People v. Moore

• Decision Date: 28 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 42484,42484
• Citation: 51 Ill.2d 79,281 N.E.2d 294
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James R. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 294

281 N.E.2d 294

51 Ill.2d 79

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James R. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 42484.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 28, 1972.

Frederick F. Cohn and Victor G. Savikas, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert A. Novelle, and Robert L. Best, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice.

Defendant, James R. Moore, was found guilty by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County of the offenses of rape, deviate sexual assault, burglary and robbery, and sentenced to concurrent sentences of not less than 30 nor more than 50 years on each of the rape, burglary and robbery convictions, and not less than 5 nor more than 10 years on the conviction for deviate sexual assault.

The complaining witness testified that on December 14, 1967, at approximately noon, she was awakened from a nap by noise in her apartment. As she opened her eyes, she saw a man standing in her room. She screamed, and the man leaped upon her and began choking her. He turned her over on her stomach, removed part of her clothing and covered his face with a bandanna. He forced her to perform an act of oral copulation, and then raped her. He left the apartment taking with him several items of personal property including two musical instruments.

As grounds for reversal defendant contends first that he was denied equal protection of the law when the trial court denied his request for a transcript of the preliminary hearing at which the complainant testified. The record shows that at a motion hearing approximately two months prior to trial defense counsel requested a copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The trial court stated that he was not entitled to the transcript but that the 'preliminary hearing statements' would be preserved and would be available 'for you and for your use at the time of trial.' At the trial, following the testimony of the complaining witness, defense counsel again requested the transcript. It was determined that the testimony had not been transcribed and the court ordered counsel to proceed without it.

Citing Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41, defendant argues that the refusal of the transcript violated his constitutional rights for the reason that if he were not indigent he could have ordered the testimony transcribed. The People contend that Roberts is not applicable for the reason that the New York statute involved in Roberts specifically provides for furnishing the transcript upon payment of the statutory fee and there is no comparable statute in Illinois. Defendant argues, and we agree, that the distinction for which the People contend is not valid for the reason that under the provisions of section 5 of the Court Reporters Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 655) a defendant able to pay the fee would have been able to obtain the transcript. We hold that under the authority of Roberts the cases therein cited, and Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), the denial of the transcript deprived defendant of equal protection of the laws.

When the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing was transcribed is not shown, but the transcript is included in the record on appeal. Citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, defendant argues, correctly, that for error of constitutional dimensions to be deemed harmless the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We have examined the testimony at the trial, the testimony at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the identification of the defendant by the complaining witness, and the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and fail to find any testimony for which the transcript could have been used for purposes of impeachment. Defendant argues that in the hearing to suppress, and at trial, the complaining witness testified the assault occurred shortly after noon and that at the preliminary hearing she testified 'it was night.' Taken out of context that statement might appear to support defendant's contention that there is a discrepancy in her testimony, but read with her other testimony at the preliminary hearing it is obvious she meant her room was darkened because the windows were covered. We conclude that the denial of the transcript was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant contends next that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to call the complainant as the court's witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification. He argues, without pointing out any specific instance, that the ruling deprived him of the opportunity to impeach her with her prior statements. The one specific reference in the argument is to a police report which obviously could not be used to impeach the complainant. Under the circumstances shown in the record we cannot say that in denying the request the court abused its discretion.

Defendant contends next that the trial court erred in unduly limiting his cross-examination of a police officer witness at the hearing to suppress. The record shows that although the court sustained the People's objection to a question, the information was elicited in response to another question propounded very shortly thereafter. Defendant has not demonstrated, nor do we perceive, in what manner the ruling complained of was prejudicial.

The defendant complains of the trial court's refusal to order the court reporter, during cross-examination of the complainant at the trial, to read back parts of her testimony on direct examination. He argues that the prior answers were proper impeachment, and the court's ruling was error. Defendant has confused allegedly contradictory testimony at the trial with inconsistent prior statements, which, not having been heard by the trier of fact, may be shown for purposes of impeachment. We find no authority to support defendant's contention, and the trial court did not err in its ruling. The record also shows that although he did not consider it necessary to do so, the trial court, at the close of the People's case, recalled the complainant and permitted defendant to interrogate her and show that there was a discrepancy in her testimony regarding the selection of the photographs from which the identification was made. Assuming, Arguendo, that the ruling of which defendant complains was error (and we hold it was not), under the circumstances shown it was rendered harmless.

Defendant contends that he was deprived of his sixth amendment right to confront the witness. This argument is based on the alleged refusal of the People to furnish defendant with the complainant's correct address. He argues that failure to furnish him with her address in California where she testified she was living at the time of trial deprived him of his right 'to investigate her very transient existence during this time in order to investigate her reputation and any other strange activities which might be admissible for the purpose of affecting her credibility.' The record shows that defendant was given the only two addresses at which she lived in Chicago and that the court took great pains to assure her availability for interview by defense counsel. She testified she had lived in California for only six days and...