People v. Monaco
| Decision Date | 27 February 1964 |
| Parties | , 197 N.E.2d 532 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Salvatore MONACO, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Maurice Edelbaum, New York City, for appellant.
Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty. (William I. Siegel and David Diamond, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.
The factual circumstances of the crime for which appellant Monaco was convicted of murder, second degree, are developed in the opinion of Judge FROESSEL on the prior appeal in this case in 1962 (People v. Fasano and Monaco, 11 N.Y.2d 436, 230 N.Y.S.2d 689, 184 N.E.2d 289).
On that appeal, however, Monaco was respondent and the People appellant, from an order of the Appellate Division (14 A.D.2d 581, 218 N.Y.S.2d 200), which had reversed the judgment against Monaco and directed a new trial for a purported error in the instructions to the jury. The refusal of the Trial Judge to charge, upon which the Appellate Division had reversed Monaco's conviction, was, as Judge FROESSEL noted, 'The narrow question presented by the People's appeal' (11 N.Y.2d p. 442, 230 N.Y.S.2d p. 694, 184 N.E.2d p. 292).
That order for a new trial was in turn reversed in this court on the ground the charge was without substantial error (11 N.Y.2d pp. 442-444, 230 N.Y.S.2d pp. 693- 695, 184 N.E.2d pp. 292-293), and the case was remitted to the Appellate Division in pursuance of section 543-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure to pass upon questions of fact (11 N.Y.2d p. 445, 230 N.Y.S.2d p. 696, 184 N.E.2d p. 293). Upon this remission the Appellate division affirmed the judgment of conviction (18 A.D.2d 1137, 240 N.Y.S.2d 957).
The present appeal by Monaco is the first time, therefore, that the sufficiency of the record as a matter of law to sustain a conviction against him of murder in the second degree has been definitively presented to this court. The sufficiency of the record as to Fasano was passed upon and the judgment affirmed as to him; but Fasano and Monaco are shown by the record to be in quite different legal relationships to the crime.
The range of appellant's argument is quite limited in scope. He suggests that the record does not sustain the conviction for murder in the second degree, 'but at most supported a charge and conviction of manslaughter in the first degree'. The essential element of murder in the second degree is, without premeditation, a 'design to effect the death of the person killed' (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 1046).
No doubt Fasano, who actually fired the shot, could have formed that design when he took out the gun and pointed it at the deceased, and the final judgment against him is necessarily based on such a finding. But the proof that Monaco, in the enterprise in which he participated with Fasano, formed such a 'design' to kill is lacking in this record.
Accepting, as we must, a view of the facts most favorable to the People's case, the record shows a purpose by both defendants to get into a fight with a rival teen-age gang. Fasano was armed with a loaded gun, and the record would sustain a finding that Monaco knew the gun was carried and was loaded.
To set forth with an armed companion into a street fight may sometimes spell out a willful homicide, a 'design' to kill, by the unarmed person. But a spontaneous and not concerted or planned use of the weapon to kill is not, without more, attributable to the companion whose guilt in a joint design to effect death must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. An agreement to murder must be shown to exclude other fair inferences.
What Monaco did before the gun was pulled out by Fasano and fired, what defendants said to each other in entering the enterprise, all fall short of a design or intention by them to kill anyone. No agreement to kill, no purpose to kill, no expressed intent to kill, even if they found themselves in danger, can be ghthered from the evidence. The entire record is consistent with a spontaneously formed decision by Fasano to shoot, in which decision Monaco took no purposeful part.
The record is all in this direction. The testimony of the police officer, Babicke, as to what Monaco said is typical. Fasano had told the officer he 'went down there for the purpose of grabbing a Ditmas Duke, showing him the gun, and giving him a beating'. Monaco went 'for the same purpose, to show them the gun, give them a...
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