People v. Moore

Citation294 Ill.App.3d 410,689 N.E.2d 1181
Decision Date13 January 1998
Docket NumberNo. 2-95-0967,2-95-0967
Parties, 228 Ill.Dec. 760 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shung A. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

G. Joseph Weller (Court-appointed), Deputy Defender, and Paul Alexander Rogers (Court-appointed), Offices of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, Phyllis J. Perko (Court-appointed), Law Offices of Harlovic & Perko, West Dundee, for Shung A. Moore.

Paul A. Logli, Winnebago County State's Attorney, Rockford, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, Michael A. Kreloff, Northfield, for the People.

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Shung Moore, appeals his conviction of possession with intent to deliver 1 to 15 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 1996)) and criminal fortification of a residence (720 ILCS 5/19-5 (West 1996)). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and erred in committing multiple instances of plain error. Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of 1 to 15 grams of cocaine. We affirm.

Through various witnesses, the State presented testimony that defendant was operating a crack house at 706 1/2 North Winnebago Street, Rockford, during early 1995. Arlene Lighthart, who lived in this apartment with her boyfriend and two children, testified that she had known defendant for several years. She permitted defendant to use the apartment to sell crack cocaine for a period of four weeks during January and February. Defendant paid Lighthart $400 per week for the use of the apartment, and the continual sale of narcotics from the apartment earned him approximately $3,000 per day. Defendant then asked to use the apartment for an additional week because his other locations had been recently raided by the police.

Lighthart testified that defendant prepared the apartment for the sale of crack cocaine. He fitted the front door of the apartment with brackets that would allow it to be barricaded from the inside with three 2 by 4s. The back door was also barricaded. A latch was attached to the outside of the front door for a padlock. A deadbolt was removed from the front door to allow the exchange of drugs and money through the hole. It was explained that this preparation was to prevent buyers from entering the apartment, sellers from leaving the apartment, and as a way of slowing a police raid long enough for the crack cocaine to be destroyed.

On February 13, 1995, defendant allegedly began to use a new seller at the property. Clarence Richardson, who was 16 years old on that date, testified that he had worked for defendant packaging crack cocaine for approximately one month. Defendant approached him about selling the crack and Richardson agreed. On February 13, defendant drove Richardson to the Winnebago Street apartment in his red Camaro. Defendant then gave him a "500 pack" of crack cocaine and gave him some basic instructions on how to sell the drugs.

Lighthart testified that defendant drove her, her boyfriend, and her children from the apartment. He took them to a hotel because Lighthart had complained of the number of people frequenting the home and the occasional police car that would drive past.

Members of the Rockford police department and the Winnebago County sheriff's metro narcotics unit observed the apartment for several hours on February 13. Two police informants had let the police know that a crack house was being operated at the location and that the operator of the house drove a red Camaro or Firebird with a black bra. The informants stated that buyers would go to the front door of the apartment through an inner staircase. The door would be padlocked from the outside and barricaded from within. A buyer would knock on the door, place money through a hole in the door, and receive crack cocaine in return. A controlled buy was made from the apartment in the early afternoon and police obtained a search warrant.

The officers observing the apartment noticed a red Camaro in front of the apartment on several occasions. They processed the license plate number and discovered that the car was registered to defendant. The officers were familiar with defendant. They saw him drive a man and a woman away from the apartment. Defendant later returned, honked the horn, and gave Richardson a brown paper bag. The police raid of the apartment began at approximately 3 p.m. Officers saw defendant driving away from the apartment and detained him. Several officers approached the vehicle with guns drawn. Defendant turned the car off, threw the keys to the floorboard, and exited the car. Officers conducted a quick "pat down" and determined that defendant did not possess any weapons.

Meanwhile, the rest of the officers executed the search warrant on the apartment. They knocked on the door and loudly announced their presence and that they had a search warrant. Officers testified that they heard running from behind the door and used a battering ram to break through the barricade. Once through the door, the officers discovered Richardson alone in the apartment.

A plastic bag on a couch in the apartment contained 15 smaller baggies with suspected cocaine. Richardson's coat contained another bag with 41 baggies of suspected cocaine. Richardson had $193 in his pocket, another $170 was found on the couch, and an insurance check in the amount of $17 and addressed to defendant was found in the living room. The police also discovered several padlocks inside the apartment.

After defendant had been detained for approximately five minutes, an officer left the apartment and informed the officers with defendant of the discoveries in the apartment. The officers conducted a more thorough search of defendant and found a padlock key that was later matched to one of the padlocks found in the apartment. A narcotics dog was used to conduct a canine sniff test of defendant's automobile. The dog alerted the handler to the driver's door seam and inside behind the front passenger seat. The officer testified at trial to the dog's actions and explained that, although no drugs were found in the car, the dog may have detected residual odors from narcotics.

Defendant and Richardson were transported in a van to the police station. One of the officers present in the van testified that defendant instructed Richardson to "do the right thing" and accept blame for the crime because he was a juvenile and would not be harshly punished.

Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence collected from his person and from his automobile. Specifically, defendant wished to suppress the keys on his person, as well as two other sets of padlock keys, which also matched padlocks found in the apartment, and the insurance check, which defendant claimed was in his vehicle. A hearing was held on the motion, and the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

The jury trial began on June 20, 1995. The State presented the testimony of many of the officers involved in the search of the apartment and the arrest of defendant. A police chemist testified that she examined 23 of the samples found during the search. These samples had a combined weight of 5.2 grams and each tested positive for the presence of cocaine. The remaining samples were not tested. Defendant did not present any evidence at trial.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges of the indictment. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 14 and 5 years. Defendant timely appeals.

On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless that ruling is manifestly erroneous. People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 181, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 (1996). A police officer may approach an individual to investigate possible criminal behavior even when there is not sufficient probable cause to make an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). To justify stopping an individual, the officer must be able to point to "specific, articulable facts which, when taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." People v. Schacht, 233 Ill.App.3d 271, 275, 174 Ill.Dec. 497, 599 N.E.2d 43 (1992). "An objective standard is used in determining whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a stop was necessary to investigate the possibility of criminal activity." People v. Walters, 256 Ill.App.3d 231, 234, 194 Ill.Dec. 638, 627 N.E.2d 1280 (1994). The purpose of such a stop is to verify information or determine whether criminal activity has occurred. Schacht, 233 Ill.App.3d at 275, 174 Ill.Dec. 497, 599 N.E.2d 43. An investigatory stop is not transformed into an arrest by the officers using force or displaying their firearms to detain the individual. People v. Washington, 205 Ill.App.3d 452, 456, 150 Ill.Dec. 630, 563 N.E.2d 517 (1990). After all, "[i]t would be paradoxical to give police the authority to detain pursuant to an investigatory stop yet deny them the use of force that may be necessary to effectuate the detention." People v. Starks, 190 Ill.App.3d 503, 509, 137 Ill.Dec. 447, 546 N.E.2d 71 (1989).

The record reflects many articulable facts from which the officers could have determined that defendant was involved in criminal activity. Two informants had told officers that cocaine was being sold from the apartment and that it was being delivered by a man in a red Camaro or Firebird with a black bra. Defendant was seen in front of the apartment on several occasions in a red Camaro with a black bra. On...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • People v. Montano
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 30 Marzo 2017
    ...State responds that the evidence is more like the narcotics-detector-dog evidence deemed admissible in People v. Moore , 294 Ill.App.3d 410, 228 Ill.Dec. 760, 689 N.E.2d 1181 (1998), where the dog alerted to the defendant's car even though no drugs were subsequently found in it. This case p......
  • People v. Lacy
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 10 Febrero 2011
    ...to corroborate other trial testimony. See, e.g., Holmes, 397 Ill.App.3d at 745, 337 Ill.Dec. 602, 922 N.E.2d 1179; People v. Moore, 294 Ill.App.3d 410, 416, 228 Ill.Dec. 760, 689 N.E.2d 1181 (1998). We note that defendant is not arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the K–9 tracki......
  • People v. Richmond, 1-01-1656.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 28 Mayo 2003
    ......See, e.g., People v. Ramos, 318 Ill.App.3d 181, 188, 252 Ill.Dec. 225, 742 N.E.2d 763 (2000) ; People v. Moore, 294 Ill.App.3d 410, 417, 228 Ill.Dec. 760, 689 N.E.2d 1181 (1998) ; People v. Garner, 248 Ill.App.3d 985, 992, 188 Ill.Dec. 183, 618 N.E.2d 753 (1993) . We do not read those cases as holding the defendant must take the stand to deny making the statement. .         We believe defense ......
  • People v. Carroccia
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 18 Octubre 2004
    ......See Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972) ; Malone, 244 Pa.Super. at 68, 366 A.2d at 588 ; Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash.App. 334, 344, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971) . Defendant reasons that because an outright acquittal proves nothing — not even that the defendant "did the act" — one who has been acquitted should be restored to the position he enjoyed before his arrest unless the State shows compelling ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT