People v. Mills
Decision Date | 24 September 1984 |
Citation | 480 N.Y.S.2d 493,103 A.D.2d 379 |
Parties | The PEOPLE etc., Respondent, v. Chester MILLS, Appellant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Warren H. Richmond, III, Northport, for appellant.
Patrick Henry, Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Frances A. Sclafani, West Islip, of counsel), for respondent.
Before GIBBONS, J.P., and THOMPSON, WEINSTEIN and BROWN, JJ.
The instant appeal poses the question of whether Criminal Term erred in conducting a nonjury trial on a stipulated set of incriminating facts without having first inquired of defendant whether he had knowingly and intelligently agreed to the stipulation which, defendant alleges, was tantamount to a guilty plea with respect to the charges of which he was ultimately convicted. Assuming, without actually concluding that the underlying stipulation was indeed the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, we are of the view that the judgment of conviction should nevertheless be affirmed.
Defendant was indicted by a Suffolk County Grand Jury and charged in Indictment Number 11 48/82 with the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts). The charges resulted from defendant's participation in a sale of cocaine to an undercover Suffolk County Narcotics Squad officer on December 10, 1981. A nonjury trial on a stipulated set of facts was held before Justice JOSEPH JASPAN on June 10, 1982.
At the outset of the proceedings, defendant signed a waiver of jury trial in the presence of both the court and defense counsel. Both sides thereafter waived opening statements and the following stipulation was made on the record.
After so stipulating, the People rested their case and the defense indicated that it had no case to offer. Defense counsel conceded two separate acts of possession which had occurred some moments apart. It was contended that the stipulated facts made out a classic case of agency with the result that defendant could not be found guilty of either of the class B felonies charged, to wit, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree or criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (with intent to sell) (Penal Law, §§ 220.39, 220.16), inasmuch as the defense of agency negated the requisite element of intent. The court indicated that it would consider the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, a class A misdemeanor (Penal Law, § 220.03).
At the conclusion of the trial, defendant was found not guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment but guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense. In view of defendant's extensive criminal record and unfavorable probation report, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration of one year.
Defendant's argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in permitting him to be tried on a stipulated set of facts without first inquiring whether he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him and his right to present evidence in his own behalf. As per defendant's analysis, there is no meaningful distinction between the instant situation and situations requiring such inquiries prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea.
The contention that defendant, by way of a stipulation of uncontroverted facts, waived his right to present evidence on his own behalf is without any merit. The record unequivocally indicates that the defense was afforded an opportunity to present a case after the People had rested. Notwithstanding this opportunity to offer evidence of an exculpatory nature, defense counsel admitted that the defense had no case to present.
The record further reveals that the trial court questioned defendant extensively concerning the waiver of his right to a trial by jury. To require that a trial court interject itself into the case at each new step in order to inquire as to a defendant's understanding, absent any indication of incompetence on the part of defendant or counsel, is utterly unreasonable. We know of no authority in this State which purports to impose such a requirement.
It bears noting that there exists an area of Federal case law which addresses the issue of whether Federal courts are obligated by subdivision (c) of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (in U.S.Code, tit. 18, Appendix) to personally advise defendants of the consequences of their decisions to stipulate to facts which are tantamount to the entry of a guilty plea. The pertinent provisions of subdivision (c) of Rule 11 are as follows:
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