People v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 27 May 1977 |
| Citation | 395 N.Y.S.2d 363,90 Misc.2d 416 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. James Thomas MORGAN, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
As the consequence of a traffic accident, the defendant was arrested on November 1, 1975, for Driving While Intoxicated and charged in an information with violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1192, subdivision 3, a misdemeanor.
When it became apparent that the defendant has been previously convicted of the same crime, the District Attorney requested and was granted adjournments of the scheduled trial so that the elevated charge could be presented to the Grand Jury. The People did not promptly avail themselves of the opportunities so provided in April and May and on May 27, 1976, the Court, upon oral motion of the defendant, and over the objection of the People, dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.
Thereafter and on June 18, 1976, the defendant was indicted for the crime of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a Felony.
The defendant now moves to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that there are jurisdictional and legal impediments to a conviction for that crime (C.P.L. § 210.20(1)(h)).
In essence, the defendant claims that the provisions of C.P.L. § 170.20(2) precluded action by the Grand Jury and that the prior dismissal in the District Court is conclusive upon the parties. He also argues that a dismissal for failure to prosecute is tantamount to the granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to provide the defendant with a speedy trial (C.P.L. § 30.30) and in the absence of a timely appeal, the order is final and binding.
C.P.L. § 170.20 provides that where an accusatory instrument is pending before a local criminal court, the district attorney may apply for an adjournment of the proceedings on the ground that he intends to present the charge in question to a grand jury. In such a case, the local criminal court must adjourn the proceedings to a date which affords the District Attorney a reasonable opportunity to present the case to the Grand Jury. The Court may grant such further adjournments for that purpose as are reasonable under the circumstances.
The section then provides that:
"(b) If the misdemeanor charge is not presented to a grand jury within the designated period, the proceedings in the local criminal court must continue." (emphasis supplied)
"In this State the Grand Jury derives its power from the Constitution and acts of the Legislature . . . Traditionally, our courts have afforded the Grand Jury the widest possible latitude in the exercise of these powers and insisted that in the absence of a clear constitutional or legislative expression they may not be curtailed." (People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265, 148 N.E.2d 400.)
A statute which forbids a Grand Jury from indicting must be worded clearly. People v. Ryback, 3 N.Y.2d 467, 168 N.Y.S.2d 945, 146 N.E.2d 680.
The statutory language of C.P.L. § 170.20 and § 170.25 recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the lower criminal courts and the superior court with respect to misdemeanor charges and provide for the orderly transfer of power to the superior court upon timely application by the defendant or by the District Attorney. There is no suggestion in these sections that the Grand Jury is barred from consideration of felony charges arising from the same transactional events. The limitations referred only to misdemeanor charges and not to the elevated crime a felony. Absent is clear language showing that the legislature intended by these sections to divest the Grand Jury of the power to indict for a felony.
Nor is Grand Jury action barred by double jeopardy or collateral estoppel. The defendant has never been put into jeopardy by trial and no trial issue involved in the case had been adjudicated at the time of the presentation to the Grand Jury.
I conclude, therefore, that there was no jurisdictional or legal...
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