at him all the while. Willie, on the other hand, was simply trying to calm his sister down. When others attempted to subdue Minnie, she pushed them out of the way. Minnie ripped out the wires from a television set she had purchased for her mother. At one point, Willie attempted to hold Minnie down in a chair but could not restrain her for very long. Still incensed, Minnie went into the kitchen, followed by Willie. Minnie warned him off, telling him 'Get out of here before I kill you'. She reached into a drawer and removed a large barbecue fork. When this was wrestled away from her without damage, she went back to the drawer and pulled out a butcher knife. She slashed at one side of Willie's face, knocking off his glasses and cutting his chin. Willie fled from the kitchen and ran upstairs. Minnie returned to the living room where she stood for a time in the corner 'slobbering' at the mouth.

According to Willie's testimony at the trial, Minnie returned upstairs, remarked that she should have cut his throat when they were downstairs, and told him that she was going to kill him. When she continued to advance, Willie backed up into his room and lifted his shotgun from a corner of his closet. When Willie emerged from his room, Minnie was still outside, holding the knife in her upraised hand. As she started walking towards him, he fired the shotgun, inflicting a fatal abdominal wound.

After the shooting, defendant co-operated fully with the police. He voluntarily gave them a sworn statement which shed great doubt on his claim of self-defense. In the statement Willie stated that his shotgun was stored in a closet, that he loaded it and took care to be certain that the safety was off. 'My mother had come into the room, and tried to get the gun away from me. I pushed her away, walked into the hallway, where my sister was still screaming about what she was going to do to me; I looked to my sister who was then standing about eight to ten feet away from my room, and pointed the gun at her from my hip, and discharged same toward her.' He also stated that he did not actually see a knife in her hand, although it was his opinion that she still had the knife. Even more damaging was his statement that, after being cut he told his sister, 'OK, I'm going to get you.'

At the trial, to substantiate the defense claim of justification, counsel attempted to elicit from various witnesses the details of specific instances of violent behavior on the part of the deceased of which the entire family, including defendant, was aware. The defense offered to prove that Minnie would become extremely violent when under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that she had been confined in a mental institution, that she had once fought with her mother and bit her mother's finger so severely that the nail had to be removed, that she had pushed her mother down a flight of stairs, that Minnie had, on occasion, thrown objects at her mother, and had once, for no apparent reason, jumped through a glass window. The trial court, citing People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 408, 70 N.E. 1, refused to permit the defendant to introduce evidence of specific violent acts of the deceased. In response to defense counsel's argument that as a matter of commonsense proof of specific acts should be admissible because of its probative value, the court stated that '(u) nfortunately the law of the State of New York hasn't gone into that.'

The jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, affirmed the conviction, noting that, in its view, 'the trial court properly refused to allow questions framed by the defense counsel which were directed to specific acts of violence'. (People v. Miller, 46 A.D.2d 108, 109, 361 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231.)

A defendant in a homicide or assault prosecution may assert, as a defense, that his use of physical force upon the alleged victim was not unlawful since it was necessary to protect himself or others from the victim's aggression. (See Penal Law, § 35.15.) The defense is only available where the belief of the defendant that he was subject to an imminent attack is a reasonable one. Thus, the perceptions, the state of mind, of the participants to the encounter are critical to a claim of justification.

It has long been the rule in this State that a defendant, in a prosecution for homicide, may introduce evidence that the deceased had a reputation as a 'quarrelsome, vindicative or violent' person, provided that the defendant was aware of this reputation at the time of the incident. (People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 408, 423, 70 N.E. 1, 5, Supra; People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 95, 68 N.E. 112, 116; People v. Flournoy, 14 A.D.2d 854, 221 N.Y.S.2d 142.) 'The character of the deceased with reference to violence, when known to the accused, enables him to judge of the danger, and aids the jury in deciding whether he acted in good faith, and upon the honest belief that his life was in peril. It shows the state of his mind as to the necessity of defending himself.' (People v. Rodawald, supra, p. 423, 70 N.E. p. 6; see, generally, Evidence--Self-Defense--Reputation, Ann., 1 A.L.R.3d 571.) Similarly, the threats of the deceased against the defendant are admissible, whether communicated to the defendant or not. Even if the defendant was not aware of the threat, the threat still is probative of the deceased's state of mind and bears, thus, on whether the deceased was the aggressor. (Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 174.) On the other hand, if the defendant did hear of the threat, the threat may also serve to indicate the defendant's own apprehensive state of mind. (People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 95, 68 N.E. 112, 116, Supra; Richardson, Evidence (10 ed.), § 157.)

The courts of our State have consistently held that while the deceased's general reputation for violence is provable, evidence of specific acts of violence by the deceased is inadmissible. (Eggler v. People, 56 N.Y. 642; Thomas v. People, 67 N.Y. 218, 223; People v. Druse, 103 N.Y. 655, 8 N.E. 733; People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 95, 68 N.E. 112, 116, Supra.) '(T)his is improper', we said in People v. Rodawald (supra), 'not only because character is never established by proof of individual acts, but because each specific act shown would create a new issue.' (177 N.Y. 408, 424, 70 N.E. 1, 6; see 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 222 subd. a par. (2), pp. 1141--1142.) Today we are called upon to reconsider this aspect of the rule.

The rule we have followed in New York is the traditional rule and, for many years, was the general rule. (See Self-Defense--Evidence--Admissibility, Ann., 121 A.L.R. 380, 382.) However, the trend of the decisions in other jurisdictions, even in certain jurisdictions which formerly denied the admissibility of testimony as to specific acts, is towards the admissibility of such evidence. ²

The States that authorize the admission of prior violent acts of the deceased, known to the defendant, stress the relevance of such evidence on the issue of whether the defendant's asserted fear of the deceased was reasonable. (See McMorris v. State, 58 Wis.2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559; State v. Gordon, 37 Del. 219, 222, 181 A. 361.) Noted commentators have taken similar positions. (See 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 198, pp. 676--677; Richardson, Evidence (10th ed.), § 157, p. 128; see, also, Comment, 1974 Wis.L.Rev. 266.) A few jurisdictions have gone so far as to...