People v. Moats
Decision Date | 15 December 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 72--19,72--19 |
Citation | 8 Ill.App.3d 944,291 N.E.2d 285 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel H. MOATS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James Geis, Illinois Defender Project, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.
James Moreno, Asst. State's Atty., knox County, Galesburg, for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant, Daniel H. Moats plead guilty to the charge of forgery and and was sentenced to a term of 1 to 5 years by the Circuit Court of Knox County. On this appeal he contends that the information did not state an offense.
The information for Forgery charged that the defendant, on the 18th of June, 1971, in Knox County, Illinois, 'did feloniously, falsely and knowingly, with intent to defraud, falsely make and forge the check of Hank & Mike Speer, Auto Mechanics, Inc., of Yates City, Illinois, drawn on the Bank of Yates City, Illinois, which he passed at Home Savings and Loan Association, Galesburg, Illinois, with intent then and there to prejudice and defraud said Bank of Yates City, Illinois, in violation of paragraph 17--3 Chap. 38, Illinois Revised Statutes * * *.'
As described in the information the document would appear as follows: (Our reconstruction)
Pay to the Order of _ _ $_ _ DOLLARS HANK & MIKE SPEER, AUTO MECHANICS, INC.
The information omits the name of the payee and the amount; there was no 'tenor description' I.e., photocopy or facsimile of the check.
Section 111--3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 111--3(a),) prescribes the manner of charging an offense. It provides that the charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by (1) Stating the name of the offense; (2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; (4) Stating the date and county of the offense * * *; (5) Stating the name of the accused * * *.
We are concerned here with only (3) above, 'Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.'
Section 17--3(a) of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 17--3(a),) defines the offense:
'(a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:
(1) Makes * * * any document Apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another * * *; or
(2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made * * *.' (Emphasis supplied)
Committee Comments, S.H.A. ch. 38, Sec. 17--3.
People v. Ciralsky, on page 559, 196 N.E. 733 says that the essential elements of forgery are a false making of an instrument in writing apparently capable of effecting fraud, together with a fraudulent intent. 19 I.L.P. Forgery, Sec. 2 states, 'Forgery is the false making or alteration with fraudulent intent, of an instrument apparently capable of effecting a fraud.'
Thus we see that the document made must be apparently capable of defrauding another. Goodman v. People, 228 Ill. 154, 81 N.E. 830. This is an essential element of the crime and must be set forth in some fashion in the indictment. 19 I.L.P. Forgery Sec. 4. In People ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 42 Ill.2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 225, the court discussed the history of pleading forgery offenses and reached the conclusion that a forgery indictment need not set out the instrument by an exact copy or typed facsimile in haec verba but could contain a purport description, narrative in style and describing the salient aspects of the instrument. The Court stated,
Can it be said that the instrument as pleaded in the instant case is apparently capable of defrauding another? In People v. Nickols, 391 Ill. 565, 63 N.E.2d 759, no payee was named in the check as pleaded in the tenor clause. There the court reversed. As was said in People v. Addison, 75 Ill.App.2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511 and again in People v. Mustread, 94 Ill.App.2d 440, 237 N.E.2d 348, 'The instrument in Nickols would defraud nobody.' In Nickols the court defined a check as follows:
At the time of this decision (1946) the Negotiable Instruments Law was in effect, however, the Commercial Code adopts the definition of a check contained in Section 184 of the Illinois N.I.L. See Illinois Code Comment to Paragraph (b) Subsection (2) of Sec. 3--104 of Uniform Commercial Code (S.H.A. ch. 26, Sec. 3--104). If the indictment merely sets out an instrument which is a nullity on its face, without any allegation showing how it could be made to act injuriously or fraudulently by reason of independent matter, no case is made. The same is true when the instrument is imperfect and incomplete * * *. 36 Am.Jur.2d, Forgery, Sec. 36.
Unless...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Toolen, s. 82-274
...an element of the offense of forgery that the document made or altered be apparently capable of defrauding another. (People v. Moats (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285.) Such a document "includes, but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or power with reference to any......
-
People v. Turner
...the payee portion remained blank. Defendant relies on People v. Nickols (1945), 391 Ill. 565, 63 N.E.2d 759, and People v. Moats (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285. Both of those cases, however, addressed the sufficiency of the charging instrument. In Nickols, the supreme court found ......
-
People v. Bokuniewicz
...S.Ct. 153, 17 L.Ed.2d 103 (defendant attempted to cash check marked "void after 30 days" 43 days after its date).) People v. Moats (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285, cited by defendant, is distinguishable. In that case, the court held that the information was insufficient to charge f......
-
People v. Roberts
... ... We had occasion to repeat a long-standing rule noted in Goodman v. People, 228 Ill. 154, 157, 81 N.E. 830 (1907) when we said in our case of People v. Moats, 8 Ill.App.3d 944, 947, 291 N.E.2d 285 (1972): ... 'Unless the instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding, or such character is given to it by extrinsic averments, forgery cannot be predicated upon it.' ... A document apparently capable of defrauding another is ... ...