People v. Morales

Decision Date03 July 1975
Docket NumberCr. 6903
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Louis Joseph MORALES, Defendant and Appellant.

Appellate Defenders, Inc., by Carolyn Eckmann, Covina and Elaine A. Alexander, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jeffrey A. Joseph and Cecilia H. Johnson, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

CAUGHLIN, * Associate Justice.

Defendant was convicted of the offense of robbery in the first degree, in the commission of which he used a firearm. Judgment of imprisonment was pronounced. He appeals, contending the court erred in refusing to institute proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 for commitment and treatment as a narcotic addict because it applied an erroneous standard in determining defendant's eligibility for treatment.

On April 29, 1974, the date set for hearing an application for pronouncement of judgment, several alternative dispositions were considered by the court, defense counsel, the district attorney and the probation officer. Included was a proposed commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for treatment as a narcotic addict. The expressed belief defendant was a heroin addict and needed treatment was not denied. The issue was where he should get the treatment, i.e., whether while on probation, at CRC, a California Youth Authority facility or in prison. The reasons for and against placement in one of these facilities were subjects of a conglomerate consideration culminating in an order to place defendant temporarily in a diagnostic facility of the Department of Corrections pursuant to and for the purposes prescribed by Penal Code section 1203.3 The court expressed concern about and requested the diagnostic facility determine the 'violent tendencies' of the defendant, saying: 'I want to know whether or not aside from any addiction problems there is in his mental makeup violent propensities'. The proceedings were continued and, after report from the diagnostic facilities, came on for further hearing on July 29, 1974. The various placements considered on April 29 again were considered at length, culminating in the sentence to prison.

In both hearings the court expressed its belief the defendant should not be committed to CRC because of his violent tendencies. At the April 29 hearing the court said, among other things: the problem with CRC is that he is treated there as an addict; he should have treatment; but he 'has been convicted of an armed robbery, and he has had in his past experience similar incidents'; under his commitment to CRC when he has recovered from his addiction he will be placed on outpatient status (see Welf. & Inst.Code § 3151), which the court referred to as probation; he 'will then be set upon the community again. I am very fearful that with the background of this man and with his sophistication in weapons apparently, someone is going to suffer. . . . I consider him to be rather dangerous'. In the July 29 hearing the court reiterated its belief defendant was a dangerous person with 'a propensity to the type of offense which finally caught up to him', iE., armed robbery.

The diagnostic study included a report by the associate superintendent of the facility; a social evaluation by a correctional counselor; a psychiatric evaluation by the chief psychiatrist; and a recommendation for commitment to the Department of Corrections. Without reviewing these reports and those of the probation officer in detail, suffice it to refer to the report of the chief psychiatrist that defendant:

'. . . is grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and unable to feel guilt or learn from experience. He is angry, resentful, and undercontrolled to the extent that he presents a substantial danger to the community. His lack of control was demonstrated during the present evaluation, where his hostility was so intense that the expression of it was more important than creating a favorable impression of himself. He has revealed his contempt for permissive programs and has failed to benefit from previous referrals to the Youth Authority.'

Proceedings to commit defendant to CRC could have been instituted only pursuant to the authority vested in the court by Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051. However, section 3052 of that code unambiguously provides 'Section . . . 3051 shall not apply to persons convicted of . . . robbery . . ..' On the other hand, section 3051 provides: 'In unusual cases, wherein the interest of justice would best be served, the judge may . . . order commitment (to CRC) notwithstanding Section 3052.'

Defendant contends the trial judge in the criminal case in which he was convicted was required to institute proceedings for commitment to CRC under section 3051 when it appeared he was an addict, even though he had been convicted of robbery; the judge in the criminal proceedings was not authorized to determine the issue whether the exclusionary provisions of section 3052 or the exception thereto provided by section 3051 should apply; and only the judge hearing the proceedings for commitment to CRC was authorized to determine whether the exception applied, i.e., whether the case was unusual and the interest of justice would best be served by ordering the commitment to CRC notwithstanding section 3052.

The contention is without merit. Fundamental rules of statutory construction require related sections of a statute be considered as a whole (People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 642, 150 P.2d 888,) and interpreted to avoid an absurd result (Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629, 165 P.2d 889). Thus construed, sections 3051 and 3052 provide the criminal proceedings in which a defendant has been convicted of robbery should not be suspended and civil proceedings to effect his commitment to CRC should not be instituted unless the judge in the criminal proceedings determines the case is unusual and the...

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4 cases
  • People v. Medina
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 1978
    ...543, 549-550, 137 Cal.Rptr. 675; People v. Herron (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 643, 646-647, 133 Cal.Rptr. 287; People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 732, 738, 122 Cal.Rptr. 804; People v. Calloway (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 905, 908-909, 112 Cal.Rptr. 745; see also People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3......
  • People v. Hernandez
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 1979
    ...is ineligible for commitment as a narcotic addict; eligibility can be determined only by the criminal court. (People v. Morales, 49 Cal.App.3d 732, 736-737, 122 Cal.Rptr. 804; People v. Harris, 274 Cal.App.2d 826, 837, 79 Cal.Rptr. 352; People v. Strickland, 243 Cal.App.2d 196, 199, 52 Cal.......
  • People v. Phillips
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • December 23, 1977
    ...confusion of this nature is not prejudicial. (People v. Calloway, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 905, 909, 112 Cal.Rptr. 745; People v. Morales, 49 Cal.App.3d 732, 738; People v. Herron, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d 643, 646-647, 133 Cal.Rptr. 287.) The only case which has come to our attention in which a se......
  • People v. Romero
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 29, 1977
    ...the inclusion of such information in a probation report is obvious.' We are unable to conclude as did the court in People v. Morales, 49 Cal.App.3d 732, 738, 122 Cal.Rptr. 804, that the sentencing judge did not rely on that portion of the probation report which recited 'police contacts.' In......

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