People v. Mingey

• Decision Date: 19 November 1907
• Citation: 82 N.E. 728,190 N.Y. 61
• Parties: PEOPLE v. MINGEY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

190 N.Y. 61

82 N.E. 728

PEOPLE

v.MINGEY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 19, 1907.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Lawrence P. Mingey was convicted of forgery in the second degree, and from an order of the Appellate Division (103 N. Y. Supp. 627,118 App. Div. 652), affirming such conviction, he appeals. Affirmed.George M. Curtis, for appellant.

William Travers Jerome, Dist. Atty. (Robert S. Johnstone, of counsel), for respondent.

CHASE, J.

One Devine gave a check upon the Hamilton Bank of New York city, payable to the Ross Lumber Company, a partnership. The check came to the possession of one Menton, an officer of the D. J. Menton Company, a corporation. He wrote the name ‘Ross Lumber Company’ across the back of the check, and delivered it to the defendant, who was the sceretary and treasurer of said corporation, and the defendant deposited the check in a bank in his name. The check was thereafter collected, and the defendant drew the amount thereof from the bank by checks which he asserts were in payment of claims against said corporation. It is claimed by the people that Menton's indorsement of the name Ross Lumber Company on said check was a forgery, and that the defendant uttered said check knowing that the payee's indorsement thereon was forged. The Ross Lumber Company is composed of C. Edward Ross and his brother. It is claimed by the defendant that Menton had authority from C. Edward Ross to indorse the name Ross Lumber Company on said check. At the trial of the indictment the jury rendered a verdict against the defendant,and judgment was entered thereon. From the judgment so rendered an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, where the judgment of conviction was unanimously affirmed, and from such judgment of affirmance an appeal has been taken to this court.

Substantially the only question of fact contested on the trial was as to whether said Menton had authority from C. Edward Ross to indorse the name Ross Lumber Company upon said check. That question, although stoutly contested, was a very narrow and simple one. The record before us contains nearly 300 pages, many of which consist wholly of discussion by and between the court and the defendant's counsel. A large part of the record of such discussions is useless for the purpose of presenting any question that could arise on an appeal to the Appellate Division or to this court. Such a record on appeal merits criticism and condemnation, and the lengthy discussions and statements in the trial court could only have tended to confuse the one all-important issue involved. The judgment of conviction having been unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division, there is nothing left for the consideration of this court but questions of law raised by appropriate exceptions in the trial court. People v. Maggiore, 189 N. Y. --, 81 N. E. 774;People v. Huson, 187 N. Y. 97, 79 N. E. 835. We have carefully considered the many objections taken by the defendant's counsel during the trial, and also every exception taken by him to the admission or exclusion of evidence and to the court's charge and refusals to charge, and we do not think that any error was committed to the prejudice of the defendant.

We refer specifically to two questions propounded to the witness C. Edward Ross and to the answers given thereto, because, if the witness did not have personal knowledge of what had been authorized by the firm of Ross Lumber Company and proper objections had been made to the latter question, the answer should have been excluded. No objection was taken to the competency of the witness to answer, and in view of the facts appearing in the case, even if the latter question had been properly objected to, the answer did not prejudice the defendant. The court, after calling the witness' attention to the indorsement on the check, asked the witness the following questions to which answers thereto were given as follows: ‘Q. Is it the signature of your firm? A. No, sir. Q. Was it ever authorized to be signed by your firm? A. No, sir.’ Counsel for the defendant then said, ‘Will you kindly note our objection to your honor's question and an exception?’ to which the court responded, ‘Yes.’ Statements were then made by the defendant's counsel and the court as follows: ‘Mr. Curtis: I desire to respectfully urge upon the court that, in the sense that every man is entitled to a fair trial, the defendant ought not to be oppressed by the superior learning, experience, and ability of the presiding justice, for whom we all have the most profound respect and the greatest veneration. The law provides a public prosecutor. The law pays him. * * * The Court: I am here to help administer criminal justice, and all I have done is to ask him to look at the indorsement on the check and then to state if...