People v. Monson
| Decision Date | 22 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 21803 |
| Citation | 28 Cal.App.3d 935,105 Cal.Rptr. 92 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Harry Randall MONSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
John H. Marshall and Henry F. Poyet, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Bradley A. Stoutt, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Harry Randall ('Doc') Monson appeals from a judgment of conviction of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496) entered upon his plea of nolo contendere, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The certificate of probable cause, required by Penal Code section 1237.5, has been filed. The appeal lies (Pen.Code, §§ 1237(1), 1538.5(m)), but is without merit.
Appellant advances the following grounds for reversal. First, he contends that there was no probable cause for his warrantless arrest, since it was based upon 'search and seizure and investigation' which themselves lacked probable cause. Second, he argues that the Los Angeles City police were without jurisdiction to arrest him in Burbank. Third, he claims that the trial judge prejudged his motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 before all the evidence was adduced and the matter was submitted.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the People, as we are bound to do (see People v. Reilly, 3 Cal.3d 421, 424--425, 90 Cal.Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649), we proceed to set forth the pertinent facts, which are undisputed.
On February 26, 1970 two Los Angeles City policy officers were proceeding to their station when they saw appellant driving beside them. They recognized him as 'Doc' Monson, a known burglar and receiver of stolen property. During the preceding five years they had received intelligence information concerning appellant's criminal activity from fellow police officers. It was usual police procedure for the officers, who were assigned to the burglary and receivers of stolen property detail, to investigate persons with criminal backgrounds to see what they were doing. They followed appellant and ran a registration check on the automobile he was driving. It was registered to him. They observed him stop in front of a retail fur store, enter the store and exit three minutes later with the store owner. Appellant was carrying a fur jacket which he placed in the trunk of the car. He removed a fur-collared gray coat and a shopping bag therefrom, and reentered the store with the owner. Thereafter, appellant got back in the car and drove away.
One of the officers then entered the fur store and asked the owner about appellant. The owner stated that he knew him as 'Doc Monson' and that since December of 1969 appellant had been bringing him furs for relinings and alterations. The owner showed the officer the two furs that appellant had just brought in, the fur-collared gray coat whose label was removed and a fur jacket whose label was also removed but which contained the monogram 'Rose Mahru'. The officer telephoned his office and learned that a fur of the same description with a monogram of the same name had been taken in a burglary that had occurred a few days earlier and that it, along with other items, had been reported stolen the previous day. After relaying this information to two other officers who apparently had joined them, the two officers went to an address in Burbank where they observed the vehicle that appellant had driven parked in the carport of apartment No. 4. After determining that appellant's name was on the mailbox of the apartment, they went to obtain a search warrant for the other items taken with the fur. Two other officers remained at the location and continued to watch appellant's apartment and car.
Appellant was arrested that same evening by one of the officers keeping surveillance outside his apartment before the return of the officers who had gone to obtain a search warrant. Appellant was arrested without a warrant for burglary after he shook five rifles wrapped in a blanket into the trunk of a visitor's car.
Appellant's first contention is that there was no probable cause for his warrantless arrest, because it was based upon 'search and seizure and investigation' which themselves lacked probable cause. Because the 'search and seizure and investigation' lacked probable cause, appellant contends that it was error to admit evidence of one of the items seized--the fur jacket with the monogram 'Rose Mahru'. Specifically he claims, without any citation of authority in support of his position, that the same probable cause required for a valid arrest is also required to begin an investigation and to place a suspect under surveillance, and that such was absent here. Apparently this is a novel argument as we have not found any authority for the proposition advanced.
We do not think that the case before us even raises a Fourth Amendment issue. The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S.Const., 4th Amend.) It applies to all governmental invasions into 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' (Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1879, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040, 1047, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626--627, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed.2d 746, 749.) The instant case contains no evidence that any intrusion into appellant's privacy occurred at the time appellant was followed to the fur store by the investigating officers; in fact, neither a search nor seizure of any sort occurred at this time nor during the subsequent questioning of the fur store owner. 1 There is no intimation that the fur store owner did not voluntarily speak with the officers or voluntarily show them the two items which appellant had just brought to the owner. '. . . (I)t is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses . . ..' (People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 858; People v. Munoz, 24 Cal.App.3d 900, 904, 101 Cal.Rptr. 265.) Otherwise they cannot perform effectively their functions of preventing crime and apprehending...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alvarez-Machain v. United States of America, 99-56762.
...this provision to police officers who make arrests outside of their jurisdiction but within California. See, e.g., People v. Monson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 92, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). California law also permits Mexican police crossing the border in fresh pursuit of a suspect to make an arrest in ......
-
Alvarez-Machain v. U.S.
...provision to police officers who make arrests outside of their jurisdiction but within California. See, e.g., People v. Monson, 28 Cal.App.3d 935, 105 Cal.Rptr. 92, 95 (1972). California law also permits Mexican police crossing the border in fresh pursuit of a suspect to make an arrest in C......
-
Com. v. Harris
..."citizen's arrest" under the same circumstances. State v. McCullar, 110 Ariz. 427, 428, 520 P.2d 299 (1974). People v. Monson, 28 Cal.App.3d 935, 939-940, 105 Cal.Rptr. 92 (1972). State v. Shipman, 370 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). State v. O'Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Iowa 1973......
-
State v. Tsukiyama
...the suppression of contraband which the individual discards in response to the approach of the officer. In People v. Monson, 28 Cal.App.3d 935, 939, 105 Cal.Rptr. 92, 95 (no Pacific Reporter citation) (1972), the court recognized the need for 'field' interviews by the police: It is not unre......