People v. Comer
| Decision Date | 23 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 152713.,152713. |
| Citation | 500 Mich. 278,901 N.W.2d 553 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Justin Timothy COMER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Michael D. Wendling, Prosecuting Attorney, and Hilary B. Georgia, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Jacqueline C. Ouvry) for defendant.
Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Amici Curiae, for the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.
Michael Wendling, President of the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, David E. Gilbert, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer Kay Clark, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Amici Curiae, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
We address whether the trial court's failure to impose lifetime electronic monitoring as a part of defendant's sentence for criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree (CSC–I) rendered defendant's sentence invalid and, if so, whether the trial court could correct the invalid sentence on its own initiative 19 months after the original judgment of sentence had entered. We hold that defendant's sentence was invalid because MCL 750.520b(2)(d) required the trial court to sentence defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring. We further hold that under MCR 6.435 and MCR 6.429, the trial court erred by correcting defendant's invalid sentence on its own initiative absent a motion from either party. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, vacate the April 29, 2013 judgment of sentence, and remand this case to the trial court to reinstate the October 8, 2012 judgment of sentence.
In 2011, defendant, Justin Comer, was charged with CSC–I and first-degree home invasion stemming from an incident involving a 48-year-old woman. He pleaded guilty to CSC–I and second-degree home invasion. On October 3, 2011, former St. Clair Circuit Court Judge James Adair sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 51 months to 18 years for the CSC–I conviction and 51 months to 15 years for the second-degree home invasion conviction. The judgment of sentence included a line to be checked by the trial court, indicating: "The defendant is subject to lifetime monitoring under MCL 750.520n." This line was not checked, and the trial court did not otherwise indicate that defendant was subject to lifetime electronic monitoring.
Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, challenging the scoring of several offense variables. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant's CSC–I sentence and remanded for resentencing based on a scoring error.1 Thereafter, on October 8, 2012, Judge Adair resentenced defendant, reducing his minimum sentence for both convictions to 42 months. The second judgment of sentence also included the same unchecked line referring to lifetime electronic monitoring and omitted any other reference to that punishment.
On January 29, 2013, the Michigan Department of Corrections notified the trial court by letter that, pursuant to People v. Brantley ,2 defendant's sentence should have included lifetime electronic monitoring. Defendant objected, arguing that Brantley did not apply and that the prosecution's failure to bring a motion to correct defendant's sentence precluded resentencing. At a hearing on April 29, 2013, Judge Adair's successor, Judge Michael West, ruled that defendant's guilty plea was "defective" because defendant was not advised about lifetime electronic monitoring. Judge West declared that he would not proceed further with the plea being defective. He rejected defendant's argument that the omission of lifetime electronic monitoring could only be corrected pursuant to a timely motion to correct an invalid sentence.3 The trial court offered defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea or to allow the plea to stand while acceding to the lifetime electronic monitoring requirement. Defendant declined to withdraw his plea. Thereafter, the trial court signed a new judgment of sentence retaining the term of incarceration previously imposed and adding: "Lifetime GPS upon release from prison."4
Defendant again sought leave to appeal. After the Court of Appeals denied defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal,5 we remanded the case to that Court for consideration as on leave granted.6 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's sentence in a published opinion.7 Bound by Brantley , the Court of Appeals held that defendant was subject to lifetime electronic monitoring when he was first sentenced in 2011.8 Because defendant's sentence did not include lifetime electronic monitoring, the Court of Appeals concluded that his sentence was invalid.9 Next, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court had the authority to correct defendant's sentence. Relying on its prior decision in People v. Harris ,10 the Court of Appeals held that "the trial court was empowered to correct defendant's invalid sentence without time limitation."11
Judge GLEICHER concurred in the result but asserted that Harris was wrongly decided because, in her view, MCR 6.429 only permits a court to correct an invalid sentence after a party has filed a motion seeking that relief.12 She noted that no such motion had been filed by either party.13 But for Harris , she would have held that the trial court lacked the authority to correct the mistake in defendant's sentence.14
Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. We scheduled oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address:
(1) whether the defendant's original sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct was rendered invalid because it did not include lifetime electronic monitoring, pursuant to MCL 750.520b(2)(d), i.e., whether MCL 750.520n requires that the defendant, who pled guilty to MCL 750.520b(1)(c), be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring, compare People v. Brantley , 296 Mich.App. 546 (2012), with People v. King , 297 Mich.App. 465 (2012) ; and (2) if so, whether the trial court was authorized to amend the defendant's judgment of sentence on the court's own initiative twenty months after the original sentencing, in the absence of a motion filed by any party. See MCR 6.429 ; MCR 6.435.[15 ]
The proper interpretation and application of statutes and court rules is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.16 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the statute's plain language.17 In doing so, we examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme.18 We must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part surplusage or nugatory.19 When the statute's language is unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written.20 These same legal principles govern the interpretation of court rules.21
We first address whether defendant is subject to lifetime electronic monitoring by virtue of his CSC–I conviction for a sexual penetration that occurred under circumstances involving the commission of another felony. Punishment for this offense is governed by MCL 750.520b(2), which provides:
MCL 750.520n addresses lifetime electronic monitoring. Subsection (1) provides:
A person convicted under section 520b or 520c for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring as provided under section 85 of the corrections code of 1953, 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.285.
We begin, as we must, with the statutory language. Section 520b(2) governs the punishment imposed for all persons convicted of CSC–I. The first three subdivisions address the terms of imprisonment imposed for CSC–I. Generally, CSC–I is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years,22 with two exceptions. Under the first exception, CSC–I offenses committed by an individual 17 years of age or older against an individual less than 13 years of age are also subject to a 25–year mandatory minimum sentence.23 The second exception, which is not at issue here, specifies that certain repeat offenders must be imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole.24
In addition to imprisonment, the Legislature has imposed lifetime electronic monitoring as an additional punishment for a CSC–I conviction.25 Under § 520b(2)(d), the trial court shall sentence a...
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People v. Washington
...generally used to refer to errors in the exercise of jurisdiction and other nonjurisdictional errors. See, e.g., People v Comer , 500 Mich. 278, 292-293, 901 N.W.2d 553 (2017) (discussing a trial court's nonjurisdictional error using the language "authorized" and "authority" rather than "ve......
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...Finally, the interpretation of statutes and court rules is also a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v. Comer , 500 Mich. 278, 287, 901 N.W.2d 553 (2017).III. ANALYSISA. HATCHERThe trial court clearly erred in failing to abide by MCR 3.971(B)(3) and (4) at the adjudication pro......
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People v. Warren
...N.W.2d 260 (2018). In doing so, this Court "must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause" in the court rule. People v. Comer , 500 Mich. 278, 287, 901 N.W.2d 553 (2017). We examine first the phrase "maximum possible prison sentence" within MCR 6.302(B)(2). The court rule does not spec......
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People v. Washington
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