People v. Miller
| Decision Date | 20 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Calender No. 4.,Docket No. 149502. |
| Citation | 869 N.W.2d 204,498 Mich. 13 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Joseph MILLER, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and Bruce H. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Malaika D. Ramsey–Heath, Michael L. Mittlestat, and Jacqueline J. McCann), for defendant.
David A. Moran, Detroit, for the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
Victor Fitz, Cassopolis, Kym L. Worthy, and Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
At issue before us is whether defendant's convictions of operating while intoxicated (OWI)1 and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of the body function of another person (OWI-injury)2 arising from a single intoxicated driving incident violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.3 Although we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that convicting defendant of both offenses violated his double jeopardy protections, we disagree with the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, the Court of Appeals erred by not recognizing the clear legislative intent reflected in the plain language of the statute precluding multiple punishments for OWI and OWI-injury. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate defendant's OWI conviction under MCL 257.625(1) on alternate grounds and remand to the trial court for resentencing.
In June 2012, while returning from a concert at which they had both been drinking alcohol, defendant and his girlfriend got into an argument. Defendant grabbed the wheel from his girlfriend, who was driving, causing the car to go off the road and strike a tree. Defendant's girlfriend suffered a broken collar bone and a concussion as a result of the accident. Defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.17 grams per 100 milliliters.
Defendant was charged with OWI and OWI-injury. A jury convicted defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years' probation, with the first nine months to be served in the county jail.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court violated the multiple punishments strand of the double jeopardy clauses by convicting him of both OWI and OWI-injury. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacated defendant's OWI conviction under MCL 257.625(1), and remanded the case for resentencing.4 The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court of Appeals' analysis was contrary to People v. Ream,5 but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in a summary order.
The prosecution sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to consider whether defendant's convictions for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the same incident constitutes a violation of the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy under the United States and Michigan Constitutions.6
This case presents questions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the application of our state and federal Constitutions, which we review de novo.7
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....”8 The Michigan Constitution similarly provides that “[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.”9 The prohibition against double jeopardy protects individuals in three ways: “(1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”10 The first two protections comprise the “successive prosecutions” strand of double jeopardy, while the third protection is known as the “multiple punishments” strand.11 Because defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both OWI and OWI-injury arising from the same conduct at the same trial, this case involves the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy.
The multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy “is designed to ensure that courts confine their sentences to the limits established by the Legislature” and therefore acts as a “restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts.”12 The multiple punishments strand is not violated “[w]here ‘a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes....' ”13 Conversely, where the Legislature expresses a clear intention in the plain language of a statute to prohibit multiple punishments, it will be a violation of the multiple punishments strand for a trial court to cumulatively punish a defendant for both offenses in a single trial.14 “Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”15
The Legislature, however, does not always clearly indicate its intent with regard to the permissibility of multiple punishments. When legislative intent is not clear, Michigan courts apply the “abstract legal elements” test articulated in Ream to ascertain whether the Legislature intended to classify two offenses as the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. This test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense to determine whether the Legislature intended for multiple punishments.16 Under the abstract legal elements test, it is not a violation of double jeopardy to convict a defendant of multiple offenses if “each of the offenses for which defendant was convicted has an element that the other does not....”17 This means that, under the Ream test, two offenses will only be considered the “same offense” where it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense.18
In sum, when considering whether two offenses are the “same offense” in the context of the multiple punishments strand of double jeopardy, we must first determine whether the statutory language evinces a legislative intent with regard to the permissibility of multiple punishments. If the legislative intent is clear, courts are required to abide by this intent.19 If, however, the legislative intent is not clear, courts must then apply the abstract legal elements test articulated in Ream to discern legislative intent.
Subsections (1) through (8) of MCL 257.625 establish different categories of operating while intoxicated offenses. In this case, we must determine whether double jeopardy precludes defendant's convictions of OWI under MCL 257.625(1) and OWI-injury under MCL 257.625(5) arising from a single intoxicated driving incident.
MCL 257.625(1) provides:
MCL 257.625(5) provides:
As stated above, to determine whether defendant's convictions of both OWI and OWI-injury violated his double jeopardy rights, we must first determine whether the Legislature expressed a clear intent regarding the permissibility of multiple operating while intoxicated convictions arising from the same incident.
The Court of Appeals concluded, based on an examination of the plain language of MCL 257.625, that the Legislature did not “evince a clear expression of any intent to allow multiple punishments for the same offense.”20 In doing so, the Court...
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