People v. Monk

• Citation: 528 N.E.2d 1063,174 Ill.App.3d 528
• Decision Date: 14 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 4-87-0791,4-87-0791
• Parties: , 124 Ill.Dec. 172 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse MONK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1063

528 N.E.2d 1063

174 Ill.App.3d 528, 124 Ill.Dec. 172

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse MONK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-87-0791.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Sept. 14, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1988.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Karen Munoz, Asst. Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Greg Roosevelt, State's Atty., Lincoln, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, David E. Mannchen, Staff Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice LUND delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 18, 1987, defendant Jesse Monk was found guilty by the circuit court of Logan County of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in violation of section 12-16(c)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-16(c)(1)). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to four years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

A bench trial was conducted on September 17, 1987. The first witness was T.M., the victim, who is currently 7 years old. The incident occurred on November 25, 1986, at which time she was 6 years old. Defendant and his wife, Alma Monk, were baby-sitting for T.M. On the date in question, defendant picked T.M. up at school and had lunch. She stated he then touched her and kissed her on her privates. By use of a doll, she showed this meant her groin. She stated he also had her kiss his penis and wipe it with a kleenex. This occurred in the bedroom, and defendant's wife was not present. Later that day T.M. told her parents and others.

On cross-examination, T.M. could not remember what clothing she wore. She also stated she was mad at defendant because defendant would not let her go to a neighbor's house. However, this occurred after defendant touched her. She maintained he took her clothes off. She also remembered telling the police defendant touched his private to her private and pushed hard. Defendant told T.M. she was his special friend.

T.M.'s father testified that defendant and his wife had been baby-sitting for his daughter for approximately one year. On the date in question, he picked T.M. up around 4 p.m. When they got home, T.M. started crying saying she wanted her mother, but she would not tell him why. When her mother came in, T.M. told them what happened.

T.M.'s mother stated that when she got home, T.M. was very upset and started crying while telling her what happened. They then took T.M. to the hospital. Later that night, T.M. wet her bed which was very unusual for her. She also had nightmares which she did not have before.

Mary Stenger is a social worker at St. John's Hospital in Springfield. She interviewed T.M. that night. T.M. seemed to her to be alert and intelligent. She was able to relate the incident without any prompting.

Dr. John Benitez examined T.M. at the hospital. He testified T.M. was alert, oriented, and playful at the time of the interview.

Sergeant John Cook is a detective with the Logan County sheriff's office. He interviewed T.M. late that night. She was very alert and communicative.

Diane Schneider is a forensic scientist specializing in serology. She tested the underwear T.M. was wearing that day and found saliva in the crotch. She was unable to find any blood factors in the saliva. Both T.M. and defendant are nonsecretors, meaning their saliva would not contain blood factors. The State rested.

Defendant stated he is 46 years old and was disabled in 1981. He and his wife had been baby-sitting T.M. in excess of one year. On the date in question, his wife needed to get some medication and asked defendant to pick T.M. up. He brought her home and gave her some lunch. She suddenly got up and started riding on the corner of his chair. He stated T.M. said, "Let's me and you go in the bedroom and do what mamma and daddy do and you and Alma do." He told her she should not talk this, and they went outside. At no time did he touch or kiss her improperly, or have her kiss him.

Once outside, he was working on a tiller. He had to continually yell at T.M. to keep her out of his neighbor's house. When his wife came home, he told her he had a problem with T.M. He explained that T.M. had a habit of sexually rubbing herself on the chair which they called "riding the chair."

Robert Fuiten considers defendant a friend. Defendant has a reputation for honesty and truthfulness. He also has a good reputation for moral character. Ed Schlosser testified similarly. Larry Wise stated defendant and his wife baby-sat his daughters. He similarly testified as to defendant's reputation. Everett and Jesse Edith Cherry, defendant's neighbors, also testified favorably concerning his reputation.

Alma Monk testified the first time she saw T.M. that day was when she got back from the pharmacy. Defendant brought T.M. into the house through the front door. He did this to make sure she was home because he was not going to bring T.M. in the house unless Alma was home. Alma gave T.M. her medicine to settle her down. Defendant told Alma that T.M. was having one of her bad days. To her this meant T.M. was frequently riding furniture. During the rest of the afternoon, T.M. played in the house like normal.

This was the first time defendant had been alone with T.M. Defendant did not tell Alma that T.M. had made the suggestive comment to him.

The court, after hearing closing arguments, found defendant guilty. On November 3, 1987, the court sentenced defendant to four years' imprisonment. Defendant now appeals alleging (1) the court erred in denying defendant access to reports relating to psychological treatment and counseling T.M. received; (2) the court erred in quashing the subpoena defendant issued to T.M.'s school teacher; (3) defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the court allowed improper evidence in the sentencing hearing; and (5) the sentence imposed is excessive. We affirm.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to produce requesting that the State be ordered to produce any psychological, psychiatric, or other counseling reports concerning T.M. Discovery of these materials is covered by Supreme Court Rule 412(h), which provides:

"Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to defense counsel of relevant material and information not covered by this rule." (107 Ill.2d R. 412(h).)

At the hearing on the motion, Alma Monk testified T.M.'s mother told her that T.M. had been to a medical doctor and a psychiatrist. She also knew that T.M. was hyperactive and was taking Ritalin. The State indicated they had no such reports. The court ordered the State to procure whatever reports there were. The next day the court viewed two reports, one from a medical doctor and one from a psychologist, in camera, and determining that there was nothing material in them, denied defendant's motion. Defendant asserts this was error. We disagree.

Illinois courts have held that evidence of a witness's mental condition is admissible to the extent that it bears on the credibility of the witness's testimony. (People v. Walton (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 698, 703, 63 Ill.Dec. 351, 355, 437 N.E.2d 1273, 1277; People v. Phipps (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 413, 416, 53 Ill.Dec. 936, 938-39, 424 N.E.2d 727, 729-30.) In Phipps, this court first addressed the question of discovery of mental health records. There the crime occurred at a mental health facility, and a number of witnesses were patients. We determined that the court should issue subpoenas for the records of the witnesses and, if the therapist or patient asserted his statutory privilege, the record should be viewed in camera with counsel present, with only relevant and material parts being disclosed. After directing the subpoena should be issued, we stated:

"In addition, the trial court should take specific note of the policy of this State in maintaining the confidentiality of these files and should conduct a further inquiry into the reasonableness and materiality of the requested material." Phipps, 98 Ill.App.3d at 417-18, 53 Ill.Dec. at 939, 424 N.E.2d at 730.

In Walton, this court further defined the procedure to be used. There, defendant, relying on Phipps, wished to discover medical and mental health records of the victim. We made clear that Phipps was not to be read too broadly, stating:

"We do not deem the rule of Phipps to be so broad as to negate the necessity of establishing the pertinence of a witness' psychiatric condition or history to the credibility of his or her testimony before such evidence may be introduced or before a witness' otherwise confidential mental health records may be subpoenaed or discovered." ( Walton, 107 Ill.App.3d at 703, 63 Ill.Dec. at 355, 437 N.E.2d at 1277.)

We observed that in Phipps the witnesses suffered from severe psychiatric disorders requiring long-term hospitalization. They were residents at the time of the crime and trial. In contrast, in Walton, the witness had once been a voluntary patient and successfully completed treatment. He was not under treatment at the time of the crime or trial. Further, the only evidence offered to support defendant's position was the assertion that the victim was under supervision of medical authorities. We found that this fell far short of the type of evidence which would have been necessary to establish the relevancy of the records to the victim's credibility. Since defendant's showing of relevancy was insufficient, we held the court properly denied the motion.

These two cases establish that a two-step procedure for discovery of these records has been set up. First, defendant must sufficiently show that the requested records are material and relevant to the witness's credibility. If that is done, the discovery is permissible. However, if the witness...