People v. Mondon

• Decision Date: 05 October 1886
• Citation: 8 N.E. 496,103 N.Y. 211
• Parties: PEOPLE v. MONDON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

103 N.Y. 211

8 N.E. 496

PEOPLE

v.MONDON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 5, 1886.

Appeal from the judgment of the supreme court, Fourth department, affirming judgment of conviction of court of oyer and terminer, Herkimer county.

EARL, J., and RUGER, C. J., dissent.

H. Clay Hall, for appellant, Frank Mondon.

Eugene E. Sheldon, for the people.

RAPALLO, J.

The appellant was convicted, at a court of oyer and terminer held in Herkimer county in May, 1885, of the crime of murder in the first degree for killing one John Wishart, and was sentenced to death. On appeal to the supreme court the conviction was affirmed at a general term held at Syracuse in November, 1885. BOARDMAN and HARDIN, JJ., delivered opinions for affirmance, and FOLLETT, J., delivered a dissenting opinion. The case now comes before us on appeal from the judgment of affirmance.

Numerous exceptions were taken at the trial, and, after a careful examination, we concur in the conclusions reached by the supreme court as to all of the points raised on behalf of the appellant, except the one upon which the learned judges who heard the case at general term differed in opinion, and we shall therefore confine our discussion to that point.

The question in difference was the admissibility in evidence, upon the trial of the prisoner, of statements alleged to have been made by him on his examination under oath at the coroner's inquest, held upon the body of the deceased after it had been found, which was a considerable time subsequent to the killing. The evidence connecting him with the crime, aside from his alleged confessions to members of his family, and afterwards to the officer having him in custody, was circumstantial, but no question as to its sufficiency arises here. After the finding of the body of the deceased, the defendant was arrested, without warrant, as the suspected murderer. While he was thus in custody the coroner impaneled a jury, and held an inquest, and the defendant was called as a witness before the inquest, and was examined by the district attorney and by the coroner. The prisoner was an ignorant Italian laborer, unfamiliar with the English language. He was unattended by counsel, and it does not appear that he was in any manner informed of his rights, or that he was not bound to answer questions tending to criminate him. He was twice examined. On the first occasion the examination was taken by questions put either by the district attorney or by the coroner, and the result written down by the coroner, who then read the evidence over to him, line by line, and asked him if he understood it, and if it was the truth, and he said it was, and the coroner then reswore him to the deposition.

The coroner testifies that he came to the conclusion that the defendant did not understand English well enough to be examined; that on taking the evidence, which was signed by him, no interpreter was used; that the interpreter was used on a subsequent day; that the defendant made no corrections or suggestions while the deposition was being read to him; that he (the coroner) became satisfied, after taking defendant's testimony on the first day, that it ought to be taken through an interpreter, and thought they might get it a little better and a little fuller. The court thereupon reserved its decision as to the admissibility of the evidence until the opening of the court on the following day.

The coroner was then asked various questions as to what the defendant had stated at the coroner's inquest, as to his having been on the ground where the body of deceased was found, as to when he had last seen the deceased alive, as to where deceased was then going, whether he was alone, as to the whereabouts of the defendant on the day the deceased disappeared, as to threats made by deceased to have the defendant arrested for marrying the daughter of deceased while having another wife living, as to disputes between deceased and defendant on that subject, and other questions tending to establish the theory of the prosecution as to the motive of the defendant in committing the murder. Some of the statements of the prisoner on his examination, as testified to by the coroner, confirmed the theory of the prosecution as to the hostile feeling between the prisoner and the deceased, and the quarrels which had taken place between them, but the others were denials of implicating circumstances. Each of the questions thus put to the coroner, as to what the prisoner had testified to, was specifically objected to. The objections were overruled, and exceptions duly taken.

The deposition taken by the coroner, as before stated, was not offered in evidence; but the coroner, in giving his testimony, referred to it to refresh his recollection with respect to the testimony given by the defendant on the inquest. The coroner also testified that a club which was found near the body of deceased was produced at the inquest before the taking of testimony began; that the defendant had then been informed that he was charged with the murder of deceased, and, on the production of the club, exclaimed, ‘Me no kill old John with that club,’ and appeared nervous and exicted.

It thus appears that, when the prisoner was called upon to make his statement on oath before the coroner, he stood in the attitude of an accused person, and was required to answer for himself, as a party, and not as a mere witness to aid the coroner in investigating the cause of the death of the deceased. The cause of death was evident. The body had been examined, with the marks of violence plainly apparent, the bruised head, the fractured skull, and the broken club lying near it, with hair still adhering to it. It was evident that a crime had been committed. From the time that a felonious homicide was established the proceedings assumed the form of a criminal investigation. Hendrickson v. People, (per GARDINER, J.,) 10 N. Y. 49.

By section 777 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it became the duty of the jury, if the death was occasioned by criminal means, to find who was guilty thereof, and on such finding the coroner was empowered to issue his warrant for the arrest of the guilty party if not already in custody. From that time the prisoner occupied the position of a person accused of crime, and his situation was similar to that of such a person before an examining magistrate; ‘and, although the tribunal might be different, yet upon principle his rights would be the same in both cases.’ 10 N. Y. 48. And in Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 9, WOODRUFF, J., in commenting upon the case of People v. McMahon, says: ‘The coroner was acting substantially in the place of an examining magistrate, and the fact that the prisoner was held under arrest without warrant could not make his protection against such an inquisition less imperative;’ and, at page 12, the same learned judge says that declarations made under examination, with such a charge depending, should be excluded, except where obedience to the statutory precautions is observed.

The admissibility of examinations in evidence upon the trial of the offender had been passed upon in many English cases, but the whole subject has been so thoroughly discussed in three cases in this court that it is not necessary to refer particularly to the English authorities.

In Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. 13, the wife of the defendant died suddenly in the morning, and in the evening of the same day a coroner's inquest was held. The defendant was called and sworn as a witness upon the inquest. At that time it did not appear that any crime had been committed, or that the defendant had been charged with any crime, or even suspected, except so far as the nature of some of the questions asked of him might indicate such a suspicion. On his subsequent trial, on an indictment for the murder of his wife, the statements made by him at the coroner's inquest were held admissible, on the ground that he was not examined as a party charged with the crime; that it had not appeared even that a crime had been committed; and that he had simply testified as a witness on the inquiry as to the cause of the death.

In People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384, the defendant was arrested by a constable, without warrant, on a charge of having murdered his wife. The constable took him before the coroner, who was holding an inquest on the body, by whom he was sworn and examined as a witness. It was held that the evidence thus given was not admissible on the prisoner's trial for the murder and his conviction was reversed upon that ground. In the judgment all the judges who heard the case concurred.

The next case is Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7. In that case the defendant appeared at the coroner's inquest in pursuance of a subpoena to testify, and voluntarily attended. He was not under arrest, but was informed by one Dally that it was charged that his wife had been poisoned, and that he would be arrested for the crime. Before he was sworn he was informed by the coroner that there were rumors that his wife came to her death by foul means, and that some of those rumors implicated him, and that he was not obliged to testify unless he chose. He said he had no objection to telling all he knew. The learned judge delivering the opinion precludes it by a reference to these facts, as showing that the statements made were voluntary in every legal sense, and held that a mere consciousness of being suspected of a crime did not so disqualify him that his testimony, in other respects freely and voluntarily given, before the coroner, could not be used against him on his trial on a charge subsequently made of such crime. On that ground he held the evidence properly admitted; at the same time referring with approval to the McMahon Case, and distinctly limiting the rule of exclusion to cases within its bounds.

The present case is identical in all its essential features with the McMahon Case. In both cases the prisoner had been arrested...